regard the word ethics, we may be conducted to two other quite different meanings of the term. Some writers, taking the word ethics in its philosophical sense, that is to say, as implying rights correlative to duties, are unwilling to employ the term natural ethics, except as designating that portion of the rules for human conduct, which, by imposing a duty on one man, create a corresponding right for another; and they limit its application, therefore, to one part only of the rules for the conduct of man to his kind. Hence a second acceptation of the word, according to which natural ethics comprehends neither natural religion, nor personal morality, nor duties to things, and not all the rules of conduct, even, for man to his kind. Others, again, taking the word ethics in a yet narrower sense, give the name natural ethics only to that part of the rules of human conduct discoverable by the reason which correspond to positive laws. This leads them to a definition much less comprehensive than the former. Hence the third and last acceptation of the term.

"For myself, I would say that the use of these words is a matter of indifference, provided a definite signification is attached to them. I like one definition as well as another. But in the present lectures, I adopt the first mentioned, which gives to the term natural ethics the widest possible signification. Ethics then, with me, means the science that treats of all the rules for human conduct in the various relations which I have enumerated. This science it is my wish and purpose to describe. It only remains for me to state the order in which I propose to discuss the different portions of so vast a subject."

In this translation, Mr. Channing makes his author say that of the term (not the thing) ethics, which he only says of the terms natural right; and which neither Mr. Jouffroy, nor any one but his translator, would ever think of saying of the former term. The following translation will enable our readers both to understand what Mr. Jouffroy really says, and to comprehend the extent to which his language has been perverted by Mr. Channing.

"If, in the expression natural right, we regard only the term

natural, we must be led to understand by that expression and to make it designate all the rules of human conduct, which are derived from the nature of things, and which consequently reason may attain to the knowledge of, whatever may be the relation to which these rules are applicable: Hence, the most general acceptation of that expression, that, namely, which, under the term natural right, includes natural religion, personal morals, real' right, and all the several parts of the rights and duties of man in regard to his fellow men. But if, on the contrary, in the same expression we give particular attention to the word right, we may be led to two other acceptations very different. Some, taking the word right in its philosophical sense, that is to say, as designating that which is the correlative of duty, will not consent to designate by the expression natural right any thing more than that part of the rules of human conduct, which, in imposing a duty upon one person, create a correlative right in another; or, in other words, but one part only of the rules for the conduct of man towards his fellow men. Others, finally, taking the word right in a still stricter sense, that is to say, in the technical sense of the schools, apply the term natural right to that part only of the rules of human conduct discovered by reason, which corresponds to positive right, properly so called; which leads them to a definition comprehending still less than the preceding Hence, the third and last acceptation of that expression."

All this is quite true of the phrase natural right, or natural law, but nothing of the sort can possibly be said of the term ethics.

Besides perverting the author's language, and disfiguring his meaning, as in the above example, the translator is obliged to omit whole passages, which he cannot by any possibility render readable with the word ethics substituted for law, or right. The following passage, which is altogether left out in the translation, occurs in the original, between the first and second paragraphs on page 18 of the

Used in the sense of the German word dinglich.

translation. The reader will perceive the impossibility of accommodating this passage to the translator's use of the word ethics, by substituting that word for right, wherever the latter occurs.

"Social right [ethics] is thus divided into two branches, private right [ethics] and public right [ethics]. In our laws, the principal branches of private right [ethics] are included and represented in the civil code and commercial code, and the principal branches of public right [ethics] in the constitutional code, the administrative code, the penal code," &c.

The above must suffice as specimens of intentional perversion. We have also noted several instances of mistranslation, which, whether the result of ignorance or haste (we incline to think the latter), are at least unintentional. The first we shall notice is a fault, which over-hasty translators from the French are exceedingly apt to fall into, namely: taking it for granted, that a French word, to which a word in English happens to correspond in orthography, may be correctly translated by the latter; as, for example, physicien by physician, and reunion by reunion. Our readers must be pretty well aware, by this time, that the present work of Mr. Jouffroy is merely introductory to his course of lectures on natural law, which, we believe, has not yet been published. The subject of this introduction is the existence of moral obligation; since, if there be no such thing as obligation, there can be no such thing as right or duty; and it would consequently be idle to attempt to construct a science of natural law. After stating the general character of the subject, namely, an inquiry into the rules of human conduct, he proceeds to announce, that, before entering upon this inquiry, it is first necessary to consider the subject of moral obligation:

"Mais au début même de la carrière, nous rencontrons une question préjudicielle à résoudre et à laquelle il ne serait ni philosophique ni raisonnable que nous cherchassions á échapper." p. 7.

Mr. Channing translates this sentence thus:

"But, in the very outset, we meet with a prejudice against the whole science of ethics, which it is neither philosophical nor reasonable to pass by."

We should translate it somewhat differently:

"But, at the very commencement of our career, we meet with a preliminary question, which must be resolved, and which it would be neither philosophical nor reasonable for us to attempt to escape."

This question prejudicielle, or preliminary question, which is the subject of Mr. Jouffroy's work, is, as we have already stated, nothing more or less than the existence of moral obligation. In another passage, the author calls it a probléme prejudiciel, which the translator renders by the word prejudice. In another passage, again, in which the same phrase occurs, Mr. Channing translates it by the phrase question of prejudice. We want no stronger evidence than this mistranslation, occurring as it does several times, and involving the subject itself of the whole work, to convince us that the translation has been executed with great haste, not to say carelessness. The word prejudiciel is indeed a technical term; but it is, notwithstanding, inserted in the dictionary of the Academy, and accurately defined. It signifies, as is indicated by its etymology, the same thing as preliminary: On appelle Question prejudicielle une question qui doit etre jugée avant la contestation principale; that is, a question to be decided before the principal contestation is called a Question prejudicielle. In this case, Mr. Channing has evidently inferred the meaning of the word from its orthography, and has blundered over it several times, without once stopping to inquire whether it could be possible for Mr. Jouffroy to speak of the question of the existence of moral obligation as a prejudicial question, or to call the denial of it a prejudice.

Another mistake of the same sort occurs in the translator's preface, in which he inserts the author's general division of his subject, extracted from the advertisement to the original work. The third branch of natural law is denominated by the author Droit reél, or that which contains the principles for the conduct of man towards things. Here, again, Mr. Channing is led astray by the orthography and sound of the word reél; and, considering it equivalent to the English word real, the synonyme of which, when used in contradistinction to imaginary or potential, is actual, he accordingly translates droit reél into Actual Ethics; - as if it were possible that any one branch of ethics should be more real or actual, or less imaginary, than another. The truth is, the word reél, in this connection, would be most properly translated by the word real, used in the first of the three senses given by Johnson, namely: "relating to things, not persons;" and, consequently, the phrase should have been rendered real right, with an explanatary note, perhaps, expressing more distinctly the sense affixed to the word real. The German word dinglich expresses the exact meaning which belongs here to the French word reél, and both are accurately rendered by the English word real, in the sense above explained.

The examples above given are sufficient, we think, to justify us in the remark made in our October number, that the translator seemed, "in some instances, to have misconceived his author's meaning, and, in others, to have perverted it." In a careful perusal of the first two lectures, we had noted several other mistranslations, which we do not think it worth our while to enumerate; such, for example, as personal morality for personal morals, — rational laws for positive laws, historical parallel for positive right parallel, &c. In conclusion, we feel bound, in all sincerity, to say, that we do not think "the sense and spirit of the original are preserved" in Mr. Channing's translation.