aspect of its own, and is supposed to present some new combination which renders it doubtful what principle should be applied, or what circumstance should be controlling; and what the court needs is, to have the principle pointed out, and the why and the how of its applicability explained. Judges may read books and hunt up precedents for themselves; but they have not always the leisure to devote to each case that thought and reflection which the counsel is employed to give, and which may be essential to insure its being grounded on the proper basis. This is the duty of the counsel; and when he has read what he supposes to bear upon the case, and has carefully arranged and digested his learning, he has a right to feel confident in his preparation, and in his ability to present a more forcible and convincing argument to the court-applying it, as he will, to the precise facts of the controversy-than any he can read from the authorities. Indeed, much reading of undigested cases, or even text-books, at the bar, is usually a waste of time, or at best only answers the purpose of directing the attention of the court to a great number of decisions which might, with equal profit, be specified in a written list to be handed up to the judges for their subsequent investigation. For such reading will often leave only a vague and imperfect idea that the authorities read from have some sort of bearing upon the question under consideration, but precisely what, the judge must satisfy himself afterward by making that study of them which the counsel has failed to make.

The caution regarding thorough preparation for practice is more needful in cases which involve fundamental rights, than in any others. The temptaton is too great in America for practitioners to open offices and tender their assistance in legal causes without any such examination of the institutions under which they live as will entitle them to be heard on questions of constitutional authority. It is too often-indeed, it is usually-the case, that law reading is directed mainly to preparation for an early entry into practice, in simple cases and in the lower courts, and that works on contracts and on torts are allowed to occupy the attention to the exclusion of the works on government. Something of politics the student will be inclined to learn; and it will not be suprising if the temptations of political life shall beset him early, and lead him away into excitements that are fatal to regular and dispassionate investigations; for, in politics, one reads not so much to form judgments as to gather arguments in support of pre-existing notions; and notoriety in that field is quite consistent with great ignorance on constitutional subjects. The leaders of the political party will be read; while the jurists, whose business it has been to treat constitutional subjects from a judicial stand-point, are overlooked: and the training which one obtains in that way, while it may fit him for making an effective stump speech, goes but a little way in the preparation for undertaking such great questions of government as the lawyer of reputed ability is liable at any time to be called upon to grapple with.

What sort of an argument, for instance, would have been made by Mr. Hargrave in the great case of Sommersett, had his reading and reflection been confined within the narrow bounds which many law students of the present day seem willing to accept as furnishing sufficient scope for their powers? Would the great chief justice, who is admitted to have made, with reluctance, a decision, which, in the law of personal liberty, will be a landmark for all time, have been brought to the point of conviction which would insure its being

made at all? Nor are we to suppose that all the great questions regarding individual liberty have been disposed of by the decisions of Lord Mansfield and Lord Camden; or, to pass to questions peculiar to our own country, that all doubts concerning the proper limits of federal authority were settled by the decisions of Chief Justice Marshall, so that nothing is left to the lawyer of today but to apply the principles that he laid down to the new cases which from time to time arise. Cases have arisen in our own time quite as important as McCulloch v. Maryland, or any of the other great controversies to which Judge Marshall brought his matchless logic and pre-eminent wisdom. The question of the proper bounds of martial law;() of the right of the federal government to make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender in the payment of debts:() of the meaning of the term "bills of attainder," and the power of the states to impose test-oaths in order to exclude from office or professional employment those who may have taken part against the government; (j) and of the right of the States to bargain away or limit by contract any of the essential powers of sovereignty; (k) have recently demanded authoritative decision, and have moved the nation as profoundly as did any of the earlier cases. But there are many questions lying along the border line between federal and state authority which still remain to be discussed and settled. The new amendments to the Federal Constitution are prolific of such questions, and not to mention any others, it must be perfectly manifest on the most casual examination of the subject, that if it is competent to transfer to the federal courts the prosecution for offenses against the state, () or to confer upon those courts authority to punish stato judicial officers for judicial acts; (m) difficulties of the most serious nature have been brought into the administration of the criminal laws, and nothing but the most consummate wisdom on the part of a court, anxious to administer the Constitution in its integrity, can ever master them. Other constitutional questions are not yet transferred beyond the region of controversy, and are to be pondered. perhaps discussed and settled, by the young men who shall hereafter come upon the stage.

And passing beyond the province of the federal power, we do not find that all is plain in the constitutional law of the individual states, and that the functions of government are in every case clearly defined, and its limits. definitely marked out. The great question of the right of the state to teach

(h) Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.

(i) Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. C03; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

(j) Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wal. 277; Ex parte Garland, id. 333.

(k) See Washington University v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 441, and the dissenting opinions.

(7) Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. Rep. 303; Virginia v. Rives, Ibid. 313.

(m) See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. Rep. 339; Tennessee v. Davis, Ibid. 257.

In illustration of another question lying along the border line between federal and state authority, and threatening to breed difficulty and danger, the reader is referred to the case of Fenton v. Farley, 9 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 401, and the forcible note of Judge Redfield appended thereto.

religion in its schools, or of its duty to abstain from such teaching, and what precisely is meant by the doctrine of religious liberty and equality as we have engrafted it in our constitution, are still, it appears, open questions, and threaten violent and angry controversy.(n)

The limits of local self-government-what it properly embraces, in what directions and how far it may be extended, and in what degree the state may limit and control it-are still demanding the attention of both the lawyer and the legislator, and questions concerning them become at times of universal importance.(6)

Not less difficult and important are the questions regarding the proper division of governmental powers between the three departments created for their exercise. We have endeavored so to frame our constitutions that "the legislative department shall never exercise the executive or judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative or judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative or executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws, and not of men."(p) But what is legislative and what is executive, and what is judicial power, and who shall say when either is seized into usurping hands?

The attention of the student is called to a few of these questions for the purpose of indicating the broad fields which still await the laborer who shall fit himself to enter them. The foundation for due preparation must be laid in student life if ever, and he who lays it broad and deep may find himself called upon to take part in the struggles of the giants which some day will be had over these questions. No small share of this preparation will be made when

(a) Attention is directed to the thorough examination which this general subject underwent in the case of Minor e. The Board of Education, in the superior court of Cincinnati (published by R. Clarke & Co., Cincinnati), and to the masterly arguments made at the bar. The case shows how important it is that the investigations of a lawyer, especially on constitutional questions, should take a wide and liberal range, and that he should make himself thoroughly familiar with the fundamental principles of the government under which he lives. The arguments of counsel are deserving, for their ability and research, as well as for the importance of the subject discussed, of the most careful and thoughtful examination. It is well with any lawyer when he is s full of his subject that he can truthfully say, as was said by the honorable Stanley Mathews, at the close of a long and masterly argument, replete with learning, and glowing with apt illustration: "There is a world of things crowding upon me to say; but 1 must forbear."

(0) The question of the right of a state to require or empower its municipalities to aid, by loans or donations, the private corporations who are engaged in constructing works of internal improvement, is certainly one of the most important now before the American people. There are many who question the right, on the same ground. substantially, on which patents of monopoly were declared unlawful in the time of Queen Elizabeth. • For the end of all these monopolies is for the private gain of the patentees:" not for the benefit of the public. Darcy v. Allain. 11 Rep. 84. Of late there has been a decided disposition in some states for the legislature to take to itself a large share in the government of its cities, and even the appoint ment of municipal officers. This is supposed to be justified by local abuses and to be within that supreme control which the state is said to have of its municipal subdivisions when not restrained by positive provisions of its constitution. But it is worthy of some reflection whether the people in chacting their constitution ever understand that they are conferring such sapreme power. Local self-government is the most conspicuous and important fact in our political history; and it cannot be doubted that every state constitution has been framed in the expectation that such government is to continue as an unquestioned right. It may be seriously questioned whether the power to take away or seriously abridge this right can be considered as fairly within any general grant of legislative power, and whether express constitutional guaranties can be needed to secure that which has always been enjoyed from the very earliest history of the country, and which is understood to be the birthright of American citizens.

(p) This is an extract from the constitution of Massachusetts.

the author before us is carefully read and understood, but the standard American writers on government ought also to be familiar, and what is peculiar in our system should be made the subject of special study and examination. In this field of his inquiries the student will meet with much that is crude, and with many decisions made under circumstances precluding due deliberation, and perhaps presenting to the mind only vague and indefinite notions of constitutional right; but it is not essential that he should follow blindly the leading of any man or any court; the light is always attainable if he will but strive for it, and the greater the confusion of authority, the greater is his credit if he can succeed in pointing out clearly the principle that should govern.(7)

The admirable lectures of Chancellor Kent every student is expected to master after he has made himself familiar with the Commentaries of Mr. Justice Blackstone. Those lectures give us a pleasant, though very much condensed, view of the general principles of the law of nations; of American constitutional law, of the sources of the municipal law of the several states, and of the absolute and relative rights of individuals. The law of corporations next engages attention. Students who read by themselves usually complete the reading of this work before passing to any other, but if, instead of so doing, they should adopt the course, after mastering the lecture upon a particular subject-as for instance the subject of corporations-of taking up one or more of the leading treatises upon the same subject, they would make more sure of their ground as they progressed, and be likely to acquire a knowledge more precise and accurate. The clear and lucid presentations of the leading principles of all these subjects made by Kent will prepare one to master the details of the more extended work.() Passing then to the law of personal property and of contracts in Kent the student will find it useful in like manner to follow with the works of text writers devoted to these branches of the law.(s) Works upon particular divisions of the law of contracts, such as bailments, agency, partnership, and mercantile law generally may usefully be read in immediate sequence. Upon all these extended and exhaustive treatises will be met with, and as the subjects are of every-day importance in the lawyer's practice, it is likely that these treatises, or others of equal value, will be presented in new editions from time to time as accumulating decisions or new circumstances shall render important, so that the student may at any

(9) Upon the subject of the federal constitution, no work as yet supersedes the elaborate treatise of Mr. Justice Story; though if it were re-written in view of recent events and authorities, it might be made much more valuable, and be largely increased in interest to those who shall hereafter read it Some very convenient little hand-books, presenting analyses of the constitution, and some of them giving the decisions of the courts under its several clauses, are readily attainable. The foundations of federal constitutional law may be traced very satisfactorily in the pages of the Federalist, and in Elliot's Debates, and of International law in Wheaton, Lawrence & Phillimore.

(r) Augell & Ames on Corporations is still a standard work, and Grant and Field are also valunble. So also is Judge Redfield's treatise on the Law of Railways. Dillon on Municipal Corporations is excellent and indispensable.

(8) Williams and Schouler on Personal Property, are valuable treatises. There are many very good recent works on Contracts. Anson is especially valuable for students, and Mr. Bishop has a work adapted particularly for their use. Parsons on Contracts is more particularly suited to the practitioner.

time have in some one or more of them a satisfactory and reliable view of the existing law. (f)

When the student, in pursuing this course, shall reach the law of real estate, it would be well for him to pause for a moment, to consider some of the circumstances which are apt to render its study superficial. There is no lack here of abundant and safe guides, for the works upon real estate law are numerous, profound and exhaustive; but that they do not prove attractive must be confessed, and that they fail to receive that attention which the importance of the subject demands is evident. The student who has studied the law of contracts faithfully and with interest will not unfrequently suppose he may safely slight the law of real estate, and, after acquainting himself with the ordinary forms of conveyancing, and a few of its familier rules, he will pass on to other subjects in which his interest is more readily engaged.

Upon no other branch of the law has so much patient thought and so much profound learning been expended as upon the law of real estate. Some of the treatises in this department have been the admiration and delight of the ablest cotemporary lawyers, and are never read without leaving profoundly impressed upon the mind their wonderful erudition and thoroughness. For this very reason, and because their proper study tasks the mind so severely, they have been shunned by the student. Works like Littleton's Tenures, Fearne on Contingent Remainders, Saunders on Uses and Trusts, and Sugden on Powers, will not willingly be selected by the beginner as his text-books, if he can make himself believe that, after reading Blackstone and Kent, he will attain the same practical end by familiarizing himself with the common forms of conveyancing, and with the questions which most often arise between vendor and purchaser. And the whole tendency of modern legislation concerning real estate has been to lull the student into a false security, and to meline him more and more to rely upon such superficial knowledge as might answer the purpose of the conveyancer, but which fails to embrace the questions of nicety and difficulty. In both England and America the attention of some of the ablest minds has been directed to a reform in the law of real estate, with a view to relieving it of unnecessary and cumbrous forms, useless technicalities, and fictions which answer no useful purpose. The changes they have introduced have been great; in some respects very radical: and their influence has been to impress us with the belief that the ancient learning in real estate law has become obsolete and useless, and that time can be more profitably spent in acquiring a practical knowledge of the manner in which business is now done, than in poring over the musty books which, though ird'spensable in a past age, seem now, in these hurrying times, to possess only antiquaiian interest. Other important circumstances, which have operated mainly in the newer states, have had a tendency in the same direction. Real estate has been cheap; we have been near the source of title; conveyances of any particular parcel have not generally been numerous, nor the title complicated; the modes of transfer have been tolerably uniform and well understood: we have a general

(1) Sec particularly Edwards on Bailments and on Bills, Story on Bailments, Daniell on Negotiable Paper, Parsons on Bills and on Partnership, Smith on Mercantile Law, and Hutch

inson on Carriers.