made, the Roman law may be invoked as a proof of this proposition. There is no other system of law, in which the propriety of terms and the light of philology are of so high importance; and this importance is manifested even in the age of its decay, since Justinian has devoted an entire title of the Digest to a vocabulary of jurisprudence, (the title de verborum significatione);—a useful aid, the want of which in the French law has been regretted by our modern professors.

Arts, letters, and philosophy were imported from Greece into Rome, without repressing in the least the enthusiasm which drew all minds towards this noble pursuit. The school of the ancient academy found an illustrious adept in the great Lucullus, who employed his immense wealth (the greater part of it ill acquired) in the diffusion of knowledge, the high value of which he fully appreciated. He established a library, to which all who desired it were allowed access, and which contributed not a little to diffuse a taste for philosophy and a love of letters in Rome, in which books were then of the greatest rarity. Cicero informs us, that he frequently availed himself of this rich deposit. The principal works it contained seem to have been those of the disciples of Socrates, of the academicians, and of the stoics, as well as those of the great historians and poets of Greece.

But the stoic philosophy attracted, in an especial manner, the attention of the jurisconsults and statesmen, among whom it found its most zealous adherents. It agreed, in general, with the character of the Romans, especially those who had escaped the corruption of the age; and it was suited, in a peculiar degree, to those men, who, from their condition in society, were led to regard justice and submission to the laws as the most important of duties; so that its influence upon the labors of jurisprudence was very soon felt; and it acquired, at a later period, a still greater devel

opment. The stoic philosophy was established under the powerful patronage of the Scipios, and was first represented by the celebrated Panætius, the friend of Polybius and of Africanus, who saw the choicest of the Roman youth crowding to his lectures, in spite of the murmurs of the old national rusticity, systematically represented by Cato, who, however, was himself an enlightened man.

Thus, of all the sects of Greek philosophy which were transported into Italy, that of the stoics made the most rapid and the most solid progress. This system taught that the end which we ought to have in view was to live according to nature, and that to live according to nature was to do nothing contrary to reason, which was the general law of humanity; that we ought to embrace and follow the precepts of virtue for its own sake, without having regard to the reward which may follow; that virtue is sufficient to render man happy; that there is nothing useful which is not at the same time good and just, and that-nothing criminal in itself can ever become useful; that it is the characteristic of a wise man to be severe and sincere; that a wise man ought to take a part in the affairs of the republic, in order to prevent vice from usurping power, and to excite the citizens to virtue; that wise men only ought to participate in the government of the state; that the administration of the government belongs to them both by reason of right and for the benefit of the people, since they alone are competent to decide the great question of good and evil; and that the wise only are irreprehensible, enlightened, incapable of doing harm, and inaccessible to the seductions by which the vulgar are carried away.

It is easy to comprehend how agreeable these dogmas must have been to the aristocratic element of the Roman character. The other schools proclaimed as a principle the refusal of honors; this, on the contrary, declared its adepts to be the only persons capable of filling public offices; and

its doctrines were consequently embraced by every one of a noble, clevated, and ambitious spirit. Besides, the Roman character was not of a speculative or contemplative turn; practical utility was in general the end of all its labors; and the precept of the stoic philosophy, which commanded the employment of one's talents and knowledge in the administration of public affairs, rendered that system more compatible than any other with the national manners and the active and patriotic inclination of the Romans.

Stoicism thus elevated the profession of the jurisconsult, and the character of the public functionary; it adorned these employments with the riches of a new science, which excited the enthusiasm of good society; it offered a captivating end, the glory of governing; and it made a duty of ambition. To these considerations it must be added, that the strictness and severity of the morals of the stoic philosophy contributed not a little to the favor with which it was received at Rome; it approximated to the primitive society of the city; it offered a moral arm to the aristocracy wherewith to restrain the passions; and, in certain respects, it might even supply the place of the ancient patrician inflexibility, which was no longer in vogue. It could not fail, therefore, by the austerity of its doctrines and by the sublimity of the mission which it assumed, to be pleasing to an aristocracy, which was essentially conservative. It also recommended itself to the plebeians, by the justice of its dogmas, by its appeal to the principle of ambition, and by the reward which it held out to the true philosophic capacity. It consequently reckoned among its most ardent propagators men of all characters,-Cato of Utica as well as Cicero, and men of all conditions, the choicest portion of Roman society.

The influence of the stoic philosophy upon the science of law, in which it effected in some sort a revolution, was im

mense.

The jurisconsults perceived at once the intimate

connection which existed between their peculiar science and that new wisdom which had been imported from abroad. Philosophy opened to their studies a new field, which they immediately seized upon and united to their ancient domain. Jurisprudence had hitherto been to them nothing more than a knowledge of the positive laws of the city; the stoic philosophy infused into it the great science of the laws of reason; it introduced into law the profound sentiment of natural justice and the divine theory of equity; it purified the political legislation by the moral law of humanity; and it impressed upon the labors of jurisprudence the sublime precepts of virtue. Disdaining the asceticism of other sects, or abandoning it to a few devotees, it did not fear to avow a desire to participate in public affairs, and, it must be acknowledged to its praise and glory, it actively employed itself in matters of public concern for the public good; for, by its care, the law for the future ceased completely to be a municipal and patrician mystery, and passed to the high condition of a logical science,-the science of philosophic law,-of the law of humanity. The combination of the purely political and civil element with the purely rational element was a work worthy of the gratitude of centuries.

The authority of the Roman jurisconsults, established upon the foundation which we have already indicated, found a new support in philosophy, which furnished them with a new means of action on public opinion. The lectures of Panæætius and Posidonius were attended with ardor by the nobility of Rome; but in the front rank were the jurisconsults, and among them the most important personages of the republic, and the most illustrious in political science. These jurisconsults, more informed than their predecessors, added to the dignity of their profession, by bringing the principles of philosophy into the investigation of the civil law, and throwing the light of a noble, pure, and

attractive liberalism upon the ancient institutions. They increased the influence of the law upon the manners of the nation, because they made it a new and powerful means of civilization.

If we descend from these generalities to details, we shall recognise, at every step, in the Roman law, such as it has come down to us, the action of the stoic philosophy; and, though this action did not receive its complete development until a late period, we shall take the liberty not to separate the principle from its consequences.

Justice, which was before a political affair, is thenceforward a virtue: Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuendi.' Right is the art of discerning that which is equitable and good: Jus est ars æqui et boni; and as the stoics called themselves the priests of virtue, the jurisconsults elevated their profession to the dignity of the priesthood of justice: Justitia.... cujus meritò quis sacerdotes nos appellet; justitiam namque colimus, et boni et æqui notitiam profitemur: æquum ab iniquo separantes, licitum ab illicito discernentes; bonos non solùm metu pœnarum, verùm etiàm præmiorum quoque exhortatione efficere cupientes; veram philosophiam, non simulatam affectantes.3

The jurisconsults defined jurisprudence, as the stoics defined wisdom, that is to say, the science of things divine and human; and Marcian borrows from Chrysippus himself his definition of laws: Sed et philosophus summa stoicæ sapientia Chrysippus incipit libro quem fecit περὶ νόμου. ̔Ο νόμος πάντων ἐςὶ βασιλεύς θείων τε, και άνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων. Δεῖ δὲ αὐτόν προςτάτην τε εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καί τών αιχρῶν καί άρχοντα καί ἡγεμόνα και κατά τοῦτο κανόνα τε εἶναι δικαίων καί ἀδίκων και τῶν φύσει πολιτικῶν ζώον, προςτατικόν μὲν ὧν ποιητέων, απαγορευτικόν δέ ῶν οὐ ποιητέων. Ler est omnium divinarum et humanarum rerum regina. Oportet autem eam esse præsidem et bonis et

1 Ulpian, fr. x. D. l. 1. 2 Ulpian, fr. 1. D. 1. 1.

2 Ulpian, fr. 1,

D. 1. 1.