and the defendants, at the same time, signed an agreement, by which, after reciting that the land had been so conveyed and mortgaged, and was subject to other claims and incumbrances, they promised the mortgager to pay him the sum of $1200, "after he has cleared and freed said premises from all claims and incumbrances, or the balance, if any there shall be, after having satisfied said claims and removed said incumbrances, ourselves." It was held, that the inchoate right to dower of the wife, was not a claim or incumbrance contemplated by such agreement. Fuller v. Wright, 18 Pickering, 403.

2. (To convey by a deed of conveyance.) If the contract be "to convey the land by a deed of conveyance," for a stipulated price, this is not fulfilled by executing a deed of conveyance merely. Lawrence v. Dole, 11 Vermont, 549.

3. (Same.) The party must be able to convey such a title as the other party had a right to expect, and this is to be determined from the fair import of the terms used, with reference to the subject-matter. Ib.

4. (For labor-apportionment of.) If A contracted with B to labor for him four months from a given day, at ten dollars per month, and was to receive no pay till he had worked the four months, still, if he is prevented from completing the four months' labor, by reason of sickness, he may recover, pro rata, for the services performed, upon a quantum meruit. Fenton v. Clark, 11 Vermont, 557.

5. (Offer of acceptance.) An offer to sell property, not requiring an acceptance of the proposition to be accompanied with the purchase money, though made through an agent, may be recalled without notice being first given to the person to whom it was made; aliter, if the money is to be paid simultaneously with the acceptance, unless the continuance of the offer was for a limited time, and the acceptance was not made until after the limitation expired. Falls and another v. Gaither, 9 Porter, 605.

6. (Where no time is specified.) If a contract or order, under which goods are to be furnished, does not specify any time at

which they are to be delivered, the law implies a contract, that they should be delivered within a reasonable time; and no evidence will be admissible to prove a specific time, at which they were to be delivered, for that would be to contradict and vary the legal interpretation of the instrument. Cocker v. Franklin

Hemp and Flax Manuf. Co., 3 Sumner, 530. 7. (Same.) The question of reasonable time is determined by a view of all the circumstances of the case; and parol evidence of the conversations of the parties may be admitted to show the circumstances under which the contract was made, and what the parties thought was a reasonable time for performing it. Ib. CONVEYANCE. (Barring of dower.) S. L. joined with his wife in executing a deed, with covenants of warranty on his part, which contained the following clauses: "I, S. L. and H. L., wife of S. L., (in her right as to one quarter part of the hereinafter described and granted premises,) in consideration of &c., do hereby give, grant, sell and convey unto B. all right, title, and interest, which we have in and to" certain land; "three undivided quarter parts of the land hereby conveyed, belong to S. L. in his own right, in fee, and the remaining fourth part belongs to S. L. and to H. L., his wife, in fee, in her right;"" to have and to hold the aforegranted premises to B." &c. ; "in witness whereof we, S. L., and H. L., my wife, in token of our conveyance of all right, title and interest, whether in fee or in freehold, in the premises, have hereunto set our hands," &c. It was held, that the wife was barred by such deed, of her right to dower in the three undivided fourth parts of the land which belonged to her husband. [See Revised Stat. c. 60, 7.] Learned v. Cutler, 18 Pickering, 9. 2. (Water power.) Where a grant is made of a water power, in terms, and the privilege itself is the principal subject, if it is left in doubt, whether it is a grant of a sufficient quantity of water to carry a particular kind of mill, making reference to such mill to indicate and measure the quantity of water power intended to be conveyed, or whether it is a grant of the use of

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the water to carry such particular kind of mill only, the former construction is to be more favored, because, in general, it is most beneficial to the grantee without being more onerous to the grantor, and because such construction is most favorable to the general interests of the community. Ashley v. Pease, 18 Pickering, 268.

3. (Mortgage.) Land was conveyed by L. to S., and at the same time an indenture was executed by the parties, which set forth, that S. " demised, granted and to farm let" the premises to L., to have and to hold during the life of L., for the purpose, that S. should maintain L. for life; and that "the lease aforesaid is given by S. for the purpose of securing to L. the maintenance aforesaid." S. died in the lifetime of L. It was held, that the indenture was a mortgage; and that after the death of L. the widow of S. was entitled to dower in the land, as against a person claiming under S. Lanfair v. Lanfair, 18 Pickering, 299.

4. (Privilege of dam.) D., the owner of a tract of land and two mill privileges, conveyed to M. a portion of the land, with a mill privilege, described in the deed, by metes and bounds, "together with the privilege of a dam below D.'s factory and flowing the water as high as will answer, and not injure or obstruct the water-wheels of D. above. It was held, that this was a grant to M. of a right to build a dam for a mill privilege, and if, for the purpose of raising the water to the height agreed upon, it was necessary for M. to extend his dam over a part of the track not included by such metes and bounds, he was authorized to do so, by the grant; that evidence of acts done by the parties under a mutual agreement, immediately after the grant was made, by way of marking out the site and height of the dam to be erected by M., was competent for the purpose of determining the extent of the grant; and that M. might maintain trespass quare clausum against D. for cutting through that portion of the dam which was placed upon the land not included by the metes and bounds, the interest of M. therein being a right of possession for the purpose of the dam, so long as his

mill should continue, and not a mere easement. Dryden v. Jepherson, 18 Pickering, 385. CORPORATION. (Acts by in closing concerns.) Under the statute

of 1819, c. 43, providing, that corporations shall be continued bodies corporate for the term of three years after the expiration of their charters, for the purpose of settling their concerns, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which they were established, a bank is authorized, immediately before the expiration of such term of three years, to indorse a note held by it, to trustees appointed to wind up the affairs of the bank, and vested by it with all the powers of the corporation. [See Revised Stat. c. 44, § 7.] Folger v. Chase, 18 Pickering, 63. COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. (Commercial questions.) On commercial questions, the courts of the United States are not bound by the decisions of the state courts. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 3 Sumner, 270.

2. (Costs in circuit courts.) In the circuit court of the United States, if the sum for which judgment is to be entered is less than five hundred dollars, the plaintiff is not entitled to costs. Robinson v. Com. Ins. Co., 3 Sumner, 221. COVENANT. (Dependent.) In a contract for the sale of land, if the price is to be paid at the time of the conveyance, the covenant to convey and to pay the price are dependent covenants, and the plaintiff cannot sustain an action for the price, without averring in his declaration a readiness to convey, and proving on trial his ability to convey. Lawrence v. Dole, 11 Vermont,

549.

DAMAGE. Actual, perceptible damage, is not indispensable as the foundation of an action. It is sufficient to show a violation of a right. The law will presume some damage in such a case. A fortiori, where the act done is such, that, by its repetition or continuance, it may become the foundation or evidence of an adverse right. Webb v. Portland Manuf. Co., 3 Sumner, 189. DEED. (Interlineation.) In a deed of a parcel of land in which were a well and pump, an interlineation of the words "with

pump and well of water," after the description of the land by metes and bounds, was held to be an immaterial alteration, as the effect of the deed would be the same without those words. Brown v. Pinkham, 18 Pickering, 172.

2. (By the laws of another state.) Where, by the laws of another state, a deed, or other instrument, is required to be recorded; if such deed or instrument be authenticated under the act of congress, it will have the same effect in this state, that it was entitled to by the laws of the state whence it came. Swift v. Fitzhugh, 9 Porter, 39.

3. (Same.) A deed, executed and duly recorded in another state which, by the laws of that state, is made evidence in her courts without further proof; is also, in pursuance of the act of congress, evidence, without further proof of its execution, in this Ib.

state.

4. (Of personal property.) An unconditional grant of personal property is perfected by the delivery of the deed to a third person, for the use of the grantee, though the possession may remain in the grantor. McCutchen's administrators v. McCutchen, 9 Porter, 650.

5. (Same.) Such a deed cannot be revoked by the grantor after delivery, as the deed vests the title to the property, and the right of possession in the grantee. Ib.

DEPOSITION. (Official character of person before whom taken.) A deposition taken under a commission directed, in the common form, to any justice of the peace, &c., is admissible in evidence, although it does not appear, that the person before whom the deposition was taken was a justice of the peace, otherwise than by his signature upon the deposition. Adams v. Graves, 18 Pickering, 355.

2. (Same.) It seems, that where a commission to take depositions, is directed to a person by name, it is immaterial whether he has any official character or not, as he would have sufficient authority to take the depositions, from the commission itself. Ib.

DEVISE AND LEGACY. (Lapsed.) A devise to a grandchild