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killed, 16,261 wounded and 875 captured or missing.*

McClellan was urged to retreat no farther, but during the night he abandoned Malvern Hill, and by morning of July 2 his head of column was at Harrison's Landing. The Confederates did not come up to his position until July 4, but deeming it unwise to make any attack, Lee on the 8th marched the whole body of his army back to the vicinity of Richmond, thus ending the Peninsula Campaign. During the whole campaign the Union loss was 16,600 killed and wounded and 7,500 captured or missing. The Confederate loss was 27,000 killed and wounded and 2,000 captured or missing. The failure of the campaign

* Rhodes, United States, vol. iv., p. 48. Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., gives the Union loss the same, but makes the Confederate loss 3,286 killed, 15,909 wounded, and 940 captured or missing.

For further details in addition to the works already mentioned see J. B. Barnard, The Peninsula Campaign; Powell, History of the 5th Army Corps; Comte de Paris, History of the

was chiefly due to McClellan, who was completely unnerved by his absurd over-estimate of the enemy and perhaps also by the fact that he was persistently absent when battles were being fought. The campaign showed that while he was a good organizer he lacked aggressive generalship.* The elaborate preparations of the Union forces had come to naught, the siege of Richmond had fallen through, and the Union troops had been driven back 20 miles. All conditions united to brighten the Southern hopes.†

Civil War, vol. ii.; Walker, History of the Second Army Corps; and the biographies of the various generals engaged.

* See Rhodes, United States, vol. iv., p. 49 et seq. On the other hand, there was a tendency on the Confederate side of blaming those in command for the escape of the Union army. After reflection, however, the Southerners began to realize the stupendous task confronting their generals and to comprehend how great reason they had for rejoicing.

For diverse opinions regarding the campaign, both from the Confederate and Union points of view, see Swinton, Army of the Potomac, p. 165; Pollard, Second Year of the War, pp. 73-76; Ropes, Story of the Civil War, pt. i., p. 225; Webb, The Peninsula, pp. 168-190.

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At Harrison's Landing McClellan was in a place of comparative security, but he continued to ask for reinforcements. On July 1 he telegraphed: "I need 50,000 men and with them I will retrieve our for tunes."'*

Stanton answered immediately that 5,000 of McDowell's corps and 25,000 of Halleck's had been dispatched. On July 1 Lincoln telegraphed that it was impossible to reinforce McClellan in the present emergency, for even if 1,000,000 men were at his disposal they could not be sent to him in time; hence he must maintain his ground if he could, "but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe." On July 2 Lincoln said that McClellan's request for 50,000 men was absurd, and further wrote:

"If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material and personal, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000 which I accept."

McClellan's retreat and the fact that he attributed his disasters to lack of men did not diminish Lincoln's confidence in him. On July 3 he wrote. to McClellan, "I am satisfied that yourself, officers and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it."* On the same day, however, McClellan increased his demand for reinforcements from 50,000 to 100,000,† which demand did not alter the kindly feeling of the President and Secretary of War, who immediately ordered forward reinforcements from A. E. Burnside, from Washington, and from David E. Hunter, and begged Halleck to send forward 10,000 infantry.‡ Nothing could have been warmer than Stanton's expressions of confidence and assurances of support. Nevertheless, on July 20, McClellan wrote that he had no faith in the Administration, and was tired of serving fools. He criticised the officials at Washington as a trifling set and as dolts with

* Official Records, vol. xi., pt., pt. iii., p. 291. Ibid, p. 292.

Ibid, pp. 291, 294, 298.

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out common politeness, who wished his army to be destroyed and were bent on his own destruction.* Much disturbed by the conflicting reports regarding conditions in the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln visited Harrison's Landing on July 8. While there he conferred freely with McClellan and the more prominent officers in command. McClellan was the only one who believed the enemy to be threatening the army, while all the others thought Lee had retired for the purpose of making an attack on Washington or some other important place. Two generals favored the withdrawal of the army from the James River, while the rest opposed it. In his perplexity as to the next movement, Lincoln felt the necessity of better military advisers than those at Washington. On July 26 General John Pope had been appointed to the command of the Army of Virginia, consisting of the corps of Frémont, Banks, and McDowell. Hence Lincoln turned to Halleck, the commander in the West, who was generally considered an authority on the art of war and had written books on military tactics, on July 2 requesting him to come to Washington for consultation. Nine days later Lincoln appointed him general-in-chief of the forces of the United States.† Pope assumed command of the army on the 23d, and the next day started for McClellan's camp, where he arrived on the 25th.

*McClellan's Own Story (July 31, August 2, 10, 14).

Official Records, vol. xi., pt. iii., pp. 286, 314.

Meanwhile the opposition to McClellan had grown in virulence. Pope made no attempt to conceal his belief in the incompetency of McClellan and the latter's indisposition to active movements.* Halleck, too, unreservedly condemned McClellan's late military operations, but seemed to believe that the latter would do very well under orders from himself.* On July 15 Burnside wrote to McClellan that he had lots of enemies. Rumors of McClellan's disloyalty were evidently in the air, for Chase says: "I said that I did not regard General McClellan as loyal to the Administration, although I did not question his general loyalty to the country," showing that this question had been under discussion in the Cabinet. It was about this time that Stanton and Chase proposed to Lincoln that Pope be sent to the James and that Mitchell be given the command of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln would not do this; but owing to the fact that Pope had stated that cordial coöperation from McClellan could not be expected, he offered the command of the Army of the Potomac to Burnside, who promptly declined it. Accordingly, as we have stated, Halleck went to McClellan's headquarters to arrange for future action. McClellan informed Halleck that he had now planned to cross the James, attack Petersburg, and cut communication between Richmond and the States far* Schuckers, Life of Chase, p. 448. McClellan's Own Story, p. 472.

‡ Warden, Life of Chase, p. 440. Schuckers, Life of Chase, pp. 447-448.

ther south. But Halleck considered this move impracticable, talked McClellan out of it, and urged him to form a junction with Pope's army, unless with a reinforcement of 20,000 men he could attack Richmond with the probability of success. McClellan thought 20,000 men insufficient and that 30,000 additional troops would be needed, but later said that he was willing to try with the number promised by the President.* Upon Halleck's return to Washington a shower of telegrams came from McClellan urging the dispatch of reinforcements. On July 30 he wrote: "Should it be determined to withdraw it I shall look upon our cause as lost and the demoralization of the army certain." most important officers under him, however, counseled immediate with

The

drawal and Halleck resolved upon this

"It

course, on July 30 directing McClellan to send away his sick as soon as possible, in order that he might be able to move in any direction.‡ On August 3 Halleck telegraphed McClellan, is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this." In reply on August 4 McClellan said:

"Your telegram has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Aquia Creek will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it

*

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will be a fatal blow. Here directly in front of this army is the heart of this rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike a blow which will determine the fate of the nation. I do now what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this order be rescinded."*

At last weary of argument, Halleck replied, "The order of the withdrawal * will not be rescinded

and you will be expected to execute it with all possible promptness." On the 6th, therefore, McClellan expressed his readiness to obey "as soon as circumstances will permit; my artillery is none too numerous now." Nevertheless McClellan determined to strike a blow before departing. He sent General Hooker to Malvern Hill, and there, after a sharp skirmish, the Confederates were driven away. The next day (August 5) he was so elated at this success that he telegraphed Halleck: "This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond and only 1434 miles distant, and I feel confident that with reinforcements I could march this army there in five days," to which Halleck curtly rejoined, "I have no reinforcements to send you."‡ Furthermore, being satisfied that McClellan was not moving with sufficient promptness, he telegraphed him: "There must be no further delay in your movements. That which has occurred was entirely unexpected and must be satisfactorily explained."||

* Official Records, vol. xi., pt. iii., p. 81.

† Ibid, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 79.

Ibid, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 78; pt. iii.,
Ibid, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 86.

p. 359.

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It is evident that after August 4 McClellan's movements were prompt and that there was no unnecessary delay. On August 14, the day on which he made his final appeal to Halleck for permission to take the offensive, two of his corps marched toward Yorktown. On the 16th the last of the sick were sent off by water* and on the 17th McClellan telegraphed that he had left his camp at Harrison's Landing. Porter's troops sailed from Newport News on August 20, Heintzelman's from Yorktown on August 21, and Franklin's from Fortress Monroe on August 23. Sumner was delayed by lack of transports, but on August 27 reached Aquia Creek, which had also been the destination of the others. McClellan reported for orders at Aquia on August 24, and three days later, in response to a telegram from Halleck, went to Alexandria near Washington.

Meanwhile General Pope had begun his campaign. But at the very outset he made a tactless move when he issued an address to the officers and soldiers of the Army of Virginia, reflecting on the Army of the Potomac.t It was received with a storm of angry ridicule, and very seriously weakened Pope's hold upon his troops and the respect of the public. Moreover it rendered impossible any sincere sympathy and support from General Mc

* Official Records, vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 76-91; pt. iii., 378-379.

Clellan and those nearest him. On July 29 Pope had pretty well concentrated his army, which consisted of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and Sigel (Frémont having declined to serve), and numbered 43,000 men. Having threatened Gordonsville (an important railroad centre) he forced Lee to send Jackson from Richmond to oppose his advance, and left Washington on July 29 to take command of operations in the field. Generals Banks and Sigel were ordered to move to Culpeper Court House. Banks promptly obeyed his orders, reaching there shortly before midnight on August 8, but because of mistaking his roads Sigel did not arrive until the 9th. By that time Banks had gone forward to Cedar Mountain.*

On August 8 Crawford's brigade of Banks' corps marched from Culpeper Court House eight miles to Cedar Run to support George D. Bayard's cavalry brigade which was being slowly driven back by Stonewall Jackson, who, with three divisions of Lee's army, under A. P. Hill, C. S. Winder, and Ewell, was advancing from Gordonsville toward Culpeper. On the 9th Banks' entire corps at Little Washington was ordered to follow Samuel W. Crawford and Sigel was directed to send his troops from Sperryville to the same point. About noon Banks joined Crawford at Cedar Run and took position on level ground just beyond him, covering the road to

Ropes, The Army under Pope, p. 16 et seq.