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The notice to produce was served four days before the trial. The action was commenced in 1832, and proceedings had taken place in Chancery also in respect of the subject-matter of the letters: Held, that they must be presumed to have been sent back from New South Wales, and that the notice was therefore sufficient to let in secondary evidence. The fact of copies of letters being kept in a merchant's letter book is evidence against him of the letters having been sent. Sturge v. Buchanan, 2 P. & D. 573. 4. (Notice to produce.) A notice to produce in sufficient time on the party himself, is sufficient, though he have employed an attorney in the cause. And it is not invalidated by a subsequent bad service of notice on the attorney. Hughes v. Budd, 8 D. P. C. 315. 5. (Dying declarations.) The declarations of a child of ten years old, made under the apprehension and expectation of immediate death, held receivable. Reg. v. Perkins, 2 Moo. C. C. 135. EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES. (Subsequent felony— Proof of identity of prisoner.) To prove the identity of a prisoner named in a certificate of a previous conviction, it is not necessary to call a witness who was present at the trial to which the certificate relates ; it is sufficient to prove that the prisoner is the person who underwent the sentence mentioned in the certificate. Reg. v. Crofts, 9 C. & P. 219. 2. (Deposition before coroner.) On a trial for murder, the deposition on oath of the prisoner before the coroner, on the inquest held on the body of the deceased, is not receivable in evidence against him. (9 C. & P. 83; 8 C. & P. 250.) Reg. v. Owen, 9 C. & P. 238. FERRY. (Declaration for infringement of Statement of ferry right—Evidence—Reputation.) Under a declaration claiming a ferry across a river from A. to B. and back again from B. to A., the plaintiff may recover in respect of a ferry one way only, from A. to B. And under a lease of a ferry, describing it as from A. to B., and back again from B. to A., a ferry one way only will pass.

A ferry-right is publici juris, and therefore evidence of reputation is admissible on a question touching the right; and so also a verdict or decree in equity, in which the right in question was adjudicated on. Pim v. Curell, 6 M. & W. 234. FOREIGN JUDGMENT. A judgment of one of the superior courts of Ireland, or of any other than one of the superior courts of this country, is not conclusive against the defendant, if it appear that he was not duly served with process in the action. (2 B. & Ad. 951.) FORGERY. (Forged request.) A forged paper in the following form, “Please let the lad have a hat, and I will answer for the money,” is a forged request for the delivery of goods, and is not the less so because it may also be a false undertaking for the payment of money. Reg. v. White, 9 C. & P. 2S2. 2. (Felonious uttering.) Knowingly uttering a bill of exchange, all the names on which are fictitious, is within the forgery statutes, though the party uttering intended to provide for the payment of the bill, the fact of the parties not being real being unknown to the person taking the bill. Reg. v. Hill, 2 Moo. C. C. 30. 3. (Uttering of bill.) An indictment for uttering a forged bill of exchange is supported by proof of uttering an instrument in form of a bill with a forged acceptance on it, though there be no person named as the drawee of the bill. Reg. v. Hawkes, 2 Moo. C. C. 60. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. (Pleading—Consideration.) The objection, that there is no note in writing of a promise to pay the debt of another, within 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4, need not be pleaded specially. (5 M. & W. 456.) A promise to a debtor to pay his debt to a third person, is not a promise to answer for the debt of another, within 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4, which applies only to promises made to the person to whom another is answerable. (8 B. & C. 728; 2 East, 325.) Mere moral consideration will not support an express promise. An express promise can only revive a precedent good consideration, which might have been enforced at law through the medium of an implied promise, had it not been suspended by some positive rule of law, but can give no original cause of action, if the obligation on which it is founded never could have been enforced at law, though not barred by any legal maxim or statute. Therefore a declaration, charging the defendant on a promise to repay the plaintiff money laid out by him in the maintenance of an infant, who afterwards became the defendant's wife, and in the improvement of her land, and alleging that the defendant, in right of his wife, had received the benefit of all the moneys so expended, was held bad in arrest of judgment. Eastwood v. Kenyon, 3 P. & D. 276. 2. (Contract for interest in land.) The defendant agreed to give the plaintiff 45l. for a crop of corn and potatoes then growing in his field, and the stubble afterwards, and whatever lay grass was in the field ; the defendant to harvest the corn and dig the potatoes, and the plaintiff to have the liberty of turning in his own cattle, and to pay the tithes: Held, that this was not a contract for the sale of an interest in land: for that the growing crops were mere chattels; and, with regard to the grass, as the plaintiff did not part with his possession of the soil, the contract was to be construed as an agistment of the defendant's cattle by the plaintiff. (5 B. & C. 829.) Jones v. Flint, 2 P. & D. 594. 3. (Goods, &c. within s. 17, what are.) A contract for the sale of shares in a banking company of 10l. value, is not a contract for the sale of goods, wares or merchandise, so as to require a written memorandum within the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds. Humble v. Mitchell, 3 P. & D. 141. 4. (Variation of written contract by parol.) The terms of a written contract for the sale of goods, falling within the operation of the Statute of Frauds, cannot be varied or altered by parol; and where a contract for the bargain and sale of goods is made, stating a time for the delivery of them, an agreement to substitute another day for that purpose, must, in order to be valid, be in writing. (5 B. & Adol. 58; 2 P. & D. 447.) Marshall v. Lynn, 6 M. & W. 109. INFANT. (Liabilities of Necessaries, what are.) To a declaration for goods sold, &c., the defendant pleaded his infancy, to which the plaintiff replied that the goods were necessaries suitable to the degree, estate, and condition of the defendant : Held, that the term necessaries included such things as were useful and suitable to the state and condition in life of the party, and not merely such as are requisite for bare subsistence. It is a question for the jury, whether the articles are such as a reasonable person, of the age and station of the infant, would require for real use. Peters v. Fleming, 6 M. & W. 42. INSURANCE. (On expected profits—Insurable interest.) Messrs. H. & Co., being the owners of two ships, called the Antelope and the Maria, trading to the coast of Africa, and which were then expected to arrive in Liverpool with cargoes of palm oil, agreed verbally to sell to the plaintiffs 200 tons of oil; 100 tons to arrive by the Antelope, and 100 tons to arrive by the Maria. The Antelope did afterwards arrive with 100 tons of oil on board, which were delivered by H. & Co. to the plaintiffs. The Maria, having 50 tons of palm oil on board, was lost by perils of the sea. The plaintiffs having insured the oil on board the Maria, together with their expected profits thereon: Held, that they had no insurable interest, as the contract they had entered into with H. & Co., being verbal only, was incapable of being enforced. Stockdale v. Dunlop, 6 M. & W. 224. LANDLORD AND TENANT. (What is a breach of covenant not to carry manure off farm.) Where, at the sale of the stock of the defendant, the tenant of a farm, W., the tenant of an adjoining farm, bought two cows, and, by the defendant's permission, left them on the defendant's farm for some weeks, bringing provender from his own farm to feed them : Held, that the manure made by these cows was manure made on the farm, and that the removal of it by W. was a breach of the condition of a bond, whereby the defendant had stipulated with his landlord that he would “put and spread all the manure and compost then collected in the middenstead, or on any other part of the farm, on the meadow land, and would not sell, cart, or convey away any dung, compost, or manure from the said farm.” Hindle v. Pollitt, 6 M. & W. 529.


LARCENY. (By servant.) If a servant take his master's pro-
perty, and hand it over to another as a gift, it is as much a
felony as if he sell or pledge it. Reg. v. White, 9 C. & P. 344.
2. (Value of thing stolen.) Although, to make a thing the subject
of an indictment for larceny, it must be, and stated to be, of
some value, yet it need not be of the value of some coin known
to the law, that is to say, of a farthing at the least. Reg. v.
Morris, 9 C. & P. 349.
3. If the owner of goods employ a person, not in his service, to
take them to a particular place, show them to a customer, and
bring them back, without authorizing him to sell them to or
leave them with the customer, and he, instead of taking them to
the place appointed, sell them for his own benefit, he will be
guilty of larceny, as he had the mere custody and not the pos-
session of the goods. Reg. v. Harvey, 9 C. & P. 353.
4. (By bailee or servant.) A person hired to drive cattle to a par-
ticular place, who sells the same and absconds with the money,
is guilty of stealing, though the intention to sell be not conceived
till after taking possession of the cattle. Reg. v. Jackson, 2
Moo. C. C. 32.
5. (By servant—of check. It is larceny in the servant of the
drawer of a check on bankers, to whom it is given to deliver
to a third person, to appropriate the value to his own use ; and
the charge may be of stealing a valuable security, to wit, a
check of the value specified, without stating the drawees to be
bankers. Reg. v. Heath, 1 Moo. C. C. 33.
LIBEL. (Province of judge and jury in actions for libel.) In
an action for libel, the judge is not bound to state to the jury,
as matter of law, whether the publication complained of be a
libel or not; but the proper course is for him to define what is
a libel in point of law, and to leave it to the jury to say whether
the publication in question falls within that definition; and, as
incidental to that, whether it is calculated to injure the charac-
ter of the plaintiff.
A publication may be a libel on a private person, which would
not be any libel on a person in a public capacity; but any im-

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