road tax in Illinois, * a bank tax in Massachusetts,† and a tax on merchants, and bankers' licenses in California, ‡ have all been held legal and binding. [

Grist, 64 N. C. 739; Griffin v. Ranney, 35 Conn. 239; Green v. Holway, 101 Mass. 243; Sammon v. Holloway, 21 Mich. 162; Hunter v. Cobb, 1 Bush, 239; People v. Gates, 43 N. Y. 40; Moore v. Moore, 47 N. Y. 487.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in The Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, directly affirmed the general doctrine that the United States cannot tax the instrumentalities of the State Governments, and held that an income tax could not be imposed upon a State judge in respect of his salary. The exemption of State instrumentalities from national taxation was placed upon exactly the same ground, and was made as broad as the exemption of the national instrumentalities from State taxation.

A State tax on State writs and process is valid. Cone v. Donaldson, 47 Penn. St. 363.

The legal tender act has no effect upon State taxes when they are made payable by law in coin. State Treasurer v. Collector of Sangamon Co. 28 Ill. 509.

The United States may tax by license laws a business prohibited by State laws, License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; but, on the other hand, the States may tax or may prohibit a business taxed under a license law by Congress, at least when Congress provides that its act in laying the license tax shall not abridge such power of the States. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475.

Possessory rights of miners may be taxed by the belongs to the United States, and is therefore exempt. ty, 1 Nev. 104.

State, though the land itself
Hale &c. Co. v. Storey Coun-

The scope of this work does not embrace the subject of State taxation in its relations with the power of Congress to regulate commerce, but the following are very recent cases upon the subject: Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 382; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123; Hinson v. Sothe, 8 Wall. 148; Case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232; State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284; Sears v. Warren Co. 36 Ind. 267.

Double Taxation and Place of Taxation.-Where the Constitution authorized taxes on income and licenses, but prohibited a tax on the property from which the income so taxed was derived, or the capital employed in the business licensed, it was held, that although the sheriff's income was taxed, his office might also be taxed. Gilkeson v. Frederick Justices, 13 Gratt. 577. An act imposing a tax on the personal property in another State of persons domiciled in the State laying the tax is valid. Boyer v. Jones, 14 Ind. 354; but see Hoyt v. Comm'rs of Taxes of N. Y. 23 N. Y. 224. That the State may tax non-residents doing business in the State as if residents, see Duer v. Small, 4 Blatch. C. C. 263; and may tax alien inhabitants for municipal purposes. Frantz Appeal, 52 Penn. St. 367. Where a person does business habitually in a town, though he resides elsewhere, his income may be taxed in the former place, Worth v. Fayetteville, 1 Wins. (N. C.) No. 2 (Eq.) 70.

Personal property may also be taxed where situated, without reference to the

In construing the clause in regard to uniformity of taxation in Louisiana, it has been held that this provision applies as well

domicil of the owner. Thus, shares owned by a non-resident in a railroad incorporated by the State laying the tax. Faxton v. McCosh, 12 Iowa, 527; Maltby v. Reading R. R. 52 Penn. St. 140. But see "Case of State Tax on Foreign Bondholders," 15 Wall. 300, which holds that a State cannot tax bonds owned by non-residents, though issued by a railroad incorporated by the State and secured by a mortgage on the property of the road within the State. That a State cannot tax the bonds of a railroad chartered by another State, held by a person not a citizen of the State imposing the tax, although the bonds are there situate, see Northern Central R. R. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262.

Who may Complain.—Only those adversely affected. Morgan v. Monmouth Pl. R. Co. 2 Dutch. 99; People v. Law, 34 Barb. 494. The bondholders of a municipality not complaining, the taxpayers cannot complain of exemptions from taxation. Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510.

What may be Sold for Taxes.—The fee simple may be, although there is a contingent remainder to unborn persons. Johnson v. Babcock, 16 N. Y. 246. It has been held in Michigan, by a divided court, that a statute authorizing property of A. in the hands of B. to be sold for B.'s tax, and giving a remedy to A. against B., is valid. Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 250.

Particular Constitutional Provisions.-The following are decisions interpreting some special provisions found in various Constitutions :

New York.-"Every law which imposes, continues, or revives a tax shall distinctly state the tax, and the object to which it is to be applied, and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such tax or object.” A statute which merely enacts that the expenses of laying out, &c., a certain avenue shall be paid in the manner provided in another act, without specifying or limiting the amount to be raised, is invalid. Hanlon v. Supervisors of Westchester Co. 57 Barb. 383. Providing that the tax shall be paid into the "general fund" which is at the disposal of the Legislature, is a compliance with this provision. People v. Supervisors of Orange Co. 17 N. Y. 235. The statute must state the object of the tax, though it is only an amendment of another statute. People v. Moringe, 47 Barb. 642. A local assessment for improvement is not such a tax as comes within this provision. In the Matter of Fox, 6 Lans. 92.

Michigan.-A similar provision, it was held, does not apply where the Constitution itself appropriates the tax. Wolcott v. People, 17 Mich. 68.

Maryland.-"Every person holding property in the State ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes for the support of government according to his actual worth in real or personal property, yet fines, duties, or taxes may properly and justly be imposed or laid with a political view for the good government and benefit of the community." A tax on collateral inheritances was held valid, in Tyson v. State, 28 Md. 577.

Iowa.-"The property of all corporations for pecuniary profit shall be subject to taxation the same as that of individuals." A statute imposing a tax upon 40 per cent. of the gross receipts of express companies, as the personal property of such companies, at the same rate as the personal property of individuals, and also imposing a tax on their real and personal property, is not unconstitutional, although there is no law taxing the earnings of individuals. Such a statute is also neither a local

to municipal and parochial as to State taxes, and that an ordinance of a parish police jury, to compel the inhabitants of a particular portion of the parish to pay for certain embankments, is unconstitutional.

503.

*

Many interesting cases have

* Cumming v. Police Jury, 9 La. An. R.

In regard to "proportional taxation" in Massachusetts, see City of Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met. 181; City of Boston v. Shaw, 1 Met. 137. An act providing that the expense of building a particular bridge shall be borne in part by the county within which it is situated, when by the operation of the general laws of the commonwealth the expense would be borne wholly by the town within which it is situated, does not violate the constitutional provision of Massachusetts requiring taxation

arisen on the subject of exemp

to be proportional and reasonable. The Inhabitants of Norwich v. The County Commissioners of Hampshire, 13 Pick. 60. A city by-law requiring the owners or occupants of houses to clear the snow from the sidewalks in front of their property, is not strictly a bylaw levying a tax. It is rather to be regarded as a police regulation. The duty required is a duty upon the person in respect to the property which he holds, and is valid under the Constitution of Massachusetts. Goddard, Petr. 16 Pick. 504.

nor a special law within the constitutioual prohibition. U. S. Express Co. v. Ellyson, 28 Iowa, 370. (There seems to be no provision that the rule of taxation shall be uniform). See provision as to particular services" next below, under

"Indiana."

Indiana." The particular services of individuals shall not be required without compensation." This is violated by a statute requiring attorneys to defend indigent criminals without compensation. Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525. It was held in Iowa that a maximum compensation in such cases might be fixed by statute. Samuels v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 536. A similar statute requiring the gratuitous services of attorneys was held invalid in Wisconsin. County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wisc. 585.

Georgia. Taxation of property shall be ad valorem only, and uniform upon all species of property taxed." Const. of 1868, Art. I, § 27. A tax of 20 cents per gallon on the sales of liquor was held valid, in Kenny v. Harwell, 42 Geo. 416. As to what business can be reached by an ad valorem tax, see Hirsh's Case, 21 Gratt. 785.

Missouri.-"Taxation upon property shall be in proportion to value." This does not apply to an income tax. Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479.

Massachusetts. The provision of the Constitution that taxes shall be "proportional" is not directory, and a tax of one-fifteenth on dividends of non-resident shareholders is not "proportional." Oliver y. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268. A statute taxing non-resident shareholders of national banks in the town where the bank is situated, at the local rates as fixed by a valuation in which the value of those shares is not included, the tax itself being for State purposes, does not violate the provision requiring taxes to be "proportional," and is valid. Prov. Inst. for Savings v. Boston, 101 Mass. 575. A tax upon savings banks according to the average of deposits for the half year, was held to be an excise or duty on the franchise, and valid. Commonwealth v. People's &c. B'k, 5 Allen, 428. That an excise" must be equal on all who exercise the particular employment or enjoy the particular commodity taxed, see Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268. A tax on the capital stock at par of any foreign mining corporation, having an office for business in the State, is a tax on a commodity, and valid. Att'y Gen. v. Bay State Mining Co. 99 Mass. 148.

tion from taxation. It has been decided that, where exemption from taxation is made a condition of a grant, it is in the nature of a contract: the grant and its conditions are equally inviolable.* But where the exemption results from a general law, and does not form a portion of a grant, any subsequent Legislature may repeal the exemption.t In New Hampshire, it has been said that the Legislature could pass laws conferring exemptions from taxation, which would be valid till repealed. But it was intimated that it was not competent for the Legisla ture to make any contract by which a party should be perpetually exempted from taxation, upon the ground that no such power was delegated to the Legislature,-that it could not grant away the essential attributes of sovereignty or right of eminent domain; that these did not seem to furnish the subjectmatter of a contract.

By a statute of 1793, in Massachusetts, all persons who had held the office of a subaltern, or of higher rank, were exempted from militia duty. This statute was repealed on the 4th of March, 1800, and the future exemption of militia officers was limited to such as should complete a term of five years' service, or be superseded. In March, 1810, the last statute was repealed and a new class of exempts defined, including the subalterns and officers mentioned in the act of 1793, on condition of an annual payment of two dollars. The case was presented of a subaltern officer, honorably discharged in May, 1799, and who, under the operation of the act of 1793, was exempted from militia duty. Under the act of 1810 a fine was imposed on him, and it was resisted on the ground that an exemption once acquired under existing laws could not be revoked; it being argued that the defendant had a vested right to his exemption. But the objection was overruled; and while admitting that there might be cases in which it would be deemed a breach of the public faith to revoke such exemptions, the court said that they were not authorized to weigh those motives, nor interfere

State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164.

Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Verm. 525. See cases in Connecticut as to exemption from taxation. Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn.

223; Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335; Parker v. Redfield, 10 Conn. 490; Langdon v. Litchfield, 11 Conn. 251.

Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 145.

with the right of the State to the military services of the citizen.*

The Constitution of Indiana contains a provision, that no man's particular services shall be demanded without just compensation: under this it has been held that a statute requiring professional services to be gratuitously rendered, would be unconstitutional and void; and it was also said, that a law which requires gratuitous services from a particular class in office, imposes a tax upon that class clearly in violation of the fundamental provision for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation upon all citizens. +

The Constitution of Tennessee contains the same provision declaring "that no man's particular services shall be demanded, or property taken or applied to public use without the consent of his representatives, or without just compensation being made therefor." The use of the disjunctive conjunction is worthy of notice.

Religious Toleration.—Most, if not all of our State Constitutions contain provisions designed to secure the great principle of freedom of conscience. But there has been so little disposition to infringe this class of guaranties, that, like the other clauses in regard to attainder, freedom of the press, the right to bear arms, and standing armies, they have been very rarely brought within the range of judicial interpretation. Some few cases may be noticed. (a)

* Commonwealth v. Baird, 12 Mass. 443. + Constitution of Indiana, art. i, § 21.

Webb v. Baird, 6 Indiana, 13.
Cons. of Tennessee, art. i, § 21.

(a) The Constitution of California declares that "all men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness," and "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this State." It was held that "an act for the better observance of the Sabbath," prohibiting the pursuit of business on that day, etc., conflicted with the above clauses, and was void. Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502. But this case was overruled and such statute sustained in Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678, and Ex parte Bird, 19 Cal. 130. Similar legislation was upheld in Frolichstein v. Mayor &c. 40 Ala. 725; Gabel v. Houston, 29 Tex. 335; Voglesong v. State, 9 Ind. 112. But see remarks of Perkins J., in Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449. A law closing theaters on Sunday is valid Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 548. It is no reason for the removal of a testamentary guardian that he is a Universalist or an infidel. Maxey v. Bell, 41 Geo. 183.