That system could not be deemed to have reached its maturity till the power of the people at large had been established by the Reform Act of 1832. For its essence resides in the delicate equipoise it creates between the three powers, the ministry, the House of Commons, and the people. The House is strong, because it can call the ministry to account for every act, and can, by refusing supplies, compel their resignation. The ministry are not defenceless, because they can dissolve Parliament, and ask the people to judge between it and them. Parliament, when it displaces a ministry, does not strike at executive authority: it merely changes its agents. The ministry, when they dissolve Parliament, do not attack Parliament as an institution: they recognize the supremacy of the body in asking the country to change the individuals who compose it. Both the House of Commons and the ministry act and move in the full view of the people, who sit as arbiters, prepared to judge in any controversy that may arise. The House is in touch with the people, because every member must watch the lights and shadows of sentiment which play over his own constituency. The ministry are in touch with the people, because they are not only themselves representatives, but are heads of a great party, sensitive to its feelings, forced to weigh the effect of every act they do upon the confidence which their party places in them. The only conjuncture which this system of "checks and balances" does not provide for is that of a ministry supported by a parliamentary majority pursuing a policy which was not presented to the people at the last general election, and of which the bulk of the people in fact disapprove.1 This is a real danger, yet one which can seldom last long enough to work grave mischief, for the organs of public opinion are now so potent, and the opportunities for its expression so numerous, that the anger of a popular majority, perhaps even of a very strong minority, is almost certain to alarm both the ministry and the House, and to arrest them in their course.2

1 The recent leading case on this subject is that of Lord Beaconsfield's Government from 1876 till 1880. It followed, during the years 1877 and 1878, a foreign policy which the bulk of the electors apparently disapproved (though some persons hold that there was not a disapproving majority in the country till 1879), but which Parliament sanctioned by large majorities. But the vehement popular agitation of 1876-78 seems to have had the effect of considerably modifying the policy of the ministry, though it could not wholly change its direction.

2 "The dangers arising from a party spirit in Parliament exceeding that of the nation, and of a selfishness in Parliament contradicting the true interest of

The drawback to this system of exquisite equipoise is the liability of its equilibrium to be frequently disturbed, each disturbance involving either a change of government, with immense temporary inconvenience to the departments, or a general election, with immense expenditure of money and trouble in the country. It is a system whose successful working presupposes the existence of two great parties and no more, parties each strong enough to restrain the violence of the other, yet one of them steadily preponderant in any given House of Commons. Where a third, perhaps a fourth, party appears, the conditions. are changed. The scales of Parliament oscillate as the weight of this detached group is thrown on one side or the other; dissolutions become more frequent, and even dissolutions may fail to restore stability. The recent history of the French Republic shows the difficulties of working a Chamber composed of groups: nor is the same source of difficulty unknown in England.

It is worth while to compare the form which a constitutional struggle takes under the Cabinet system and under that of America.

In England, if the executive ministry displeases the House of Commons, the House passes an adverse vote. The ministry have their choice to resign or to dissolve Parliament. If they resign, a new ministry is appointed from the party which has proved itself strongest in the House of Commons; and co-operation being restored between the legislature and the executive, public business proceeds. If, on the other hand, the ministry dissolve Parliament, a new Parliament is sent up which, if favourable to the existing cabinet, keeps them in office, if unfavourable, dismisses them forthwith.1 Accord is in either case restored. Should the difference arise between the House of Lords and a the nation, are not great dangers in a country where the mind of the nation is steadily political, and where its control over its representatives is constant. A steady opposition to a formed public opinion is hardly possible in our House of Commons, so incessant is the national attention to politics, and so keen the fear in the mind of each member that he may lose his valued seat."-Walter Bagehot, English Constitution, p. 241. These remarks of the most acute of English political writers are even more true now than they were in 1872.

1 Recent instances, dating from Mr. Disraeli's resignation in December 1868, when the results of the election of that year were ascertained, have established the usage that a ministry quits office, without waiting to be turned out, when they know that the election has gone against them. Mr. Gladstone resigned forth with after the General Elections of 1874 and 1886, Lord Beaconsfield after that of 1860. The usage, however, is not yet a rule of the Constitution though it seems on the way to become one.

ministry supported by the House of Commons, and the former persist in rejecting a bill which the Commons send up, a dissolution is the constitutional remedy; and if the newly-elected House of Commons reasserts the view of its predecessor, the Lords, according to the now recognized constitutional practice, yield at once. Should they, however, still stand out, there remains the extreme expedient, threatened in 1832, but never yet resorted to, of a creation by the sovereign (i.e. the ministry) of new peers sufficient to turn the balance of votes in the Upper House. Practically the ultimate decision always rests with the people, that is to say, with the party which for the moment commands a majority of electoral votes. This method of cutting knots applies to all differences that can arise between executive and legislature. It is a swift and effective method; in this swiftness and effectiveness lie its dangers as well as its merits.

In America a dispute between the President and Congress may arise over an executive act or over a bill. If over an executive act, an appointment or a treaty, one branch of Congress, the Senate, can check the President, that is, can prevent him from doing what he wishes, but cannot make him do what they wish. If over a bill which the President has returned to Congress unsigned, the two Houses can, by a two-thirds majority, pass it over his veto, and so end the quarrel; though the carrying out of the bill in its details must be left to him and his ministers, whose dislike of it may render them unwilling and therefore unsuitable agents. Should there not be a two-thirds majority, the bill drops; and however important the question may be, however essential to the country some prompt dealing with it, either in the sense desired by the majority of Congress or in that preferred by the President, nothing can be done till the current term of Congress expires. The matter is then remitted to the people. If the President has still two more years in office, the people may signify their approval of his policy by electing a House in political agreement with him, or disapprove it by re-electing a hostile House. If the election of a new President coincides with that of the new House, the people have a second means provided of expressing their judgment. They may choose not only a House of the same or an opposite complexion to the last, but a President of the same or an opposite complexion. Anyhow they can now establish accord between

one house of Congress and the executive.1 The Senate, however, may still remain opposed to the President, and may not be brought into harmony with him until a sufficient time has elapsed for the majority in it to be changed by the choice of new senators by the State legislatures. This is a slower method than that of Britain. It may fail in a crisis needing immediate action; but it escapes the danger of a hurried and perhaps irrevocable decision.

There exists between England and the United States a difference which is full of interest. In England the legislative branch has become supreme, and it is considered by Englishmen a merit in their system that the practical executive of the country is directly responsible to the House of Commons. In the United States, however, not only in the national government, but in every one of the States, the exactly opposite theory is proceeded uponthat the executive should be wholly independent of the legislative branch. Americans understand that this scheme involves a loss of power and efficiency, but they believe that it makes greatly for safety in a popular government. They expect the executive and the legislature to work together as well as they can, and public opinion does usually compel a degree of co-operation and efficiency which perhaps could not be expected theoretically. It is an interesting commentary on the tendencies of democratic government, that in America reliance is coming to be placed more and more, in the nation, in the State, and in the city, upon the veto of the Executive as a protection to the community against the legislative branch. Weak Executives frequently do harm, but a strong Executive has rarely abused popular confidence. On the other hand, instances where the Executive, by the use of his veto power, has arrested mischiefs due to the action of the legislature are by no means rare. This circumstance leads some Americans to believe that the day is not far distant when in England some sort of veto power, or other constitutional safeguard, must be interposed to protect the people against their Parliament.2

1 It is of course possible that the people may elect at the same time a President belonging to one party and a House the majority whereof belongs to the other party. This happened in 1876, when, however, the presidential election was disputed. It is rendered possible by the fact that the President is elected on a different plan from the House, the smaller States having relatively more weight in a presidential election, and the presidential electors being now chosen, in each State by "general ticket," not in districts.

2 See Note to Chapter XXXV. at the end of this volume.

While some bid England borrow from her daughter, other Americans conceive that the separation of the legislature from the executive has been carried too far in the United States, and suggest that it would be an improvement if the ministers of the President were permitted to appear in both Houses of Congress to answer questions, perhaps even to join in debate. I have no space to discuss the merits of this proposal, but must observe that it might lead to changes more extensive than its advocates seem to contemplate. The more the President's ministers come into contact with Congress, the more difficult will it be to maintain the independence of Congress which he and they now possess. When not long ago the Norwegian Stor Thing forced the King of Sweden and Norway to consent to his ministers appearing in that legislature, the king, perceiving the import of the concession, resolved to choose in future ministers in accord with the party holding a majority in the Stor Thing. It is hard to say, when one begins to make alterations in an old house, how far one will be led on in rebuilding, and I doubt whether this change in the present American system, possibly in itself desirable, might not be found to involve a reconstruction large enough to put a new face upon several parts of that system.

The

It

In the history of the United States there have been four serious conflicts between the legislature and the executive. first was that between President Jackson and Congress. ended in Jackson's favour, for he got his way; but he prevailed because during the time when both Houses were against him, his opponents had not a two-thirds majority. In the latter part of the struggle the (re-elected) House was with him; and before he had quitted office his friends obtained a majority in the alwayschanging Senate. But his success was not so much the success of the executive office as of a particular President popular with the masses. The second contest, which was between President Tyler and both Houses of Congress, was a drawn battle, because the majority in the Houses fell short of two-thirds. In the third, between President Johnson and Congress, Congress prevailed; the enemies of the President having, owing to the disfranchisement of most Southern States, an overpowering majority in both Houses, and by that majority carrying over his veto a series of Acts so peremptory that even his reluctance to obey them could not destroy, though it sometimes marred, their efficiency. It the fourth case, referred to in a previous chapter, the victory