114 ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. portant slavery question came up for discussion. The opinion of the Northern public was divided, some holding that slavery, being the primal cause of the war, ought to be abolished at once and forever, while the conservatives wished to have the war conducted irrespective of the question of slavery, or at least on a non-interference basis. In the House slavery was denounced, and movements were made looking to the immediate emancipation of slaves who had left their masters. On December 5 a bill was introduced "to confiscate the property of rebels, to liberate their slaves, and employ or colonize the same and for other purposes," which was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. On December 20 the Committee on the Judiciary was instructed to report a bill amending the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. In the Senate, on December 4, Saulsbury moved that commissioners be named to meet commissioners appointed by the Confederates for the purpose of adjusting existing difficulties peaceably; but this motion. was laid on the table. The next day Trumbull introduced a bill for the confiscation of the property of rebels, and giving freedom to the persons they hold in slavery," which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. On March 24 a bill was introduced in the House by Arnold, of Illinois, the purport of which was to render freedom National and slavery sectional. This was taken up for discussion on May 9, in the midst of the exciting and encouraging news from New Orleans. Some of the members, like Cox, of Ohio, groaned over "the Heaven is whole negro business. sick," he exclaimed, "and earth is weary of this damnable and dangerous iteration." The House passed the bill on May 12 by a vote of 89 to 50, and it was soon passed by the Senate by a vote of 28 to 10. As finally passed it was: "An act to secure freedom of all persons within the territory of the United States."'* Meanwhile a bill for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia had been introduced in the House, and after reference to the Committee on the District was reported favorably, March 12. A bill with the same object had been reported also in the Senate in February. The border slave States opposed it vigorously, and efforts were made to fasten on to the bill a compulsory colonizing of the negroes, but to no purpose.t In spite of opposition, however, the bill passed the Senate on April 3 by a vote of 29 to 14, and the House on April 11 by a vote of 92 to 38. As thus adopted, the bill abolished slavery in the District of Columbia, appropriated $1,000,000 to compensate the owners of slaves, at a rate LINCOLN'S PLAN OF COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION. not exceeding $300 for each, and provided means for the voluntary colonization of negroes in Haiti or Liberia.* On April 16 President Lincoln sent a brief message to Congress, approving the act and asserting his gratification" that the two principles of compensation and colonization are both recognized and practically applied in the act.". He stated, however, that there was no provision for minors, femes coverte, insane, or absent persons, and presuming this omission was a mere oversight, recommended that it be supplied by a supplementary act.† Action was speedily taken for the negroes thus freed. Primary schools were organized as soon as possible, and everything was done on a liberal scale to secure for the blacks the privileges which they had long enjoyed in the free States.‡ Meanwhile President Lincoln had taken a step far beyond either of these measures. For a long time he had had under consideration a measure establishing a system of compensated abolishment. These schemes culminated in his message of March 6, 1862, when he recommended the adoption of the following resolution: "Resolved, that the United States ought to cooperate with any State which may adopt gradual 115 abolishment of slavery, giving to each State pecuniary aid to be used by such state, in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public or private, produced by such change of system." Lincoln reinforced this recommendation by argument in his message, and added some cogent reasons in private letters to influential persons. To Senator McDougall he wrote that less than one half day's cost of the war would pay for the slaves in Delaware, at $400 per head. Again, computing the number of slaves in Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and the District of Columbia at 432,622, he figured the cost of the slaves in these States to be $173,048,800. This sum, enormous as it was, would be less than the cost of 87 days of war, which Lincoln estimated would come to $174,000,000; so he had no doubt that his scheme of compensated emancipation would be an immense saving to the country. He recommended, if his plan should be adopted, that the sum to be paid to each State by the United States be ascertained by taking the number of slaves in the State, according to the census of 1860, and multiplying that number by $400 (the estimated average value of slaves), this sum to be paid by the United States in 20 equal annual instalments in 6 per cent. bonds of the United States.† The President discussed this plan with * Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vi., pp. 68-69; Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2d session, p. 1102. See the letter in Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. v., pp. 210–211. 116 CHARGES AGAINST CAMERON. Congressmen from the border slave States of Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, urging them to support the measure.* On the same day on which this interview was held, Roscoe Conkling introduced into the House the joint resolution recommended by the President in his message of the 6th, and debate on the subject began. Moderate Republicans generally supported the resolution, and even pronounced antislavery men expressed a willingness to favor the plan if the loyal slave States would consent to relinquish their portion of the disturbing and dangerous evil. Despite the opposi tion of a few border slave State Republicans and some persistent Democrats from the free States, the resolution was passed on March 11 in the House by a vote of 89 to 31, and in the Senate on April 2 by a vote of 32 to 10, receiving the President's signature on April 10, 1862.† In his annual report, Secretary of War Cameron had suggested that the slaves should be armed, and when employed as soldiers should be freed. Without submitting this report to Lincoln, Cameron sent the printed copies to the postmasters of the chief cities with instructions to hand them to the press as soon as the President's message should be read in Congress.‡ *McPherson, History of the Rebellion, p. 210 et seq. See also Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, pp. 211-213. Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. v., p. 214; Rhodes, United States, vol. iii., p. 635. Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. v., p. 125. When Lincoln ascertained this, he insisted that the copies sent out be recalled by telegraph, and that the report be modified according to his own policy in regard to slavery.* One portion of Cameron's report was astounding 66 to the ecothat relating to nomical administration of affairs dis played by the various branches of the service." On the whole the management of the War Department had been efficient and honest, but in many cases large contracts had been given to Cameron's political followers and henchmen as rewards for past services. Probably none of the money filched from the public treasury by exorbitant prices and commissions and the delivery of unfair goods found its way into Cameron's pocket, yet there is much evidence leading one to suppose that he was at least cognizant of crooked and corrupt practices. Charges of corruption and incompetency were numerous. Writing to Fessenden Senator Senator Grimes says: "The truth is we are going to destruction as fast as imbecility, corruption, and the wheels of time can carry us," and he refers also to "the flood of corruption that is sweeping over the land and perverting the moral sense of the people. The army is in most inextricable confusion and is every day becoming worse and worse."+ Writing to Cameron on November 27, 1861, Chase says: Ibid, vol. v., pp. 126-127. See also Rhodes, United States, vol. iii., p. 573. † Salter, Life of Grimes, p. 156. DISMISSAL OF CAMERON; APPOINTMENT OF STANTON. * * * "I feel that I must decline to submit establishments based upon mere conjecture, the aggregate of which will in the absence, comparatively, of results, carry conviction to the minds of the people of the entire want of system in the management of our military affairs. The want of success of our armies, and the difficulties of our financial operations, have not been in consequence of a want or excess of men, but for want of systematic administration. If the lack of economy, and the absence of accountability, are allowed to prevail in the future as in the past, bankruptcy, and the success of the rebellion, will be necessary consequences. # I have heretofore objected, and do now object, to rendering the Treasury of the United States liable for one thousand million of dollars in addition to already outstanding debt, when by proper system and proper economy the same results can be obtained by the expenditure of half the sum." Nesmith, of Oregon, and Hale declared that high officials had been guilty of corruption, while Powell, of Connecticut, said: "If the statements contained in the report of the committee of investigation of the other House on government contracts are true, the head of the War Department and the head of the Navy Department must be written down in public opinion as possessed of a very great degree of stupidity or knavery. From one or the other they cannot escape." While there were many to censure Cameron, Welles seems to have possessed the unbounded confidence of the majority. Accordingly, the House refused to censure Welles, by a vote of 72 to 45, but censured Cameron by the vote 79 to 45. Meanwhile Cameron had signified his weariness of the onerous labors of the War Department, and hinted to the President that he would prefer a foreign mission. Nothing was said for several * Schuckers, Life of Chase, p. 280. † Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2d session, pp. 203, 207. ‡ Congressional Globe, p. 1888. 117 weeks, but on January 11, 1862, Lincoln sent Cameron a curt dismissal, and nominated him as minister to Russia.* There was little opposition to Cameron's appointment, as many were inclined to defend him. On December 25, 1861, Chase wrote to Murat Halstead: I "You are unjust to Cameron have seen him closely as most men here, and I am sure he has acted honorably and faithfully and patriotically. He challenges investigation of all his transactions on the score of corruption, and may do so, I believe, with entire safety." † Furthermore, as Sumner moved Cameron's confirmation without the customary reference, it is obvious that he did not believe the charges against him. The President appointed Edwin M. Stanton Secretary of War in Cameron's place. The appointment was acceptable to Seward and Chase, to Congress, and to the country, for he had the confidence of all. He immediately took hold of the War Department with an iron hand; he centered the telegraph in his department, so that the publication of military news could be supervised, expanded his military bureaus, and in every way labored to bring his department up to a standard of efficiency that it had not before known, with what success we shall see. Before giving further details of military operations, however, let us glance at the financial operations of the Confederacy and the foreign relations of the two governments. Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. v., p. 128. Schuckers, Life of Chase, p. 281. ‡ DeForest, Life of Sumner, vol. iv., p. 63. 118 CONFEDERATE FINANCES. CHAPTER VII. 1861-1865. CONFEDERATE FINANCES." The chief fiscal problem of the Confederacy-Solution sought in issues of bonds - Inefficacy of the funding Cotton the means of floating a act of 1863- Other impotent acts Farmers' fear of government notes foreign loan - Defective taxation and lax methods of collection - The note-issue policy - The great amount Precariousness of the Confederate army of outstanding treasury notes - Temporary resort to barter Fiscal policy not responsible for failure of the war. * As the financial transactions of the Confederacy throughout the war were not so extensive as those of the North, it has seemed best that the entire story be told in one chapter as conducive to a clearer comprehension, rather than to scatter the - Accordingly, on February 28, 1861, the Confederate government authorized a $15,000,000 issue of bonds, running for ten years and bearing interest at 8 per cent. These bonds were quickly taken up, the specie held by Southern banks being generally transferred to the Confederate treasury in exchange for them. The government lost no time in sending the specie abroad for the purchase of ships and war supplies, of which they then stood in desperate need. A small export tax was levied on cotton, and it was from the proceeds of this that the government expected to meet the interest on the bond issue. This first loan was the forerunner of a long series, no less than $150,000,000 being borrowed during 1861 alone. None of these issues, however, proved as successful as the first. There seemed to be no medium of redemption save treasury notes; these therefore sank in value with the changing scale of the paper currency, which, influenced by the shifting fortunes of war, was ex various items here and there in chronological tremely unstable during this whole order. period. Of the government's two |