Popular addresses preroga tive. been lately noticed. The address of the Commons, after the dismissal of the Coalition Ministry, pray ing the King not to dissolve Parliament, has been described elsewhere.2 Lord Wharncliffe's vain effort to arrest the dissolution of Parliament in 1831, has also been adverted to.3 But though the right of Parliament to address the Crown, on such occasions is unquestionable,―its exercise has been restrained by considerations of policy, and party tactics. The leaders of parties, profiting by the experience of Mr. Fox and Lord North,-have since been too wise to risk the forfeiture of public esteem, by factiously opposing the right of ministers to appeal from the House of Commons to the people. Unless that right has been already exercised, the alternatives of resigning office or dissolving Parliament have been left,— by general consent,-to the judgment of ministers who cannot command the confidence of the House of Commons. In the exercise of their discretion, ministers have been met with remonstrances; but sullen acquiescence on the part of their opponents, has given place to violent addresses, and measures for stopping the supplies. As Parliament may tender its advice to the Crown, concerning regarding its own dissolution, so the people, in their turn, have claimed the right of praying the Crown to exercise its prerogative, in order to give them the means of condemning the conduct of Parliament. In 1701, during a fierce contest between the Whig and Tory parties, numerous petitions and addresses were pre sented to William III. at the instance of the Whigs, praying for the dissolution of the Parliament, which was soon afterwards dissolved. 1 Supra, p. 403, 404. 2 Supra, p. 62. 3 Supra, p. 118. The constitutional character 4 Burnet's Own Time, iv. 543. Rockingham Mem., ii. 105. 1 of these addresses having been questioned, was upheld by a vote of the House of Commons, which affirmed "that it is the undoubted right of the people of England to petition or address the King, for the calling, sitting, and dissolving Parliaments, and for the redressing of grievances." In 1710, similar tactics were resorted to by the Tories, when addresses were presented to Queen Anne, praying for a dissolution, and assuring her Majesty that the people would choose none but such as were faithful to the Crown, and zealous for the Church.2 In 1769, Lord Chatham sought public support of the same kind, in his efforts to obtain a dissolution of Parliament. Lord Rockingham and some of the leading Whigs, who doubted at first, were convinced of the constitutional propriety of such a course; and Lord Camden expressed a decisive opinion, affirming the right of the subject. The people were justly dissatisfied with the recent proceedings of the House of Commons; and were encouraged by the Opposition to lay their complaints at the foot of the throne, and to pray for a dissolution. The contest between Mr. Pitt and the Coalition was characterised by similar proceedings. While the Commons were protesting against a dissolution, the supporters of Mr. Pitt were actively engaged in obtaining addresses to his Majesty, to assure him of the support of the people, in the constitutional exercise of his prerogative.1 1 Parl. Hist., v. 1339; Grenville Papers, iv. 446. Somerville's Reign of Queen Anne, 409; Smollett's Hist., ii. 191; Grenville Papers, iv. 453. 3 His answer was full and manly, that the right is absolute, and unquestionable for the exercise." Lord Chatham to Lord Temple, Nov. 8th, 1769; Grenville Papers, iv. 479. See Address of the City, Ann. Reg., 1784, p. 4, &c. Votes of want of confidence. Votes of confidence. The House of Commons in the first instance,-and the people in the last resort,-have become arbiters of the fate of the ministers of the Crown. Ministers may have the entire confidence of their Sovereign, and be all-powerful in the House of Lords; but without a majority of the House of Commons, they are unable to administer the affairs of the country. The fall of ministries has more often been the result of their failure to carry measures which they have proposed, or of adverse votes on general questions of public policy; but frequently it has been due,— particularly in modern times,—to express representations to the Crown, that its ministers have not the confidence of the House of Commons. Where such votes have been agreed to by an old Parliament,as in 1784,-ministers have still had before them the alternative of a dissolution; but when they have already appealed to the country for support, as in 1841, and again in 1859,—a vote affirming that they have not the confidence of the House of Commons, has been conclusive. The disapprobation of ministers by the House of Commons being decisive, the expression of its confidence has, at other times, arrested their impending fall. Thus in 1831, Lord Grey's ministry, embarrassed by an adverse vote of the other House, on the second reform bill', was supported by a declaration of the continued confidence of the House of Commons. And at other times, the House has interposed its advice to the Crown, on the formation of administrations, with a view to favour or obstruct political arrangements, then in progress. Thus, in 1784, when negotiations had been commenced for a fusion of parties, resolutions 1 Supra, p. 118. were laid before his Majesty expressing the opinion of the House of Commons, that the situation of public affairs required a "firm, efficient, extended, and united administration, entitled to the confidence of the people, and such as may have a tendency to put an end to the divisions and distractions of the country." Similar advice was tendered to the Prince Regent in 1812, after the death of Mr. Perceval; and to William IV., in 1832, on the resignation of Earl Grey.2 1 ments. But this constant responsibility of ministers, while it Impeachhas made their position dependent upon the pleasure of Parliament, has protected fallen ministers from its vengeance. When the acts and policy of statesmen had been dictated by their duty to the Crown alone, without regard to the approval of Parliament, they were in danger of being crushed by vindictive impeachments, and attainders. Strafford had died on the scaffold; Clarendon had been driven into exile; Danby had suffered a long imprisonment in the Tower; Oxford, Bolingbroke, and Ormond had been disgraced and ruined 5, at the suit of the Commons. But Parliamentary responsibility has prevented the commission of those political crimes, which had provoked the indignation of the Commons; and when the conduct or policy of ministers has been condemned, loss of power has been their only punishment. Hence the rarity of impeachments in later times. The last hundred years present but two cases of impeachment,—the one against Mr. Warren Hastings, on charges of misgovernment in 1 Parl. Hist., xxiv. 450; Ann. Reg., 1784, p. 265. 2 Supra, p. 104, 355; Hansard's Deb., 1st Ser., xxiii. 249. 3 Having gone abroad pending his impeachment, an Act of banishment and incapacity was passed by Parliament, 4 Not being brought to trial, he was admitted to bail by the Court of King's Bench, after an imprisonment of five years. St. Tr., xi. 871. 5 Oxford was imprisoned for two years in the Tower. Bolingbroke and Ormond, having escaped, were attainted. Impeach abated by a dissolution, 1791. India,—the other against Lord Melville, for alleged malversation in his office. The former was not a minister of the Crown, and he was accused of offences committed beyond the reach of Parliamentary control; and the offences charged against the latter, had no relation to his political duties as a responsible minister. The case of Mr. Warren Hastings finally established ments not the constitutional doctrine, that an impeachment by the Commons is not terminated by any prorogation or dissolution of Parliament. It had been affirmed by the Lords in 1678, after an examination of precedents': when Lord Stafford fell a victim to its assertion; and six years afterwards, it had been denied, in order to secure the escape of the "popish lords," then under impeachment.2 Lord Danby's lingering impeachment had been continued by the first decision, and annulled by the last. The same question having arisen after the lapse of a century, Parliament was called upon to review the precedents of former impeachments, and to pass its judgment upon the contradictory decisions of the Lords. Many of the precedents were so obscure as to furnish arguments on both sides of the question; conflicting opinions were to be found amongst text-writers; and the most eminent lawyers of the day were not agreed. But the masterly and conclusive speech of Mr. Pitt was alone sufficient to settle the controversy, even on the grounds of law and precedent. On broad constitutional principles, the first statesmen of all parties concurred xiv. 11. Macdonald, Sir John Scott, Mr. s Lord Thurlow, Lord Kenyon, and Sir William Grant, maintained Sir Richard Arden, Sir Archibald its continuance, |