In Maine, the Constitution declares substantially that all men have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience; that no one shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshiping God after his own conscience; and that no subordination or preference of any sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law; nor shall · any religious tests be required as a qualification for any office or trust under the State.* It also provides as follows: "A general diffusion of the advantages of education being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, to promote this important object the Legislature are authorized, and it shall be their duty, to require the several towns to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the support and maintenance of public schools." + Under this general authority an act was passed in that State giving to school committees the power to "direct the general course of instruction, and what books shall be used in the respective schools." In a case arising upon this act, it has been held by the Supreme Court of Maine, that a requirement by a superintending school committee, that the Protestant version of the Bible should be read in the public schools of the town, by the scholars who are able to read, is in violation of no constitutional provision, and is binding on all the members of the schools, though composed of divers religious sects; and it was said, "The Legislature establishes general rules for the guidance of its citizens. It 'does not necessarily follow that they are unconstitutional, nor that a citizen is to be legally absolved from obedience, because they may conflict with his conscientious views of religious duty or right. To allow this, would be to subordinate the State to the individual conscience. A law is not unconstitutional because it may prohibit what a citizen may conscientiously think right, or require what he may conscientiously think wrong. The State is governed by its own views of duty. The right or wrong of the State is the right or wrong as declared by legis lative acts constitutionally passed;" and it was held, that for a * Constitution of Maine, art. i, § 3. + Constitution of Maine, art. viii. refusal to read the books thus prescribed, the committee might, if they saw fit, expel the disobedient scholar.* In the State of Massachusetts, it has been held, on consideration of the second article of their Bill of Rights, which is similar to the constitutional provisions of Maine in regard to religious liberty above cited, that the rejection of a witness as incompetent by reason of his want of religious belief, was not in violation of it; the court saying, "It was intended to prevent prosecution by punishing any one for his religious opinions, however erroneous they might be."† Connected with this subject, I may here call attention to the original provisions of the Constitution of Massachusetts; which, to a certain extent, recognized and declared a relationship and connection between the church and the State. The third article of the original Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was as follows: "The people have a right to invest their Legis lature with power to authorize and require, and the Legislature shall from time to time authorize and require, the several towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies corporate and politic, and religious societies, to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the public worship of God, and for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality, in all cases where such provision shall not be made voluntarily." And it was further declared in the same article, "that the people of this commonwealth have a right to, and do, invest their Legislature with authority to enjoin upon all their subjects, an attendance upon the instructions of the public teachers aforesaid, at stated times and seasons, if there be any on whose instructions they can conscientiously and conveniently attend." In Adams v. Howe et al. 14 Mass. 346, the object and purpose of these clauses is stated as follows: "Three great objects appear to have been the influential causes of this solemn declaration of the will of the people: 1. To establish at all events, liberty of conscience and choice of the mode of worship; 2. To assert the right of * Donohoe v. Richards, 38 Maine, 379, 410. This is the only judicial decision of which I am aware, which touches on what has been familiarly called the Higher Low. Thurston v. Whitney, 2 Cush, 104. the State, in its political capacity, to require and enforce the public worship of God; 3. To deny the right of establishing any hierarchy, or any power in the State itself to require conformity to any creed or formulary of worship." The provision was soon, however, considered unfriendly to the great interests of religious liberty; several statutes were passed designed to relieve individuals from any necessity of supporting the dominant religious sect in the State; and various cases are to be found in the Massachusetts reports, which are of much interest upon the subject to which they relate. So, under this clause it was held that a person claiming ministerial taxes must be the public teacher of one, and that an incorporated, society.* But these decisions are now of little practical importance, as the provision was struck from the Bill of Rights by a popu lar amendment of the Constitution in the year 1833. It may be that as the cycles of human affairs revolve, the interest of the questions connected with these decisions, will again become actual and pressing. † Under the first Constitution, or charter, of the State of Connecticut, also, provision for the support and maintenance of religious worship was treated as a duty resting on the State; and that provision was made and carried into effect through the instrumentality of local ecclesiastical societies, established by the State, through its legislative power; and under that * See Barnes v. First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass. 400, where the general character of the constitutional provision is discussed; Turner v. Second Precinct in Brookfield, 7 Mass. 60. See also, Kendalls v. The Inhabitants of Kingston, 5 Mass. 524; see Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 341, as to the constitutionality of certain exemptions from the operation of the constitutional clause created by statute. See also, Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 248, for another case on exemptions. See also, Gage v. Currier, 4 Pick. 399. Many points of a general bearing will be found decided in the cases to which this controversy gave rise. So, in a case on the Massachusetts statute, exempting parties from the constitutional obligation to support the church, the Supreme Court of that State said, per Wilde J.: "In many statutes it will be found that the preamble states imperfectly the views of the Legislature, and can afford but little aid in the construction of the enacting parts. It is not unfrequently merely introductory to the first section, and it appears to me that it was so used in this statute." Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 248. In another case it was said, Where the provisions of two statutes are dissimilar but not repugnant, a party may pursue the provisions of either. As if by one statute jurisdiction of a matter be given to one court, and afterwards by a new statute the same matter is made cognizable by another court, a party may select either tribunal. So, if a special statute providing that the inhabitants of a particular town may separate from a religious society on certain conditions, and a general statute is passed dissimilar but not repugnant, it is sufficient for a person to bring himself within the provisions of either." Gage v. Currier, 4 Pick. 399. * Constitution the General Assembly constantly exercised the power of establishing and dividing local ecclesiastical societies; but the present Constitution of the State provides that "no person shall, by law, be compelled to join or support, nor to be classed with or associated to, any congregation, church, or religious association;" and under this Constitution it has been there decided that it is not competent for the Legislature to divide an ancient local ecclesiastical society. + Divorces.-Legislative acts granting divorces from the marriage tie, like the still more objectionable class of acts of attainder, derive their origin from the early periods of English history, when the line between legislative and judicial power was feebly drawn and ill understood, and when private rights were almost completely at the mercy of violent and reckless partisan legislation. But that age has fortunately passed, and the marked improvement that is visible in our jurisprudence on the subject of legislative divorces deserves special comment. The facility with which laws annulling the marriage contract were obtained from the Legislatures of the several States, in our early history, was discreditable to our system; but many of our recent Constitutions have shown their increased respect for the sacred institution of marriage by prohibiting, expressly and absolutely, all divorces, except such as are granted by courts of justice. Some of the clauses are here given: New York." Nor shall any divorce be granted otherwise than by due judicial proceedings." California." No divorce shall be granted by the Legislature." || Missouri. "The General Assembly shall not have power to grant a divorce in any case."T Arkansas." The General Assembly shall not have power to pass any bill of divorce, but may prescribe by law the manner in which such cases shall be investigated in the courts of justice, and divorces granted.** Texas." No divorce shall be granted by the Legislature." t Tennessee." The Legislature shall have no power to grant divorces, but may authorize the courts of justice to grant them for such causes as may be specified Cons. of 1818, art. viii, § 1. The Second Eccl. Soc'y of Portland v. The First Eccl. Soc'y of Portland, 23 Conn. 255. Constitution of New York, art. i, § 10. Constitution of California, art. iv, § 26. Constitution of Missouri, art. iii, § 32. **Constitution of Arkansas, art. iv, § 24. ++ Constitution of Texas, art. vii, § 18. ‡‡ Constitution of Wisconsin, art. ív, § 24. by law; provided that such laws be general and uniform in their operation throughout the State." * Indiana.-"The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases: "In all the cases enumerated in the preceding sections, and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the State." t Michigan." Divorces shall not be granted by the Legislature." These changes in the fundamental law of so many of our States are very curious and interesting; they show the facility with which our institutions lend themselves to improvement, and, at the same time, the rapidity with which a regulation or a law that commends itself to the national judgment is gated from one member of the confederacy to another, thus keeping in harmony, though under various governments, the general organization and jurisprudence of the component parts of the empire. propa Titles of Laws.-Some of the most important of the recent additions to our constitutional guaranties are to be found in the restrictions imposed on what may be called the practice and procedure of our legislative bodies. Great abuses have been found to result from a practice, already mentioned, of ancient date, of incorporating in the same bill subjects of a very heterogeneous nature, resorted to either for the purpose of surprising the good faith of the lawmaking body, or of enlisting hostile interests in support of the proposed act." ** To put a * Constitution of Tennessee, art. xi, § 4. Constitution of Indiana, art. iv, § 22. Constitution of Michigan, art. iv, § 26. Constitution of Louisiana, art. vi, § 114. Constitution of Iowa, art. iv, § 28. **Acts of this kind are called, in the country from which we derive most of both our virtues and our defects, hodge-podge acts. The English statute, 17 Geo. II, c. 40, is entitled thus: "An act to continue the several laws therein mentioned, for preventing theft and rapine on the northern borders of England; for the more effectual punishing wicked and evil disposed persons going around in disguise, and doing injuries and violences to the persons and properties of his Majesty's subjects, and for the more speedy bringing the offenders to justice; for continuing two clauses, to prevent the cutting or breaking down the bank of any river or sea bank, and to prevent the malicious cutting of hop-binds; and for the more effectual punishment of persons maliciously setting on fire any mine, pit, or delph of coal or cannel coal; and of persons unlawfully hunting or taking any red or fallow deer in forests, or chafes, or beating or wounding the keepers or other officers in forests, chafes, or parks; and for granting a liberty to carry sugars of the growth, produce, or manufacture of any of his Majesty's sugar colonies in America, from the said colonies directly to foreign ports in ships built in Great Britain, and navigated according to law; and to explain two acts relating |