that there were but two principles on which negotiations for peace usually proceeded: the first was the state of things before the war, or the status quo ante bellum; or the actual state of things at the time of negotiating, or the uti possidetis. If the situation of things was such as that it was not possible to restore them to what they was before the war, then the negotiation should have been on the latter principle, and every deviation from that principle should be strictly watched. If we had been much inferior to the enemy in strength at the time of the negotiation, that surely must enter into the account; but every noble lord who had yet spoken, disclaimed, and indeed it had been completely disproved by the event of the last year's war, in which it was by no means found that we were inferior to the enemy, either in success, in means, or resources. If the situation of the country then was elevated and prosperous, we ought to have had honourable terms of peace; we were in a condition to demand such terms as were adequate to our rank and power. He then requested their lordships to consider the situation of France, and by comparing it with that of this country, ascertain the relative situation of both. He by no means meant to undervalue the conquests of France, on the contrary, he thought them of the highest importance. By taking the Rhine for her boundary, and annexing Savoy, &c. she had not only extended her empire beyond what the most ambitious of her monarchs had ever conceived, but she had her frontiers additionally secured by dependent republics and tributary kings, additional war, continued success,

and fresh conquest. On our side, our successes were no less brilliant. We had rescued Egypt; possessed ourselves of Malta and Minorca ; and shut up the Mediterranean against the ships of France and Spain. We had the Cape of Good Hope, a most important key to the East. In the West Indies we had every thing that was desirable, Martinico, Trinidad, &c. On the continent of South America we had, at Demerara and Surinam, an empire almost equal in extent and importance to the power to whom we restored it. Although the war had · not been undertaken for colonial acquisitions, yet it was wisely directed to that object, as being the best means of crippling her marine, by contracting her commerce; but although we were disappointed in the objects of the war, these possessions should have been held as pledges for indemnity, and still more so for security. If the continent of Europe could not be restored to its former state, they ought to have been retained as a counterpoise to the power of France. The noble lord had seemed principally to rely upon an argument ad hominem, by comparing this treaty with the projet of Lisle, but he had forgot to state that, besides the cessions contained in that projet, the present treaty gave up Surinam, Minorca, and Malta. After four years of additional war and expense, we had given more to receive less; besides we should have remembered in what a period of despondency those negotiations began. The stoppage at the bank, which threatened more alarming consequences than resulted from it, to which was to be added, the unexpected defection of our allies, and, above all,

that

that which he would wish to blot from his memory, the mutiny in our fleet. At Lisle, though we gave up much for ourselves, we retained the dignity of stipulating for our allies. We then expressly stipulated for Portugal. We expressly stipulated for the prince of Orange. We did not leave his interests for future negotiations. If ministers had insisted on an indemnity for the pince of Orange, could it be supposed that the treaty would have been broken off on that account? If it should appear that his property had been confiscated on the pretence of his having given an order for the surrender of some colonies, was it not clear that this confiscation should be taken off when those colonies were restored? He objected much to that sort of preliminary treaty which was to be construed by secret understandings between the parties; for instance, when an article, expressing to guaranty the integrity of the territories of Portugal, was, in fact, to mean the dismemberment of it, pursuant to the separate treaties which Portugal had made with Spain. In permitting this dismemberment, in addition to what we had ourselves ceded, he conceived that the security of our possessions in the East had suffered much; for when the enemy should be able to exclude us from touching either at Brazil or the Cape of Good Hope, when they were able to place as strong European garrisons as they pleased in Pondicherry and Cochin, they would have great advantages in an Indian war. They could send over armaments with safety and convenience: we could not, for want of any intermediate port to touch at.

In the West Indies we had given up Martinique, the value of which was certainly greater than that of Trinidad. In the Mediterranean we had given up every thing; Minorca, Malta, Porto Ferrajo, and Egypt: and the first fruits of the liberation of Egypt, was a treaty by which France was to be as much favoured as ourselves, throughout the whole extent of the Turkish empire. As to Naples, the advantages she had obtained by this treaty were illusory. The French army was to evacuate her territory, but might remain within sixty miles of it, in the Cisalpine territory, and regain in a few days all that they now consented to give up. He could noť conceive that the situation of France entitled her to make such exorbitant demands; there was no reciprocity in the treaty, all the sacrifices were on our part, and none on theirs. His lordship concluded by giving his opinion, that we had given every pledge of security which was in our hands, and had now no other security but the word of France: that whatever might be the feelings which induced ministers to consent to such humiliating and dangerous sacrifices, (the more dangerous because they were so humiliating,) and whatever delusive confidence the country entertained in the continuance of such a peace, yet that the nation would be impressed with this conviction, that the stand must at least be made then, if not sooner; and that we must act like men having incautiously surrendered the out-works, but who retained the citadel, and would rather bury themselves in the ruins than surrender that.

The Lord Chancellor defended the peace, and was firmly persuaded

that

that the war had been carried on till it was hopeless to proceed any further. So far of its object as went to the security of our constitution had been attained. He should not boast of this peace as a very honourable one; but his principal wish was satisfied, if it was a secure and lasting peace, and the former ministers had declared that was their only object. We had certainly conquered many possessions of the enemy; but had France gained no dominion over Naples and Portugal? As to the projet of Lisle, that was but a projet, a proposition, and by no means an ultimatum, and it is by no means certain what would have been the terms agreed to, if these negotiations had gone on; however, he wished to procure a suitable indemnity for the prince of Orange; he could not, in his conscience, risk the peace by insisting upon this point; he thought it better to leave it for future arrangement. As to the Cape of Good Hope, however important it might be as a station and as a harbour, he thought it by no means worth continuing the war at an expense of thirty millions a year to obtain the possession of it; and as to the Mediteranean, he conceived we were better off now than in 1797, when the island of Malta had no power to guaranty it from France; and we were much better off than we would be if we, for the sake of retaining it, suffered France to keep possession of Naples and Portugal. In the West Indies, he confessed that he should prefer Martinique, if it could be obtained, to Trinidad. He thought there was a greater chance of this peace being permanent, than any peace which might have been made in

He

Lord Moira, in reply to lord Grenville. said, the peace was only so far inadequate as it was inadequate to the expectations which that noble lord and his colleagues had daily held out to parliament and. the country, of indemnity for the past, and security for the future. Although parliament had given the most unbounded confidence, and ample supplies that were ever entrusted to ministers, yet those promises constantly failed, and the country was brought so on the verge of ruin, as that a peace at any price became necessary. should, however, wish that what was past, should be, as much as possible, buried in oblivion, and that we should look forward to the more pleasing prospects which now open upon us. He did not at all agree in the justice of the metaphor used by lord Pelham, that this country and France had gone on in parallel lines; he thought there was no parallel between them. France was an extensive continental power, and her greatness depended on her army. The security of England rested on her navy; but however glorious and brilliant our victories bad been both by sea and by land, Great Britain stood in a state of comparative inferiority both in strength and aggrandizement. The acquisitions we had made certainly bore no comparison to those which

France

peace to be a mere hollow and precarious truce, that carried with it no symptoms of permanency or security. He considered, that the joy which the people expressed was a mere momentary delusion, that would vanish as soon as the people should return to their reason, and compare the immense sacrifices we have made to the trifling cessions made by France. For the two islands of Ceylon and Trinidad, the country has been nine years at war, has wasted some hundreds of millions of her treasure, and thousands of lives. At the same time that he disapproved of the peace, he considered that the public faith was now pledged, and that the terms of the treaty, bad as it was, must be adhered to.

Lord Westmoreland defended the preliminaries.

Lord St. Vincent considered Cey1on and Trindad as two of the most valuable islands in the whole habitable globe, either considered in a political or commercial point of view. Lord Nelson rose to give the opinion he had formed from the best opportunities which he had of ascertaming the value of some of the places which we had taken and afterwards ceded. Minorca he con'ceived of little value, as it was too far distant from Toulon to be an important naval station. As to Malta, he did not consider it as likely to be of any great importance to this 'country. We took it to rescue it from the hands of the French. would require a garrison of 7000 men to defend the works. He thought, provided the French did not get it, it was immaterial what third power was possessed of it. Neither did he consider the Cape of Good Hope as a settlement of very

It

great value. When the Indiamen were heavy ships, it was necessary to touch there and refit, but now that they are coppered and sail well, they often make the voyage without touching at any port whatever. He thought his majesty's ministers were bound to seize the first opportunity of making peace that offered, and that the preliminaries on the table were both honourable and advantageous.

The marquis of Buckingham lamented sincerely that he could not give his consent to the preliminaries on the table, as they appeared to him to be humiliating and disgraceful to this country. In the first place, he considered them dishonourable, as they left our allies exposed and unprotected. Portugal, in particular, appeared to him to have been shamefully abandoned, and by our consenting to its new commercial regulations with respect to France, we all but excluded our own woollens from the markets of Portugal. With regard to the security of the peace, nothing had been stipulated, but we were left solely to depend on the bare word and honour of the person now holding the government of the French republic. What was there in the character and conduct of that person to induce us to suppose, that he would not take the earliest favourable opportunity which offered for breaking the peace? He had betrayed a rooted jealousy and deep lodged hatred against this country, which it was not to be supposed would be easily washed away by any superabundant milk of human kindness in his composition. Since the signing the preliminaries, the intrigues of the French government had negotiated a private peace between the republic and the Porte, in order to prevent

the