his own son, and to leave him all his property at his death. No sufficient evidence was given of the 1007. having been paid, or that the plaintiff ever resided with A. under the agreement: Held, in a suit against the representatives of A., that both parties to the agreement must be taken to have renounced it by consent, and that they were entitled to do so, no alteration in the status or condition of the plaintiff having taken place in consequence of it. (Colyear v. Lady Mulgrave, 2 Keen, 81.) Hill v. Gomme, 1 Bea. 540.

CONSTRUCTION. (Settlement-Policy of Assurance-Bonus.) A settlement, after reciting an agreement that the husband should insure his life in the names of trustees for the sum of £3000, which had been done; and further, that he should secure by his bond a further sum, payable at his decease, to be settled, together with the said sum of £3000 under the policy, upon certain trusts, proceeded to declare that the trustees should stand possessed of the policy until the marriage, in trust for the intended husband, and after the marriage, then of the said sum of £3000, when received, and of the other sum to be secured by bond upon certain trusts. The husband died a bankrupt Held, That a bonus which was given on the policy passed to the trustees of the settlement, the case being decided upon the construction of the settlement, and not upon any notion of a right in the trustees to retain the whole of the proceeds of the policy in satisfaction of the bond which was unpaid. Parkes v. Bott, 9 Sim. 388.

DECREE. (Further directions restricted by terms of decree.) Executors were charged by the bill with what they might "but for their wilful default have received," but by the decree the common accounts only were directed; on further directions, held, that the executors could not be charged as for their wilful default, and an inquiry was refused, though a presumption of such default was raised by the master's report. Garland v. Littlewood, 1 Bea. 527.

GIFT INTER VIVOS. (When complete-Order to bankers.) A. B. wrote a letter to his bankers directing them to invest a

sum of money in the joint names of himself and wife. The bankers accordingly caused a purchase to be made by their brokers the day before, but the transfer was not made till the day after the death of A. B.: Held, that the gift was completed by the bankers acting on the order to the extent of making a contract by the broker.

N. B. The order which was delivered to the wife was not sent by her to the bankers till two days afterwards. Vance v.

Vance, 1 Bea. 605. HUSBAND AND WIFE. (Wife's equity.) A wife, after having established her equity to a settlement against the husband's assignees, cannot waive her equity so as to prejudice the rights of children of the marriage. Whitten v. Sawyer, 1 Bea. 593. NEXT FRIEND. (Costs.) A suit instituted by next friend on behalf of infants, was dismissed with costs to be paid by next friend, on report of the master that it had been not properly instituted. Fox v. Suwerkrop, 1 Bea. 583.

Sale

2. (Same.) Where it appeared clearly by affidavits on the part of defendant, that a suit had been instituted by the next friend of an infant to promote purposes of his own. The suit was dismissed with costs to be paid by him, without a reference. v. Sale, 1 Bea. 586. PATENT. (Requisite degree of novelty.) Where the improvement relied on in support of a patent for new machinery for spinning flax, was the shortening the reach at which it was spun to a distance of about two inches and a half, and it appeared that in the machinery used for spinning different materials, including flax, the principle of shortening the reach according to the material was known, and that though in the machinery for spinning flax the minimum was fourteen inches, for cotton it varied from an inch and a quarter to seven eighths of an inch; it was held, agreeably to the certificate of the judges, (see Bing. N. C. 492,) that there was not sufficient novelty to support the patent. The object of the short reach, as applied to flax, was to spin it in a macerated state, but the plaintiff did not pretend that the maceration of flax for the purpose of spinning it was al

together new, but that the shorter reach enabled him to employ maceration in a much greater degree. Kay v. Marshall, 1 Bea. 534. See S. C. as to other points, 1 M. & C. 373; 1 Keen, 190. PLEADING. (Demurrer-Extent of admission.) Where the bill, in order to give the plaintiff a right to sue in equity, charged that the defendant pretended a release (in law), it was held that a demurrer to the whole bill did not amount to an admission of the existence of such release. Hammond v. Messenger, 9 Sim. 328.

2. (Discovery-Production of documents.) A bill was filed for an account of dealings and transactions between the parties up to the filing of the bill, and also to restrain an action brought by the defendant against the plaintiff upon a previous alleged state of the accounts, certain books and documents referred to in the answer having been brought into court: Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to inspect only such parts of them as referred to the matters in question in the suit, i. e. the state of the accounts at the filing of the bill. Rawson v. Samuel, 9 Sim. 442. PRACTICE. (Amendment-Further answer.) Where a plaintiff amends, but does not require a further answer, the order to amend ought to contain a recital to that effect. Boddington v. Woodley, 9 Sim. 380.

2. (Examination of witness.) If liberty is given to a party to exhibit further interrogatories, he may reëxamine a witness whom he has before examined, but not to the same matter. Turner v. Trelawney, 9 Sim. 453.

3. (Reference.) A reference will not be granted as to the fact on which the foundation of plaintiff's title rests; and accordingly where the assignee of an insolvent omitted to prove that a fund which he claimed to recover as having been fraudulently settled, had ever been the property of the insolvent, a reference as to the fact was refused. Holden v. Hearn, 1 Bea. 445. 4. (Transmission of money from abroad.) Where a large sum of money belonging to an estate in which a receiver had been appointed in India, as the Court refused, on the petition of the receiver, to make an order as to the mode of transmitting such money without a reference. Keys v. Keys, 1 Bea. 425.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS. (Demurrer.) The statute of frauds may be taken advantage of on general demurrer; but where a bill for specific performance did not expressly admit that the agreement was not signed, and contained allegations of partperformance, a general demurrer was overruled. Field v. Hutchinson, 1 Bea. 599.

WILL. (Construction-Specific legacy.) A legacy given in the following terms: "I give to A. B. the sum of 1007., which said sum is owing to me by bond from her father:" Held to be specific and not demonstrative. Davies v. Morgan, 1 Bea. 405. 2. (Construction-Annuity.) Held, that a bequest to two of testatrix's servants, who were man and wife, of "an annuity of £200 each for their joint lives and the life of the survivor," gave to each an annuity of £200 for their joint lives and the life of the survivor. Eales v. The Earl of Cardigan, 9 Sim. 384.

3. (Construction-Cousins.) Testator by his will gave legacies to several persons by name, describing each of them as his cousin. By a codicil he gave his residuary estate to all such of his cousins both on his father's and mother's side as should be living at his decease, and to all the children of such of his said cousins as might theretofore have died or might die in his lifetime. The testator left several first cousins and children of first and second cousins, and also one first cousin once removed, but all the persons named in the will were first cousins: Held, that they alone, and the children of such of them as had died in testator's lifetime, were entitled to the residue under the codicil. Caldecott v. Harrison, 9 Sim. 457.

4. (Same.) Testatrix bequeathed her residue to her second cousins of the name of S., and the issue of such of them as were dead (per stirpes). She had no second cousins, but had had three first cousins once removed of the name of S., two of whom were living at her death, and the other had died leaving children Held, that these two, together with the children of the one who was dead, were entitled, to the exclusion of first cousins twice removed, that is, grandchildren of a first cousin, though

standing in the same degree of relationship as second cousins. Slade v. Fooks, 9 Sim. 386.

5. (Construction-Description of residue.) The testator, after directing that his property should be realized, and after payment of his debts and funeral expenses should be invested in the 3 per cent. consols, left the annual interest to his executor to be paid to five persons by way of annuities, two of which were given simply in the words " £30 to A., £20 to B." In a subsequent part of his will he gave all his household furniture, the whole of his personal property of every kind not specified above, to his wife. Held, that the capital producing the two sums abovementioned, subject to the life interest of the annuitants, passed to the wife. Clowes v. Clowes, 9 Sim. 403. 6. (Construction-Forfeiture.) Testatrix gave legacies to A., B. and C., and declared that if any of them should be dead at her decease, or should not then be heard of to be then living, or should not respectively claim their legacies within twelve months after her death, then the legacies given to such of them as should be dead at her decease, or as should neglect to claim the same within the time aforesaid, should sink into her residuary estate. Three years after the testatrix's death, C. who had not been heard of upwards of twenty years, claimed her legacy. Held, that she was not entitled to it, although she had been ignorant until a short time before that the testatrix was dead. Hawkes v. Baldwin, 9 Sim. 355.

II-DIGEST OF AMERICAN CASES.

Selections from 1 Hoffman, and 1 Clarke (N. Y. Chancery); 1 McLean, (U. S. 7th Circuit); 1 Meigs, (Tenn.) and 8 New Hampshire.

ABANDONMENT BY ASSURED. (Right and offer of.) The right to abandon depends on actual facts, existing at the time of the offer, not on the information then possessed. The offer to abandon must be founded on information of facts, sufficient