214 HUNTER'S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION. and civil officers were forbidden to surrender any fugitive to the claimant; the colonization of colored persons was authorized, as was the employment of negroes as soldiers; and the President was granted power to amnesty the Confederates by proclamation and to make exceptions from a general pardon.* The bill as finally passed was not so stringent in its provisions as the bill originally proposed; but even in this altered form it was more acceptable to the radicals than the measure proposed by the conservative Republicans and the Unionists of the border States. Nevertheless, after the conference, the Confiscation Act was passed by the House on July 11 and by the Senate the next day. Lincoln originally intended to veto this bill, and had already prepared his message to Congress to that effect, but Congress added an explanatory joint resolution which removed Lincoln's main objection to the bill itself, and therefore he allowed it to become law.t The radical Republicans now became more censorious toward the President. First, they found fault with him because he was not conducting the war with vigor; second, because he did not remove General McClellan from command; third, be *For Lincoln's note appended to his approval of this act, see Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vi., pp. 85-87. See also Appleton's Annual Encyclopædia for 1862, p. 274; McPherson, History of the Rebellion, p. 197. Rhodes, United States, vol. iv., pp. 60-64. cause he did not strike at slavery. Many seemed to think that Congress was acting under duress and must learn the "royal pleasure" before an act could be passed. Nevertheless Lincoln was thinking about slavery as earnestly as any of the radicals,† and was soon able to take action with regard to it. On March 31 General David Hunter had taken command of the Department of the South, comprising the States of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. On May 9 he issued an order from Hilton Head in which, after asserting that the Department of the South was under martial law, he said: "Slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible. The per sons in these three States, Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declared forever free." Public atten tion was at once aroused. Hunter's course was applauded by some and denounced by others. The first knowledge of Hunter's proclamation came to Lincoln through the newspapers about the middle of May. Chase urged the President to let the order stand, but Lincoln said that no commanding general should do "such a thing upon my responsibility without * See Woods' speech in Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2d session, p. 3375 et seq. Harris, The Political Conflict in America, pp. 264-265. Official Records, vol. xiv., p. 341; Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vi., p. 91; Williams, The Negro Race in America, vol. ii., p. 257; Robert C. Schenck, Major-General David Hunter. LINCOLN'S COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION SCHEME. consulting me.' Accordingly on May 19 he issued a proclamation declaring Hunter's order void and appealing to the people of the border slave States to agree upon some plan of gradual abolishment of slavery and to accept the compensation for their slaves proffered them by the President and Congress. This appeal, however, did not convince those to whom it was addressed; but it showed that Lincoln was desirous of ridding the Nation of slavery in a constitutional way. The proclamation received general approval throughout the country. Accordingly at a conference on July 12 Lincoln requested the Republicans of the border slave States (Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri) to adopt his policy, accept compensation for their slaves, and press the subject upon the attention of their constituency. They replied that this policy seemed to interfere with the rights of the States; that it was a question whether Congress had the constitutional power to make an appropriation for such a purpose; that the country could not bear the expense involved; and that Congress was not sincere in making such an offer. * Warden, Life of Chase, p. 433. Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vi., pp. 91-92; Lincoln's Complete Works, vol. ii., p. 156. See also Rhodes, United States, vol. iv., pp. 65-66; Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. vi., pp. 94-95; Williams, The Negro Race in America, vol. ii., pp. 258-259. For his second appeal to them, see Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. vi., pp. 109-111. || McPherson, History of the Rebellion, p. 215; Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. vi., pp. 111-112; Rhodes, United States, vol. iv., p. 68. 215 Still Lincoln did not abandon hope, and on July 13 discussed the subject with Seward and Welles. The reverses suffered by the Union army compelled the conviction that a new policy must be adopted. Since the slaves were raising the food for the Confederate army and serving as teamsters and laborers on intrenchments, Lincoln came to the conclusion that it was absolutely essential for the salvation of the Nation that the slaves be freed.* Accordingly, on July 14, Lincoln asked the Senate and the House to pass a bill placing at his disposal a certain sum of 6 per cent. interestbearing bonds of the United States to be used by him in paying for slaves in any State that lawfully abolished slavery within its territory. This message was not well received in the Senate, and in the House action was postponed until the day before adjournment, when (on July 16) a bill was introduced providing for an issue of bonds amounting to $180,000,000 to be used to compensate loyal slave owners in the border States and Tennessee when these States lawfully abolished slavery, and for an appropriation of $20,000,000 to be expended in colonizing free negroes. However, as Congress was to adjourn the next day, the bill was not considered.‡ See the diary of Secretary Welles quoted in Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. vi., pp. 121-123. 84. Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vi., p. Rhodes, United States, vol. iv., pp. 70-71. See also Congressional Globe, p. 3394. 216 EMANCIPATION POSTPONED; LINCOLN'S POLICY. Five days after Congress adjourned (July 22), Lincoln read to his Cabinet an emancipation proclamation which he proposed to issue, stating that on January 1, 1863, all slaves in States wherein the constitutional authority of the United States was not recognized should be thenceforward and forever free.* Most of the Cabinet members gave this policy unqualified support. Seward, however, questioned the expediency of issuing the proclamation at this time, stating that the depression of the public mind was so great that he feared the effect of so important a step. He suggested that its promulgation be postponed until Lincoln could give it to the country supported by a great military victory. Lincoln followed Seward's advice, and postponed the matter.† When Lincoln made this decision all indications afforded a reasonable hope that the delay would be short. Disaster, however, hung upon the Union arms and, moreover, the military situation gave a new and serious character to the political conditions. The radicals and conservatives accused each other with being the cause of failure and clamored for a change of policy. While Lincoln had determined upon his course, circumstances precluded his divulging it, and he was obliged to maintain the appearance of indecision, thus only bringing Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, pp. 125–126. See Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. vi., pp. 128-130, quoting F. B. Carpenter, Six Months in the White House, pp. 20–22. upon himself a greater flood of importunities. On August 20 Greeley wrote and printed in the New York Tribune a long open letter to Lincoln (known as "The Prayer of Twenty Millions"), accusing him of failing to execute the Confiscation Act and of being unduly influenced by certain "fossil politicians" from the border'slave States, and complaining that a large proportion of the army officers were evincing more solicitude to uphold slavery than to put down the rebellion. On August 22 Lincoln replied that his policy was as follows: * "I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe whatever I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of of Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. vi.. pp. 151-152; Rhodes, United States, vol. iv., pp. 72-73; Greeley, The American conflict, vol. ii., p. 249; Williams, The Negro Race in America, vol. ii., p. 253. LEE'S INVASION OF MARYLAND: SOUTH MOUNTAIN: ANTIETAM: FREDERICKSBURG. Lee's failure to secure aid in Maryland — Beginning of the pursuit by McClellan Jackson's capture of Harper's Ferry The battle of South Mountain (Crampton's, Turner's and Fox's Gaps)- Lee's retreat to the Antietam The battle of Sharpsburg or Antietam — Lee's retreat into Virginia — The engagement at Shepherdstown Ford - Stuart's raid into Pennsylvania — The removal of McClellan - Defeat of Burnside at Fredericksburg - The "Mud. March "— The removal of Burnside from command. Lee's success in routing Pope seems to have convinced the Confederate authorities that the present was a propitious time to invade Maryland. Lee wrote that he could not afford to be idle, since his soldiers were ragged and destitute, the army was deficient in material of war, and moreover the weakened and demoralized condition of the Union army invited attack.t Accordingly, on September 3, Lee put his troops in motion and on reaching Dranesville informed Davis of his intention of invading Maryland. On September 4, while at Leesburg, he Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. vi., pp. 152-153; Lincoln's Complete Works, vol. ii., p. 227; Williams, The Negro Race in America, vol. ii., pp. 254–255. † F. W. Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg, p. 15. informed Davis that he intended to begin the march unless Davis should signify his disapprobation, but before his dispatch could have reached Richmond the Army of Northern Virginia had crossed the Potomac and the van led by Jackson had reached Frederick City (on the 6th).* Anxious to conciliate and give the people of Maryland "an opportunity of liberating themselves " Lee on September 8 is *It was Jackson's ride through the streets of Frederick City that gave occasion to Whittier to invent the story of Barbara Frietchie. Jackson was not a man who would give an order to fire at the window of a private house merely because he saw there "the old flag" and it is quite impossible that Barbara's remark, 'Spare your country's flag" could have brought a "blush of shame over Jackson's face. See Rhodes, United States, vol. iv., pp. 140-141: Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 618-619. † Official Records, vol. xix., pt. ii., p. 593. 218 INDIFFERENCE OF MARYLANDERS; MCCLELLAN'S PURSUIT. sued an address to the people of Maryland appealing to them to throw off tyranny, to regain their rights in connection with their Southern brethren, and to secure by his aid their ancient freedom of thought and speech.* Lee's invitations, however, were treated with indifference; the people gave no sign of rising.† As a whole, the State was loyal and adhered to the Union from motives of principle more than those of interest. The most serious obstacle with which Lee had to contend was the difficulty in securing subsistence. He proposed to pay for all the supplies taken, but his only medium of exchange was Confederate currency or certificates of indebtedness, and these the Marylanders refused to take. Moreover, caring little for the custom offered them by the officers and soldiers, the Frederick people closed their shops. Learning that he could not subsist on the country, Lee decided to open a line of communication through the Shenandoah Valley. Here again Lee met with an obstacle, for Harper's Ferry, which commanded the valley, was held by a Union garrison. Lee expected the Union troops to evacuate upon his approach, and this would have been done had McClellan's advice been taken.|| But Halleck refused to abandon the place, and thus Lee was compelled to Official Records, vol. xix., pt. ii., 601; Confederate Military History, vol. ii., pp. 89–90. Official Records, p. 596. Ibid, p. 506 et seq. Ibid, vol. xix., pt. i., pp. 43, 145; Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg, pp. 18-19. divide his army, sending Jackson into Virginia to capture Harper's Ferry while he and Longstreet proceeded toward Hagerstown. McClellan arranged to follow Lee and on September 5 started his troops from Washington. On September 10 he ordered a general advance, but almost immediately relapsed into his old habit of requesting reinforcements. On the 11th he wrote to Halleck, specifying the troops that he wished and urging that it would be better to weaken the defences about Washington to strengthen his army than to risk the ruin and disaster "which would follow a signal defeat of this army."‡ Accordingly the President ordered Porter's corps to join McClellan and on September 12 a portion of the Union right wing entered Frederick City amid the joyful acclaim of its inhabitants.|| At this juncture fortune favored McClellan. On the 13th one of his officers found Lee's special order of the 9th containing his entire plan of campaign.§ By this he learned that the enemy was before him, only a day's march away, *Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. vi., pp. 132-133; Rhodes, United States, vol. iv., pp. 142-143. 571. Official Records, vol. xix., p. 234. Regarding this see McClellan's Own Story, p. § Rhodes, United States, vol. iv., p. 145. See also Gen. Nelson A. Miles, My Recollections of Antietam, in Cosmopolitan Magazine, vol. liii., no. 5, p. 582 (October, 1912). A copy of the order is in Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg, pp. 20-21. See also Confederate Military History, vol. iv., pp. 107-108. |