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leaving a year's rent, stated the terms with more particularity than was necessary, it was held, that they must be proved as laid. Bristow v. Wright, Dougl. 640, 665.

Evidence of collateral facts, when admissible.] In general, evidence of collateral facts is not admissible. Thus where the question was as to the quality of beer to be furnished by the plaintiffs to the defendant, it was held that evidence could not be admitted of the quality of beer supplied by the plaintiff to other persons. Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Campb. 391. But where a collateral fact is material to the proof of the issue joined between the parties, evidence of such fact is admissible. Thus, in order to prove that the acceptor of a bill knew the payee to be a fictitious person, or that the drawer had a general authority from him to fill up bills with the name of a fictitious payee, evidence may be adduced to show that he had accepted similar bills before they could, according to their date, have arrived from the place of date. Hunter v. Gibson, 2 H. Bl. 288. But, in an action against the acceptor of a bill who defends on the ground of forgery, evidence that the person suspected of the forgery has forged the defendant's name in other instances is inadmissible. Balutti v. Serani, Peake, 142. Graft v. Lord Brownlow Bertie, M. S. Peake Ev. 111. Viney v. Barss, 1 Esp. 293. Proof of a customary right in a particular manor or parish is no evidence as to the customary rights in an adjoining parish or manor; Duke of Somerset v. France, 1 Str. 661; but, where all the manors in a particular district are held under the same tenure, and a question arises in one of the manors as to an incident to the tenure, evidence may be given of the usage prevailing in any other of the manors within the district. Ibid. Chumpian v. Atkinson, 3 Keb. 90, R. v. Ellis, 1 M. and S. 662. So where, in each of several manors belonging to the same lord, and part of the same district, it appeared that there was a class of tenants answering the same description, and to whom their tenements were granted by similar words, it was held that evidence of the rights enjoyed by those tenants in one manor might be received to show what were their rights in another. Rowe v. Brenton, 8 B. and C. 758. So proof of the manner in which a particular trade is carried on at one place is evidence as to the course of that particular trade in another place. Noble v. Kennaway, 2 Dougi. 510. Upon a question of skill and judg ment evidence may be given of facts, which, although in other respects collateral, are, by means of the skill and judgment of the witness, connected with, and tend to elucidate the issue. Folkes v. Chad. 1 Phill. Ev. 276. 3 Dougl. 157, S. C. Where the question was as to the right to certain trees growing in a woody belt of considerable extent, entire and undivided, evidence was admitted of several acts of ownership in

different parts of the belt; Stanley v. White, 14 East, 332; but in trespass by the proprietors of a canal, it was held, that evidence of acts of ownership by the proprietors on other parts of the banks than those in question was not admissible to prove property, without showing them to be part of one entire district, or that they had belonged to one person. Hollis v. Goldfinch, 1 B. and C. 205, and see Tyrwhit v. Wynn, 2 B. and A. 554. In an action by a rector for tithes, where the question is, whether a modus exists of a certain sum of money for a particular farm in a township within the parish, and the ecclesiastical and parliamentary surveys are silent as to any township or farm modus, after proof by the defendant of a uniform payment in lieu of tithes, the plaintiff may inquire whether other farms in the same township are not subject to the same payment, for the purpose of showing that such payments cannot be a modus, consistently with the evidence previously adduced. Blundell v. Howard, 1 M. and S. 292. 1 Phill. Ev. 164.

Evidence of special damage.] Where the special damage sustained by the plaintiff is not stated in the declaration, it is not one of the points in issue, and evidence of it cannot be received. But a damage which is the necessary result of the defendant's breach of contract may be proved, although not alleged in the declaration. See Ward v. Smith, 11 Price, 19. Special damage must be stated with certainty. Thus, where in an action for an irregular distress, it was averred that the plaintiff, in consequence of the injury, had lost divers lodgers, without naming any, Lord Ellenborough rejected evidence of the damage, because the names of the lodgers were not specified. Westwood v. Cowne, 1 Stark. 172. Where it was alleged as special damage that the plaintiff lost her marriage with J.N., Holt, C.J. refused to let evidence be given of a loss of marriage with any other person. Martin v. Henrickson, 2 Ld. Raym. 1007; and see post, "Case for defamation.”

Evidence of character.] In general, evidence as to the character of either of the parties to a suit is inadmissible, it being foreign to the point in issue. Thus, in an action for slander, imputing dishonesty to the plaintiff, he cannot adduce evidence in the first instance of good character. Cornwall v. Richardson, R. and M. 305. So also it has been held, that the plaintiff in an action for crim. con. or seduction, cannot give evidence of the good character of the wife or daughter, until evidence has been offered on the other side to impeach it; Bamfield v. Massey, 1 Campb. 460; and, if such evidence be not general, but go only to a specific instance, it has been ruled, that the plaintiff cannot, in reply, give evidence of general character, but must be restricted to the disproving of

the specific instance. Ibid. but see 2 Phill. 205, 2 Stark. Ev. 371. Where the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses has been directed to impeach the character of the plaintiff, and the witnesses deny the imputation intended, proof of the plaintiff's good character is not admissible. King v. Francis, 3 Esp. 116. See Bute v. Hill, 1 C. and P. 100.

But evidence of the party's bad character is admitted in some actions, with a view to the amount of damages. Thus, in actions of crim. con. evidence is admissible of the wife's bad character for chastity, and even of particular acts of adultery committed by her before her intercourse with the defendant; for, by bringing the action, the husband puts her gene❤ ral behaviour in issue. B. N. P. 27, 296. So of the husband's profligacy, and of his criminal connexion with other women. Ibid. So in slander, it was formerly held, that where the defendant does not justify, evidence might be given of the plaintiff's bad character, as that at the time of the supposed offence, the plaintiff was generally suspected of the crime imputed to him; v. Moor,1 M. and S. 284, Lord Leicester v. Walter, 2 Campb. 251; but it has since been decided, that general evidence of the plaintiff's bad character is inadmissi ble in mitigation of damages. Jones v. Stevens, 11 Price, 235. See further as to the character of witnesses, post.

Particulars of plaintiff's demand.] Where the plaintiff has delivered a bill of the particulars of his demand, he will be precluded from giving any evidence of demands not contained in his particular. Thus, where the particular states a demand for horses sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, evi dence cannot be given of money due from the defendant for horses sold by him as the plaintiff's agent. Holland v. Hopkins, 2 B. and P. 243. But in an action against an agent for not accounting for goods delivered to the plaintiff to be sold, and for goods sold, and money had and received, particu lars headed "A. to B. tierces of porter, &c. l. "and containing also items for money had and received, were held to be applicable to any of the counts in the declaration. Hunter v. Welch, 1 Stark. 224. So in an action by a carrier who had misdelivered certain goods to the defendant, which the latter appropriated to his own use, the carrier having paid the amount of the goods to the real owner, it was held that he might recover on the count for money paid, although his particulars were only "To seventeen firkins of butter, 551. 6s." Brown v. Hodgson, 4 Taunt. 189. Where the particulars contained a demand on a promissory note only, which could not be given in evidence for want of a stamp, it was held, that the plaintiff could not give evidence of the consideration of the note. Wade v. Beasley, Esp. 7. Where a particular need not be given as to some counts, the omission of those causes

of action will not be material. Thus, where the first count was on a bill of exchange for 401., and the second on a bill for 201., and the third for goods sold, and the particulars specified only the 201. bill and the goods, per Abbott, C. J. "That is no objection. If the bill is specified in the declaration, it need not be mentioned in the particulars. You must give a particular of goods sold, but you never need give a particular of bills of exchange, if they appear in the declaration." Cooper v. Amos, 2 C. and P. 267. The plaintiff may recover interest, though the particular only contains a demand upon a promissory note. Blake v. Lawrence, 4 Esp. 147. In one case, it was ruled that the plaintiff might recover more than his particulars demanded, the defendant having given in evidence an account, from which it appeared that there was a sum of money due to the plaintiff beyond that claimed in his particulars. Hurst v. Watkins, 1 Campb. 68, and see 1 Phill Ev. 182. So where the defendant pleaded in abatement, that the promises were made by himself and another person jointly, and it appeared from the particulars, and was admit ted at the trial, that some of the articles were furnished to the defendant jointly with the person named in the plea, it was held by Lord Kenyon, that the plaintiff was bound by his particulars, and that he must be nonsuited, although it appeared by the particulars that part of the demand was due from the defendant alone. Colson v. Selby, 1 Esp. 451. But where, in an action for lottery-tickets sold, the particulars of the defendant's set-off mentioned the sale of the tickets to himself, it was held, that this was not sufficient proof of the sale, and that the fact must be proved by other evidence. Miller v. Johnson, 2 Esp.602. Harrington v. Macmorris, 5 Taunt. 229. Yet, in a very late case, the particulars of the plaintiff's demand were allowed to be read for the defendant, in order to prove payments for which the plaintiff had given the defendant credit. Rymer v. Cook, 1 M. and M. 86 (n). The plaintiff may give evidence of a demand contained in his particular, though he omitted to include it in a bill delivered before action brought. Short v. Edwards, 1 Esp. 374.

A mistake in the particulars, not calculated to mislead, is immaterial. Thus, where the particular specified a bill for 60%. bearing date on a certain day, and the evidence was of a bill for 631. dated on a different day in the same year and month, Abbott, J. held the variance to be immaterial. Manning's Index, 240. So where the particulars specify a payment made on account of the defendant to A., which was in fact made to B., it is sufficient, unless the defendant will state to the court by affidavit that he has been misled. Day v. Bowyer, 1 Campb. 69 (n). So where the action is for money had and received to the use of the bankrupt, and the particulars for money had and received to the use of the plaintiffs, as assignees,

Tucker v. Barrow, 1 M. and M. 137. So also where work and labour is stated to have been performed in a certain month, which was in fact performed in another month, it is immaterial. Millwood v. Walter, 2 Taunt. 224. So again, where in debt for rent, premises situate at A. are described as situate at B., it is immaterial, unless the defendant can prove that he held other premises at B. of the plaintiff. Davies v. Edwards, 3 M. and S. 380. If the plaintiff, perceiving a defect in his particulars, delivers a second bill of particulars large enough to comprehend his whole demand, yet this will not avail him, unless the second particular has been delivered under a judge's order, and he will be confined to his first particular. Brown v. Watts, 1 Taunt. 353.

The particulars are proved by the production of the judge's order, and of the particulars themselves, and by proof of the signature of the party, or his attorney or agent. 1 Phill, Ev. 183.

Evidence confined to the issue-of what facts the courts will take judicial notice.] There are various facts which the courts notice judicially, and of which it is of course unnecessary to give any evidence. They will judicially notice the order and course of proceedings in Parliament; Lake v. King, 1 Saund. 131; the superior courts and their jurisdiction; Tregany v. Fletcher, 1 Lord Raym. 184; and course of proceeding; Dobson v. Bell, 2 Lev. 176; and the privileges of their officers; Ogle v. Norcliffe, 2 Lord Raym. 869; the beginning and end of term; Estwicke v. Cooke, 2 Lord Raym. 1557; 1 Suund. 300, d (n). 5th ed.; general customs, as those of gavelkind and borough English; Clements v. Scudamore, 2 Ld. Raym. 1025; the limits of ecclesiastical jurisdictions; Adams v. Terretenants of Savage, 2 Ld. Raym. 854; the limits of counties; 2 Inst. 557. Deybel's case, 4 B. and A. 248; the days of festivals appointed by the calendar; Brough v. Perkins, 6 Mod. 81; and the number of days in a particular month. 1 Rol. Ab. 524.

The courts will not notice judicially the nature and jurisdiction of inferior courts; Moravia v. Sloper, Willes, 37; nor foreign laws; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, Cowp. 174; nor the seal nor proceeding of a foreign court; Henry v. Adey, 3 East, 221; Ganer v. Lady Lanesborough, Peake, 17; nor the laws of the colonies; Wey v. Yally, 6 Mod. 194; nor the King's proclamation, without production of the Gazette; Van Omeron v. Dowick, 2 Campb. 44; nor particular customs, as those of London; Argyle v. Hunt, 1 Str. 187, Wiseman v. Cotton, 1 Sid. 138; nor that a particular town is within a certain diocese; R. v. Simpson, 2 Ld. Ruym. 1379; nor the local situation of a town in a county; Deybel's case, 4 B. and A. 243; nor that a particular town, as Dublin, is in Ireland; Kearney v. King, 2 B. and A. 303; nor the sheriffs' book. Russell v. Dickson, 6 Bingh 442. Though the court will take judicial notice of the articles

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