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appearing that they had been paid, or had released their debts or signed any composition deed, does not alter the case. Ib. CONFLICT OF LAWS. (Damages.) Where a suit was brought, for a balance of account, for advances made at Boston, upon goods consigned to the plaintiffs at Trieste, and sold by them at a great loss, it was held, that the balance was not payable at Trieste, but at Boston, and, therefore, the balance was to be estimated in damages at the par, and not at the rate of exchange. Grant v. Healey, 3 Sumner, 523. 2. (Same.) Where a balance is due on account, payable in a foreign country, the creditor, if he sues for the same in another country, is entitled to be paid at the rate of exchange. In other words, he is entitled to have the money replaced, where it was agreed to be paid. Ib. (Same.) Semble, That there is no difference between bills of exchange and other contracts for payment of money in a foreign country, as to the right to damages, to replace the money where it was payable, except that the usage of trade has fixed the rate of damages. Ib. 4. (Advances where reimbursable.) Semble, That advances ought to be deemed reimbursable at the place where they are made, and sales of goods accounted for at that place, where they are made, or authorized to be made. Ib. CONDITION PRECEDENT. (Payment of specific articles.) In the case of a note payable in specific articles, at a fixed time, at such place as the payee shall elect, if no election is made by him, in a reasonable time to enable the maker to pay the note before the time of payment elapses, the maker may, at such place as he shall elect, tender payment, and notify the payee of such tender. Adm'r. of Peck v. Hubbard, 11 Vermont, 612. 2. (Same.) In such case, the election of a place of payment, by the payee, is not a condition precedent, but a mere privilege, which, if not exercised in a reasonable time, is waived. Ib. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Appropriation of private property to public uses.) A corporation is not authorized to appropriate private property to public uses, without the con

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sent of the owner, unless it appear, either by the express words of the act of incorporation, or by necessary implication therefrom, that the legislature intended to confer such -authority upon the corporation. Thacher v. Dartmouth Bridge Co., 18 Pickering, 501. 2. (Same.) An act incorporating certain persons for the construction of a bridge, and conferring upon them authority to take the land necessary for such purpose, without the consent of the owner, and making no provision for his indemnification, is, in this respect, in contravention of the constitution of the Commonwealth, and is so far void. Ib. CONSTRUCTION. (May and Shall.) The word may, when used in a statute, means must or shall, in those cases where the public interest and rights are concerned, and where the public or third persons have a claim de jure, that the power designated should be exercised. Ew parte, William Simonton and another, 9 Porter, 390. 2. (State laws.) The courts of the United States are not bound, in the interpretation of deeds, by the local adjudications of a particular State. Thomas v. Hatch, 3 Sumner, 170. 3. (Deeds.) Deeds are always construed according to the force of the language used by the grantor, and the apparent intentions of the parties deducible thereform. Ib. 4. (Same.) The following words followed the granting part of a deed; “a certain tract of land, of which only five-eighths, common and undivided, is the property of J. D. (the grantor,) and is hereby conveyed, with the exceptions of about ten acres of land conveyed by deed to W. H., &c. &c., and also one acre conveyed by deed to R. &c., and also a strip of land, &c., containing one-eighth of an acre, &c., which exceptions are reserved out of the five-eighths as aforesaid;” Held that the grantor conveyed nothing in the excepted parcels, but five undivided eighths in the remainder of the tract. Ib. 5. (On—by—to ) A boundary “on a stream,” or “by a stream,” or “to a stream,” includes the flats, at least to low water-mark, and in many cases to the middle thread of the river. Quatre; how it would be where the boundary was “on the bank” of a river. Ib. 6. (Same.) A boundary on the bank of a river, referring to fixed monuments on the bank, limits the grant to the bank, and excludes the flats. Ib. 7. (Same.) Where there was a deed from the state, conveying all the right, title and interest of the state unto a “lot of land numbered ten, as was surveyed by Park Holland, in the year 1801,” which deed in the specific boundaries, bounded the lot on one side to a stake, and thence “to the bank of the river, thence by the bank of the river to the first mentioned bounds;” and in the plan the lot was laid down bounded on the river; Quatre, whether taking the whole description together, it did not convey the lot to the stream, and include the flats. Ib. 8. (Plan referred to.) If a plan is referred to in a deed, and the land, according to that plan, is bounded on a river, with no other specific boundaries than the river: semble, that the flats will pass, by operation of law, with the upland. Ib. 9. (Same.) A plan of a tract of land, which is referred to in a deed, for purposes of description, is to be treated, as if it were annexed to, and made part of the deed. Ib. 10. (Penal statutes.) In the construction of penal statutes, the proper course is to search out and follow the true intent of the legislature, and to adopt that sense, which harmonizes best with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. United States v. Winn, 3 Sumner, 185. 11. (Mistake in statute.) In construing an act of congress, if there be a mistake apparent upon the face of the act, which may be corrected by other language in the act itself, the mistake is not fatal. Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sumner, 279. 12. (Same.) No mere misnomer in the name of a person, or a corporation, named in the act is fatal, if the person or corporation really intended can be collected from the terms of the act. Ib. 13. (Same.) But where the descriptive words constitute the very essence of the act, unless the description is so clear and accurate as to refer to the particular subject intended, and to be incapable of being applied to any other, the mistake is fatal. Ib. 14. (Same.) There is no case, where a court, in the construction of a statute, has substituted other words and other dates in order to maintain an act, making erroneous references to things aliunde. Ib. 15. (Same.) By act of congress of 30th June, 1834, it was enacted, “That there be granted, &c. unto Thomas Blanchard, &c., for the term of fourteen years from the 12th day of January, 1837, the exclusive privilege of making, constructing, using, and vending to others to be used, his invention of a “machine for turning or cutting irregular forms, a description of which is given in schedule or specification annexed to letters patent, granted to the said T. B. for the said invention, on the 12th of January, 1820.” Now, there were no such letters patent of the 12th of January, 1820, as are referred to in this act; but letters patent of the 20th January, 1820; and the words of description therein were, “an engine for turning or cutting irregular forms,” instead of “a machine for turning or cutting irregular forms.” Held, that the court could not correct this variance, so as to give validity to the letters patent, under the act of 1834. Ib. 16. (Retrospective.) An act of congress ought to be construed so as not to operate retrospectively, or ew post facto, unless that construction is unavoidable. Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sumner, 535. CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION. (What.) Where the owner of a lot of land, regularly laid out, is in possession of any part, he is considered as constructively in possession of the whole; and while he is in possession, if any one, without color of title, enters into possession of another part of the lot, he cannot be considered as in joint possession of the whole lot with the owner, so as to acquire a title to the lot adversely to the owner. Hubbard v. Austin, 11 Vermont. 129. 2. (Same.) No subsequent conflicting possession in lands can be extended, by construction, beyond the limits of the actual adverse possession, for the purpose of defeating a prior constructive possession. Ralph v. Bayley, 11 Vermont, 521. CONSUL. (Administration of personal estate by.) Under the act of congress of 1792, c. 24, empowering consuls of the United States to take possession of the personal estale left by any citizen of the United States who shall die within their consulates, and there with “to pay the debts due from his estate which he shall have their contracted,” a consul is not authorized to pay a claim, not reduced to a judgment, for damages for a wrongful act committed by the deceased. Sturgis v. Slocum, 18 Pickering, 36. 2. (Same.) The defendant, who was consul of the United States at Buenos Ayres, being about to visit the United States, appointed K. acting consul during his absence, but the chargé d'affaires of the United States at Buenos Ayres refused to recognise K. as such, and performed the duties of consul himself, until the appointment of K. was approved by the government of the United States; and in consequence of such refusal, K. was prevented from receiving the emoluments of that office for several months. The chargé d'affaires subsequently died intestate, and the defendant in pursuance of the act of congress of 1792, c. 24, took possession of his property, and, having sold it, transmitted to the plaintiff, who was appointed administrator in this state, an account of the disposition made of it, showing a balance in favor of the estate, which the defendant claimed to retain on account of the intestate's refusal to recognise K. as the acting consul. It was held, that the defendant by setting up such claim, ceased to act under that statute; that he had no lien on the property for the alleged tort of the intestate ; and that an action at law might be maintained by the plaintiff against him, in this state, to recover such balance. 1b. CONTRACT. (Claim—Incumbrance.) A mortgager of real estate whose equity of redemption had been attached by a creditor, in consideration of the sum of $1200, conveyed the land to the defendants, without his wife releasing her right of dower,

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