authority, and recaptured by the crew, they are entitled to salvage; and the decree of an American court in rem will be deemed conclusive on the right, unless fraud is shown. Ib. 17. (Stowing cargo.) Where goods are shipped under the common bill of lading, it is presumed that they are shipped to be put under deck, as the ordinary mode of stowing cargo; unless there is a positive agreement to the contrary, or circumstances from which this may be inferred. Vernard v. Hudson, 3 Sumner, 405.

18. (Deck freight.) Where goods were shipped under the common bill of lading, at an under-deck freight, but were carried on deck, and finally delivered without damage, held, that the ship-owner was entitled only to a deck freight. Ib. SLANDER. (Of witness.) To say to a witness, who was giving

his testimony upon a material point in a cause then on trial, "that is a lie ;" and to repeat this, not only to the witness, but to the counsel for the opposite party, if done maliciously and with a view to defame the witness, is slander. Mower v. Watson, 11 Vermont, 536.

2. (Liability of party.) The privileges of the party and his counsel, in regard to words spoken in the conduct of a cause, seems to be coëxtensive. lb.

3. (Same.) Neither is liable to an action of slander for words spoken in the course of the conduct of the case, and which were pertinent to the issue, or to the matter then in hand. Ib. 4. (Same.) And, if such words are not pertinent to the matter in issue, but were spoken bona fide, no action of slander will lie. lb.

5. (Same.) Hence, the party, in order to maintain an action of slander, for words so spoken, must show that they were not pertinent to the matter in progress at that time, and were spoken with a view to defame the plaintiff. Ib.

SLAVE. (Brought by owner into a non-slaveholding state.) A citizen of any one of the United States where negro slavery is established by law, who comes into this state for any temporary purpose of business or pleasure, bringing a slave with him as a

consent.

personal attendant, and stays some time, but does not acquire a domicil here, cannot restrain the slave of his liberty during his continuance here, and carry him out of this state against his Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Pickering, 193. 2. (Obligation of master.) A master, being entitled to the labor of his slaves, is bound to provide for their wants. Fisher and another v. Campbell, 9 Porter, 210.

3. (Same.) And where no provision is made by an absent master for their subsistence, an overseer may procure necessary supplies on account of the owner, on the same principle that a father is liable to support his children. Ib.

STATUTES OF OTHER STATES. The statutes of New York, published under the public authorities of that state, are properly admitted in evidence in Alabama. Hanrick v. Andrews, 9 Porter, 10.

2. The statute of this state, (Aik. Dig. 284,) authorizes the secretary of state to certify copies of the acts of the several states, on file in his office, and make such certified copies evidence. Swift v. Fitzhugh, 9 Porter, 39.

3. And in such certificate, the part of an act relating to the subject in controversy, need only be set out; and not the whole act. Ib.

4. The printed statutes of any of the states of the union, purporting to have been published by authority of the state, are to be received as evidence of the public acts of such state.

Fitzhugh, 9 Porter, 72.

Smoot v.

SUNDAY. (Levy on.) A levy made on Sunday, is void by statute, and does not divest defendant's title to the property levied on. Pierce v. Hill, 9 Porter, 151.

TENANT IN COMMON. (Conveyance by one.) Quære, What is the effect upon the rights of co-tenants, of a conveyance by one tenant in common of the entirety of one part of the lands held in common? Thomas and another v. Hatch, 3 Sumner,

170.

2. (Authority of one.) A tenant in common cannot, without the consent of his co-tenants, grant permits to persons to go on the

premises owned in common, and to cut down timber thereon for their own use, for a compensation, called, in the language of the country," stumpage." Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumner, 476. 3. (Acts done by one.) All acts done by one tenant in common, are to be done for the interest of all the co-tenants and in conformity to their rights, until an adverse claim is notoriously set up and established by competent proofs. Ib. TENDER. (Specific articles.) In the case of a note payable in specific articles, at a fixed time, at such place as the payee shall elect, if no election is made by him, in a reasonable time to enable the maker to pay the note before the time of payment elapses, the maker may, at such place as he shall elect, tender payment, and notify the payee of such tender. Adm'r. of Peck v. Hubbard, 11 Vermont, 612.

TOWN. (Authority of to indemnify its officers.) A town is authorized to indemnify its officers, against any liability which they may incur in the bona fide discharge of their duties, although it turn out that they have exceeded their legal rights and authority. Bancroft v. Lynfield, 18 Pickering, 565. 2. (Same.) Where a drain was dug by a surveyor of highways, for the purpose of raising a legal question as to the bounds of a highway, and the town appointed a committee to defend an action brought against the surveyor therefor, and voted to defray the expenses incurred by the committee, it was held, that the town was bound by such vote, although it were under no previous obligation to indemnify the surveyor, and that the committee were entitled to compensation and indemnity from the town, for their services and expenses. Ib.

TRUST. (Responsibility of trustee.) A provision in the deed of assignment, that the trustee shall be responsible only for his own defaults, must, on its face, be understood to import, that he shall not be liable for the acts of such agents, as are necessary to enable him to execute the trust, selected in good faith, with a due regard to their fitness, and with a proper supervision exercised over them. Ashurst v. Martin, 9 Porter, 566.

TRUST. (When purchase deemed in.) Stimpson gave a deed of

release of his interest, as a tenant in common, in certain premises, to Baker; at the time of this conveyance, Whiting was in possession and seisin of the premises, claiming them in his own right, by virtue of a purchase under a tax sale. Whiting was one of the tenants in common of the premises, and was the agent of Stimpson and the other proprietors. Held, that the purchase of Whiting must be deemed a trust for the benefit of Stimpson, and his grantee, Baker, to the extent of their interests; that he ought to be decreed to convey the legal title to the premises, after being satisfied of all just claims which he had against them for taxes, for the purchase-money laid out in the tax sale, for his expenditures and improvements upon them, and also for his reasonable services as agent in the premises, deducting all sums of money received by him in the premises for stumpage" or otherwise. Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumner, 476. 3. (Length of time.) In equity, length of time is no bar to a trust clearly established; provided no circumstances exist to raise a presumption from lapse of time of an extinguishment of the trust, and no open denial or repudiation of the trust is brought home to the knowledge of the parties in interest, which requires them to act as upon an adverse title. Ib. 4. (Disposition of trust estate.) A cestui que trust may lawfully dispose of his trust estate, notwithstanding his title is contested by the trustee. Neither the common law, with regard to maintenance and champerty, nor the statute of 32 Henry VIII., ch. 9, made in aid thereof, apply to a trust estate actually existing, either by the acts of the parties or by construction of law. Ib. 5. (Disseisin of.) There can be no disseisin of a trust, though the exercise of an adverse possession for a great length of time. may in equity bar or extinguish it. Ib.

6. (Purchase by agent.) A purchase by an agent will be deemed by a court of equity a purchase for his principals, unless the agent has openly and notoriously, and with full notice to his principals, discharged himself from his agency. lb. TURNPIKE. (Over existing highway.) The legislature have the power to grant to turnpike corporations the right to build a

road over an existing highway, and maintain the same by tolls. Panton Turnpike Co. v. Bishop, 11 Vermont, 198.

2. (Alteration of gates.) A turnpike company, under an act of incorporation, allowing said company to erect gates and receive toll, may, from time to time, alter the location of such gates. Fowler v. Pratt, and another, 11 Vermont, 369.

3. (Public road over.) A public road cannot be laid on a turnpike road so as to take the road from the owners of the turnpike. Ib.

4. (Alteration of road.) Where a turnpike corporation, in pursuance of its charter, makes some slight alteration in the road the new part becomes incorporated with, and a component part of the old road, and so far as the liability of the corporation is concerned, may be described in a declaration against such corporation as one road. Noyes v. White River Turnpike Co., 11 Vermont, 531.

VERDICT.

(When to be set aside.) A verdict was set aside on the ground, that it could not have been found by the jury, without either disregarding the instructions of the court in point of law, or giving an effect to evidence, which, in a just and legal sense, was not proper. Thomas v. Hatch, 3 Sumner, 171. WAGER. (Money deposited.) Money deposited as a wager,

while in the hands of the stakeholder, either before or after the happening of the event upon which the forfeiture depends, is in transitu; and may be arrested by the bailor. Wood v. Duncan, 9 Porter, 227. WARRANTY. (Sound price.) The rule, that a sound price warrants sound property, unless there be a special agreement to take the property sound or unsound, is not according to the course of judicial decision at common law; and is not the law of this state. West v. Cunningham, 9 Porter 104.

2. (Power to sell.) A power given to an agent to sell a slave, implies a power to warrant the soundness of the slave. Skinner v. W. & R. Gunn. 9 Porter, 305.

WASTE. (To inheritance.) The law considers those acts, which do a permanent injury to the inheritance, as waste. Keeler v. Eastman, 11 Vermont, 293.