300 prisoners, two guns, four caissons and 1,000 stand of small arms. The Confederates continued the retreat and, during the following week, were pursued to Woodstock and thence to Edenburg, about 20 miles beyond Strasburg. In this engagement Shields had a force of about 7,000 men, and lost 118 killed, 450 wounded and 22 missing. The Confederates considerably outnumbered the Union forces, and lost about 720 killed and wounded.*

Meanwhile, on March 8, having consented to McClellan's plan for a campaign on the peninsula, Lincoln issued general war order No. 2 dividing the army of the Potomac into four corps commanded, respectively, by Generals Irvin McDowell, E. V. Sumner, S. P. Heintzelman, and E. D. Keyes. Part of the forces under General James S. Wadsworth was left to defend Washington, while a 5th corps, commanded by General N. P. Banks, was to be formed of his and General Shields' divisions. † This order was followed by special war order No. 3 issued on March 11, relieving McClellan of the command of all military departments save that of the Potomac, the ostensible reason being that the general would be actively engaged in the field, though undoubt

* Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 283-284, 303309; Webb, The Peninsula, p. 89; Confederate Military History, vol. iii., pp. 218–222.

† Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vi., p. 110.

Ibid, p. 111; Official Records, vol. v., p. 54; Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. v., pp. 178– 179.

153

edly it represented the waning confidence of Lincoln and Congress in him.* By the same order General Halleck was placed in command of the Department of the Mississippi, and the Mountain Department (the region west of the Department of the Potomac) was placed under the command of Frémont. On March 13 McClellan and his corps of officers held a council of war at Fairfax Court House, where they decided in favor of the peninsula plan of campaign, provided the navy would silence the batteries on York River. Lincoln made no objection to this plan, but in a letter dated March 13 stipulated that a sufficient force should be left at Manassas Junction to prevent its reoccupation by the Confederates, and that Washington be left entirely secure.† McClellan planned to move in two columns, one on the right directly to Yorktown, and another along the James River westward of and beyond Yorktown to the vicinity of Williamsburg. Should the Confederate works at Yorktown and Williamsburg offer serious resistance, he designed to land General McDowell's first corps, reinforced if necessary, on the left bank of the York or on the Severn, and move it on Gloucester and West Point in order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might have on the peninsula and compel him to abandon his positions. During the latter part

* Rhodes, United States, vol. iii., p. 615. Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vi.,

p. 111.

154

of March troops were embarked for Fortress Monroe, and on the morning of April 2 General McClellan himself arrived to take command in person. According to his own report he had the next day, ready to move, about 58,000 men and 100 guns besides the division artillery.* On the 4th the movement began, Heintzelman's corps on Yorktown and that of Keyes on its left. Heavy rains had made the roads very bad, and although the Confederates had abandoned some points, yet when Keyes reached Lee's Mills he found the post too strong to be carried, as he had been directed, by assault. On the morning of the 6th Heintzelman arrived in front of Yorktown, but found that the Confederate forces there were too strong to be overcome. The Confederates under General J. B. Magruder held a line across the peninsula from the mouths of the Warwick River and Deep Creek on James River, to Yorktown on York River. A line about 12 miles in length was covered a great part of the distance by boggy and difficult swamps and quite well fortified by redoubts at the road crossings. McClellan estimated Magruder's force at from 15,000 to 20,000, but Magruder states that his force consisted of 11,000 men, of whom 6,000 were required for the fortifications at Yorktown and only 5,000 to hold the line across the peninsula. The ex

istence of this line was a surprise to McClellan who knew that Yorktown was fortified, but had no knowledge of the line extending from that place to the James River, and his movement on Yorktown was predicated on the belief that he could turn it by his left. It was a part of McClellan's plan also that McDowell's corps should turn Yorktown by the right, by landing at Gloucester Point north of York River. But two or three days' reconnoissances convinced McClellan that he could not break through Magruder's line, and he therefore resolved upon a regular siege. He was engaged in bringing up troops and guns preparatory to siege operations and was asking for heavy reinforcements and more siege guns when, on the 5th, he received from the adjutant-general of the army, at Lincoln's direction, an order detaching McDowell's corps of 33,400 from his command, under the plea that such a course was essential to the safety of Washington. McClellan protested against this, and urged that McCall's and Franklin's divisions of McDowell's corps should be sent him, and, a few days later, ordered Franklin's division to report to him, which it did on the 29th. Meanwhile, on the 9th, President Lincoln wrote McClellan urging him to strike a blow.*

Instead of piercing the Confederate lines by assault, however, McClellan *For the entire letter see Official Records, vol. xi., pt. i., p. 15. See also Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. v., pp. 362–364; Rhodes, United States, vol. iii., pp. 616-617.

doubts for artillery. On April 16 General W. F. Smith, with his division of Keyes' corps, was ordered by General McClellan to reconnoiter Cobb's position, stop his work, and, if necessary drive him from it. Brooks' Vermont brigade was thrown forward and, after an artillery fire of more than six hours (part of the time from 18 guns), four companies of the 3d Vermont crossed the stream and seized the rifle-pits of the 15th North Carolina, but were driven back with severe

VOL. VIII-11

carry the Confederate position by assault, and he therefore devoted his attention entirely to siege operations against Yorktown. Under the direction of General Fitz-John Porter, who was made director of the siege, J. G. Barnard, chief of engineers, and General W. F. Barry, chief of artillery,

*Official Records, vol. xi.; Webb, The Peninsula, pp. 64-65; McClellan's Own Story; Allan, History of the Army of Northern Virginia; Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. v., pp. 368370; Confederate Military History, vol. iv., pp.

46-48.

156

the operations were conducted elaborately and with great skill. Barry reported that 101 pieces, Parrott guns, mortars, and howitzers, were placed in batteries from 1,500 to 2,200 yards away from the Confederate works. McClellan kept this immense armament silent for weeks while he was continually adding to it, though he could easily have compelled the Confederates either to surrender or retreat, and it was against the advice of his ablest staff officers that the batteries were not opened as fast as they were completed.* On April 17 General Joseph E. Johnston had been assigned to the defence of the peninsula and Richmond, and his forces, after the arrival of G. W. Smith's and Longstreet's divisions, amounted to 53,000 men, including 3,000 sick and disabled. He made no strenuous effort to interfere with McClellan's operations, but determined to hold his position until McClellan was ready to attack and then to fall back without waiting to have his troops driven

* Official Records, vol. xi., pt. i., pp. 130, 348. Johnston's Narrative, p. 117.

from their works.* By April 30 McClellan had present for duty 115,102 men, including Franklin's division which had been sent to him to turn Yorktown by Gloucester Point or West Point, but which, since its arrival on the 20th, had been kept on board the transports.† On May 1 McClellan proposed to open fire on the morning of the 6th with all his guns, and to press the siege until final assault should be deemed practical, but on April 27 Johnston learned that McClellan's batteries were approaching completion, and accordingly made his dispositions for retreat. On the night of May 3, leaving some serviceable heavy guns behind, he evacuated Yorktown and fell back to Williamsburg on the way to Richmond. ‡

*Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. v., p.

371.

Nicolay and Hay (Life of Lincoln, vol. v., p. 375) make the aggregate present for duty 112,392 and the total aggregate present and absent 130,078. See, however, the figures given in McClellan's account in Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 160-187.

Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 189 et seq.; Webb, The Peninsula, chap. iii.; Allan, History of the Army of Northern Virginia; Barnard, Peninsula Campaign; McClellan's Own Story.