5 many wars founded upon commerial motives, fince that has become he prevailing fyftem of nations, as vere before occafioned by the cupiity of territory or dominion? Has ot the fpirit of commerce, in many nftances, administered new incenives to the appetite both for the ne and for the other? Let experince, the leaft fallible guide of hunan opinions, be appealed to for an ufwer to thefe enquiries. Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carhage, were all republics; two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they is often engaged in wars, offenfive and defenfive, as the neighbouring monarchies of the fame times. Sparta was little better than a well regulated camp; and Rome was never fated of carnage and conqueft. Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggreffor in the very war that ended in her deftruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into the heart of Italy, and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a conqueft of the commonwealth. Venice, in latter times, figured more than once in wars of ambition; 'till becoming an object of terror to the other Italian ftates, pope Julius the fecond, found means to accomplish that formidable league*, which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic. The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes, took a leading and confpicuous part in the wars of Europe. They had furious contefts with England NOTE, The league of Cambray, comprehending the emperor, the king of France, the king of Arragon, and moft of the Italian princes and ftates. for the dominion of the fea, and were among the most perfevering and moft implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV. In the government of Britain, the reprefentatives of the people compofe one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been, for ages, the predominant purfuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars, in which that kingdom has been engaged, have in numerous inftances proceeded from the people. There have been, if I may fo exprefs it, almoft as many popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation, and the importunities of their reprefentatives, have, upon various occafions, dragged their monarchs into war, or continued them in it contrary to their inclinations, and fometimes contrary to the real interefts of the ftate. In that memorable struggle for fuperiority, between the rival houfes of Auftria and Bourbon, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that the antipathies of the English against the French, feconding the ambition, or rather the avarice of a favourite leader +, protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by found policy, and for a confiderable time in oppofition to the views of the court. The wars of these two laft mentioned nations have in a great measure grown out of commercial confiderations-the defire of fupplanting, and the fear of being fupplanted, either in particular branches of traffic, or in the general advantages of trade and navigation. From this fummary of what has taken place in other countries, whose fituations have borne the nearest refemblance to our own, what reason NOTE. + The duke of Marlborough. pre can we have to confide in thofe reveries, which would feduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the meinbers of the fent confederacy, in a state of feparation? Have we not already feen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of thofe idle theories which have amufed us with promiles of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses, and evils incident to fociety in every fhape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt, as a practical maxim, for the direction of our political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wifdom and perfect virtue ? Let the point of extreme depreffion to whom our national dignity and credit have funk-let the inconveniencies felt every where from a lax and ill adminiftration of government let the revolt of a part of the ftate of North Carolina-the late menacing disturbances in Pennfylvania, -and the actual infurrections and rebellions in Maffachusetts-declare! So far is the general fenfe of mankind from correfponding with the tenets of those, who endeavour to lull afleep our apprehenfions of difcord and hoftility between the ftates, in the event of difunion, that it has, from long obfervation of the progrefs of fociety, become a fort of axiom in politics, that vicinity, or nearnefs of fituation, conftitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent writer expreffes himself on this fubject to this effect-" neighbouring nations (fays he) are naturally enemies of each other, unless their common weakness forces them to league in a confederate republic, and their conftitution prevents the differences that neighbourhood occafions, extinguifhing that fecret jealoufy which difpofes all states to aggrandife them felves at the expence of their neigh bours." This paffage at the fame time points out the evil, and fuggetts the remedy. PUBLIUS. New York, Nov. 17, 1787. (To be continued). མ�ས The objections of the bon. George Mafon, one of the delegates from Virgi nia, in the late continental conventis, to the propofed federal conflitatra, affigned as his reasons for not figuieg the fame. HERE is no declaration of TH rights and the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws and conftitutions of the feveral ftates, the declarations of rights, in the feparate states, are no fecurity. Nor are the people fecured even in the enjoyment of the beneat of the common law, which ftands here upon no other foundation than its having been adopted by the refpective acts forming the conftitu tions of the several states. In the house of reprefentatives, there is not the fubftance, but the fhadow only of representation; which can never produce proper information in the legislature, or infpire confidence in the people. The laws will, therefore, be generally made by men little concerned in, and unacquainted with their effects and confequencest. The fenate have the power of altering all money-bills, and of origi NOTES. Vide principes des negotiations par l'Abbe de Mably. + This objection has been in fome degree leffened, by an amendment, often before refused, and at laft made by an erafure, after the engroffment upon parchment, of the word forty, and inferting thirty, in the third claufe of the second section of the first article. ating appropriations of money, and e falaries of the officers of their wn appointment, in conjunction ith the prefident of the united ates-although they are not the rerefentatives of the people, or ameable to them. Thefe, with their ther great powers, (viz. their powrs in the appointment of ambaffalors, and all public officers, in makng treaties, and in trying all imeachments), their influence upon, and connection with, the fupreme xecutive from thefe caufes, their luration of office, and their being a conftant exifting body, almost contiually fitting, joined with their beng one complete branch of the legillature, will deftroy any balance n the government, and enable them o accomplish what ufurpations they leafe, upon the rights and liberties of the people. The judiciary of the united states is fo conftructed and extended, as to abforb and deftroy the judiciaries of the several states; thereby rendering law as tedious, intricate, and expenfive, and justice as unattainable by a great part of the community, as in England; and enabling the rich to opprefs and ruin the poor. The prefident of the united states has no conftitutional council (a thing unknown in any fafe and regular government): he will therefore be unfupported by proper information and advice; and will generally be directed by minions and favouritesor he will become a tool to the fenate -or a council of ftate will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments the worst and most dangerous of all ingredients for fuch a council, in a free country; for they may be induced to join in any dangerous or oppreffive meafures, to fhelter themselves, and prevent an enquiry into their own mifconduct in office. Whereas had a conftitutional council been formed (as was proposed) of fix members, viz. two from the eaftern, two from the middle, and two from the fouthern ftates, to be appointed by vote of the ftates in the house of reprefentatives, with the fame duration and rotation of office as the fenate, the executive would always have had fafe and proper information and advice: the prefident of fuch a council might have acted as vice-prefident of the united states, pro tempore, upon any vacancy or difability of the chief magiftrate; and long continued feffions of the fenate would in a great meafure have been prevented. From this fatal defect of a conftitutional council, has arifen the improper power of the fenate, in the appointment of public officers, and the alarming dependence and connection between that branch of the legiflature and the fupreme executive. Hence alfo fprung that unneceffary and dangerous officer, the vice-prefident, who for want of other employment, is made prefident of the fenate; thereby dangerously blending the executive and legiflative powers; befides always giving to fome one of the states an unnecessary and unjust pre-eminence over the others. The prefident of the united states has the unrestrained power of granting pardon for treafon; which may be fometimes exercifed to fercen from punishment thofe whom he had fecretly inftigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent a difcovery of his own guilt. By declaring all treaties fupreme laws of the land, the executive and the fenate have. in many cafes, an exclufive power of legiflation; which might have been avoided, by proper diftinctions with refpect to treaties, and requiring the affent of the houfe of reprefentatives, where it could be done with fafety. By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and navigation laws, the five fouthern itates (whofe produce and circumftances are totally different from thofe of the eight northern and eastern states) will be ruined for fuch rigid and premature regulations may be made, as will enable the merchants of the northern and eastern states not only to demand an exorbitant freight, but to monopolize the purchase of the commodities, at their own price, for many years, to the great injury of the landed intereft, and impoverishment of the people and the danger is the greater, as the gain on one fide will be in proportion to the lofs on the other. Whereas, requiring two-thirds of the members present in both houfes, would have produced mutual moderation, promoted the general intereft, and removed an infuperable objection to the adoption of the go vernment. Under their own construction of the will hereafter be a breach of all the conftitutions in the union, and afford precedents for other innovations. This government will commence in a moderate ariftocracy; it is at prefent impoffible to foresee whether it will, in its operation, produce a monarchy, or a corrupt oppreffive ariftocracy; it will most probably vibrate fome years between the two, and then terminate in the one or the other. The addrefs, and reafons of diffent, of the minority of the convention of the State of Pennsylvania, to their cam ftituents. T was not until after the termi general claufe at the end of the enume-ion of the late glorious com rated powers, the congrefs may grant monopolies in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusual and fevere punishments, and extend their power as far as they fhall think proper; fo that the ftate legislatures have no fecurity for the powers now prefumed to remain to them; or the people for their rights. There is no declaration of any kind for preferving the liberty of the prefs, the trial by jury in civil caufes, nor against the danger of ftanding armies in time of peace. The ftate legislatures are reftrained from laying export duties on their own produce the general legislature is reftrained from prohibiting the further importation of flaves for twenty odd years, though fuch importations render the united states weaker, more vulnerable, and lefs capable of defence-Both the general legislature, and the ftate legiflatures, are exprefsly prohibited making ex poft facto laws, though there never was, nor can be, a legiflature, but muft and will make fuch laws, when neceffity and the public fafety require them, which teft, which made the people of the united states an independent nation, that any defect was difcovered in the prefent confederation. It was formed by fome of the ableft patriots in America. It carried us fuccefsfully through the war; and the virtue and patriotifm of the people, with their difpofition to promote the common caufe, fupplied the want of power in congrefs. The requifition of congrefs for the five per cent. impoft was made before the peace, fo early as the firf of February, 1781; but was pr vented taking effect by the refufal of one ftate. Yet it is probable every ftate in the union would have agreed to this meafure, at that period, bad it not been for the extravagant term in which it was demanded. The requifition was new moulded in 1783, and accompanied with an ad ditional demand of certain fupple mentary funds for 25 years. Peace had now taken place; and the united ftates found themselves labouring un der a confiderable foreign and do mestic debt, incurred during the war. The requifition of 1783 was commenfurate with the intereft of the debt, as it was then calculated; but it has been more accurately afcertained fince that time. The domeftic debt has been found to fall feveral millions of dollars fhort of the calculation and it has lately been confiderably diminifhed by large fales of the weltern lands. The fates have been called on by congrefs, annually, for fupplies, until the general fyftem of finance, propofed in 1783, fhould take place. revifing and amending the prefent articles of confederation." Pennfylvania, by the aft appointing deputies, exprefsly confined their pow probable that fome of the members of the affembly of this flate had, at that time, in contemplation to annihilate the prefent confederation, as well as the conflitution of Pennfylvania, yet the plan was not fufficiently matured to communicate it to the public. It was at this time that the want of an efficient federal government was firft complained of; and that the powers vefted in congrefs were founders to this object; and though it is to be inadequate to the procuring of the benefits that fhould refult from the union. The impoft was granted by most of the ftates but many refufed the fupplementary funds. The annual requifitions were fet at nought by fome of the ftates: while others complied with them by legiflative acts, but were tardy in their payments: and congrefs found themfelves incapable of complying with their engagements, and fupporting the federal government. It was found that our national character was finking in the opinion of foreign nations. The congrefs could make treaties of commerce; but could not enforce the obfervance of them. We were fuffering from the reftrictions of foreign nations, who had fhackled our commerce, while we were unable to retaliate and all now agreed, that it would be advantageous to the union to enlarge the powers of congrefs; that they fhould be enabled in the ampleft manner to regulate com merce, and to lay and collect duties on the imports throughout the united flates. With this view a convention was first propofed by Virginia, and finally recominended by congrefs for he different ftates to appoint depuies to meet in convention, "for he purpose of revifing and amendVol. II. No. VI. The majority of the legislature of this commonwealth, were at that time under the influence of the members from the city of Philadelphia. They agreed that the deputies fent by them to convention fhould have Do compenfation for their fervices, which determination was calculated to prevent the election of any members who refided at a distance from the city. It was in vain for the minority to attempt electing delegates to the convention, who underflood the circumftances, and the feelings of the people, and had a common intereft with them. They found a difpofition in the leaders of the majority of the houfe, to choose themfelves and fome of their dependants. The minority attempted to prevent this by agreeing to vote for fome of the leading members, who, they knew, had influence enough to be appointed at any rate, in hopes of carrying with them fome refpectable citizens of Philadelphia, in whole C |