tonism and stoicism flourishing in different regions. It was at Rome, where the former gained no foothold, that the latter established itself and predominated; Alexandria was the seat of platonism. The jurisconsults were the heirs of that elevated Roman aristocracy, which had been enlightened by Panetius. Intimately united to the Roman city, — strong in the city, -loving the city, the jurisconsults had not quitted the city. We have remarked, that the Roman jurisprudence was a stranger to the instruction in that celebrated school of Alexandria, which was enlightened by the greatest talents of the resuscitated Greek literature. This tendency of mind of the stoic jurisconsults had the effect to prejudice them against christianity, notwithstanding they were attracted to it by its moral precepts; but, at this period, the moral doctrines of christianity were completely misconceived. The emperors considered christianity as a secret and seditious association; and the stoics looked upon the christians and Jews as odious mystagogues.

The repugnance did not diminish when the stoics had become impregnated with orientalism. All the sects of this period were syncretic. Pure new-platonism was not less syncretic than stoicism, since it absorbed all the other philosophical doctrines; but stoicism was syncretic also. Nevertheless, it regarded christianity with hatred; christianity was too extatic, and pleased itself too much in the contemplative admiration of metaphysical perfection. The future destiny of man, the existence of the supreme being and his nature,— preoccupied it exclusively. Stoicism, on the contrary, remained always positive, political, and practical; it conceived of reason only in its action, not only as the moving power of the mind, but also as the spiritual and fundamental principle of all activity.

Augustin and Otto have found Papinian, Ulpian, and Modestin impressed with Hebraism. But let us hear Baronius and his bitter recriminations: Papinianus, says he,

inter omnes, qui Romæ jus dicerent, judices eminens, et alii jurisconsulti, quod in causis christianorum judicandis nullam penitus æqui habuissent rationem, sed proculcatis legibus innumeros innocentes homines condemnassent: ipsi pariter, nulla mortis digna allata causa, contra jus fasque libidine tantum incitati principis, quæ in christianos irrogassent, eadem supplicia pertulere.' In relation to Papinian, Paul, and Ulpian, however, the accusation is perhaps exaggerated; for, from the contemporary testimonies cited by Otto and Schulting, it appears that these jurisconsults were favorably disposed towards the religionists of Judea, that is to say, the christians, for whom they obtained a participation in certain capacities, from which they had previously been excluded. But, whether any thing of this sort be true or not, the triumphant progress of christianity was not the less attended by reaction and revolution in regard to jurisprudence.

The christian religion, as soon as it had become the dominant faith, commenced the work of persecution, as before it had been persecuted. All the intolerance and all the cruelty, with which the pagan emperors had been so justly reproached, were reproduced with the same characters, in the acts of their christian successors against the followers of the ancient religion. Sacrifices were prohibited under pain of death and of confiscation of goods; the temples were demolished; the beautiful and learned Hypatia was assassinated in her chair; and if the prince sometimes wished to preserve, as works of art, the monuments of polytheism, the zeal of the monks transgressed his orders, and stirred up against these odious remains an ignorant and barbarous multitude.

1 Baron., ad ann. 214, § 3. These bitter reproaches are not wholly destitute of truth, for we find traces of them in the laws 13, ff. de officio præsidis ; 1, § 3, ff. de extraordin. cognit.; 25, § 1, ff. de probation. ; and 30, ff. de pænis ; as well as in Lactantius, Inst. book v. chap. ix.

It was with the same severity, that christianity effaced all traces of the conquered religion from the public institutions and the civil legislation. The ancient jus sacrum necessarily disappeared, and with it the memory of the historical origin of the greater number of the institutions of civil right; and thus the Roman law lost the peculiar and national characteristics by which it had been distinguished. Freed from its connection with religious and civil antiquities, the law passed, as it were, from the state of civil to that of national law. The christian morality contributed, also, in no small degree, to this transformation, by introducing itself into the law; in which it made the principles of absolute and religious equity predominate more than they had ever done before; and from which it repelled, farther than they were formerly, the severe rules and the rigorous logic of the civil law.

In this point of view, the influence of christianity on the Roman law, presents some analogy with that which had already been exerted upon it by the stoic philosophy; of which christianity was in several respects the continuation, inasmuch as stoicism also tended to civilize the law, and to bring it under the dominion of the sentiment of equity. Still, however, if the influence exerted by christianity, considered in its philosophical aspect, was humane and salutary, it was distinguished by characters and effects different from the influence exercised upon the Roman law by the stoic philosophy. Stoicism had united in one two sciences naturally adapted to aid each other, those of philosophy and jurisprudence. Christianity might have produced the same effect, if it had been only a philosophical doctrine, but it was something more; it was above all a religion; and while stoicism especially called its adepts to the science of law, christianity, on the contrary, impressed upon the minds of men a mysticism piously disdainful of the sciences of earth. It seduced all the great minds to abandon the study

of law, by proposing to them an end more elevated, — a divine science. The new theology thus absorbed all understandings. "Ask a man to change a piece of money for you, and he will inform you wherein the Son differs from the Father; inquire of another the price of bread, and he will answer you, that the Son is inferior to the Father; demand whether the bath is ready, and you will be told that the Son was created from nothing." Such is the picture which an esteemed author (Jortin) gives of the public mind of this epoch; and thus general preoccupation crushed the study of jurisprudence by its formidable rivalship.

At the same time, and for the reason that the science of law was abandoned by superior minds for that of theology, the consideration and power of the jurisconsults passed from them to the doctors of the divine law-the bishops. Under the pagan emperors, the jurisconsults were at the head of society, by their intelligence, their political importance, and the high functions with which they were entrusted; they had preserved the purity of the language and the sacred deposit of the ancient literature and philosophy; they delineated for the ministers of justice a table of the duties of the magistrate; their opinions were received as oracles; the first dignities of the state were to them, as it were, their hereditary patrimony. Under the lower empire, on the contrary, the glory of the fathers of the church commenced: the priests became the counsellors and the friends of the emperors, the great public functions were seized upon by the church, and the most honorable privileges were accorded to it; the ascendency of religious opinions over the people was immense; jurisprudence was completely eclipsed by theology; and the profession of jurisconsult, which the ancient Romans esteemed the first of the social professions, was from thenceforward reduced to an industrial and practical trade.

In order, therefore, to embrace the whole extent of the influence of christianity on the Roman law, it is necessary to consider the former under a double point of view; we must regard it both as a system of philosophy and a scheme of religious faith. The christian philosophy, by its humanity and its cosmopolitism, as well as by the purity of its morals, had a salutary influence on the law; it contributed powerfully to extend to all other nations the civil rights which seemed in principle to be the exclusive patrimony of Roman citizens, or of the subjects of the empire; and it modified, in furtherance of equity and for the benefit of morals, many of the particular theories of the existing legislation. But the christian religion, by the intolerant zeal which it excited, and by the hatred which it awakened towards every thing which owed its origin to paganism, sapped the foundations of the ancient law; and, besides, by the new direction which it gave to intellect, it diverted attention from the science of laws, as it did the minds of men from the culture of literature and the fine arts, the children of paganism. If, consequently, we may attribute to the influence of christianity some wise and humane modifications, which have moderated the rigor of the ancient law, we may also consider it, on the other hand, as one of the causes of the decay of the Roman law during this fourth period, (from the time of Alexander Severus to that of Justinian); and the same phenomenon manifests itself in the history of the literature of this epoch.

Having pointed out these general characters of the influence of christianity on jurisprudence, when the former was adopted as the dominant religion, we shall now investigate the traces of this same influence in particular parts of the legal system. We may then measure and count the breaches which the new law of the state could not fail to make in the grand and noble edifice of the laws of pagan Rome.