this verdict might be set aside, and a nonsuit entered, on the grounds that no retainer of the plaintiff by Wainman had been proved at the trial; and as the bill of costs, for which this action was brought, had never been delivered to him, he could not be considered as answerable for any part of its amount; and more particularly so, as he was not originally a party to the suit, for the conducting of which the plaintiff's claim was founded. The sum he took under the decree, he was entitled to as a legatee in right of his wife, and not as a party; and although he was beneficially interested in the result, yet he has done no act to render himself responsible to the plaintiff for carrying on the suit in Chancery. Lord Chief Justice DALLAS. The receipt of the money by the defendant under the decree of that Court at the termination of the suit, was equivalent to a retainer of the plaintiff in the first instance. The defendant's wife was one of the original parties to the suit, for the expense of conducting which the present action was brought; and on her marriage, Wainman became a party in her right; and the suit was not brought to a conclusion until some time afterwards. The plaintiff had the management of the suit as well before as after the marriage of Wainman; and it is a well known principle, that all parties interested in a suit in equity must be before the Court; and as he became an intervening party by marriage, and took his share of the property under the decree, the plaintiff is entitled to receive a remuneration for his services; and more particularly so, as he was eventually successful in his application to that Court. The defendant, therefore, is bound to pay his proportion of the plaintiff's bill, subject to its taxation by a Master in Chancery. 1823. GRAY v. WAINMAN. Mr. Justice PARK.-The acceptance of the money by Wainman under the decree, was an adoption of the plaintiff's services in the conducting of the suit; and as he received a benefit from those services, it is but just that he should bear his proportion of the expenses attending it. The wife was a party to the suit under the original order of the Court; and the defendant by marriage, eventually received his proportion of the fund through the professional assistance of the plaintiff. Mr. Justice BURROUGH.-Both the defendant and his wife were parties to the suit before it was finally deter mined. The plaintiff, therefore, conducted it for both; and by the defendant's accepting his proportion of the fund in right of his wife, it amounted to an adoption of the suit, as well as an acknowledgment and ratification of the plaintiff's services in conducting it. The original bill was of course amended on the marriage, by making Wainman a party to it. The jury were therefore fully warranted in finding a verdict for the plaintiff, as the defendant must have known that he was originally retained or employed to conduct the proceedings in the Court of Chancery. His bill, therefore, must be subject to taxation in the usual course; and the defendant is bound to pay his proportion, after such taxation has been completed. Rule refused. 1823. BROOKE V. BRIDGES and others. He Tuesday, Jan. 28th. Where an ac tion of eject a ment is defended, and the plaintiff obtains verdict, he execution of a writ of inquiry mages in an cannot, on the to assess da the extra costs crease the da after judgment costs of such judgment may be recovered as mesne profits." well as the Ma. Serjeant Bosanquet, on the first day of this Term, obtained a rule, calling on the plaintiff to shew cause why the writ of inquiry, and inquisition taken thereon in this cause, might not be set aside, and a new writ of inquiry issued and executed between the parties; or that the dam ages found by the jury on the execution of the said writ, should be reduced to the sum of 50l. action for founded his motion on an affidavit, which stated that mesne mesne profits, the present plaintiff was the lessor of the plaintiff in give in evidence an action of ejectment, brought in the Court of King's beyond his taxed costs, in Bench, and tried at the last assizes for the county of order to inEssex, where he obtained a verdict against the defendants, mages; but who appeared and defended; and that he ultimately got by default in possession of the premises sought to be recovered: that ejectment, the the bill of costs of the plaintiff's attorney in that action amounted to 3117. 12s. 7d., which was afterwards referred to the Master for taxation, who ordered 1347. 4s. 11d. to be deducted; that 1771. 7s. 8d. being the amount of the Master's allocatur, was paid to the plaintiff's attorney immediately after the taxation. That after possession of the premises had been given, and just before the payment of those costs, the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendants in this Court, for the recovery of the mesne profits of the premises, in which he obtained judgment by default: that thereupon a writ of inquiry was issued and executed before the under-sheriff of Esser: that the plaintiff's attorney, after giving evidence of the yearly value of the premises, produced the bill of costs as taxed by the Master, and tendered it in evidence, in order to increase the damages, as forming part thereof, to which the defendant's attorney objected, but was overruled by the under-sheriff; 1823. BROOKE V. BRIDGES. whereupon the jury, under his direction, returned a verdict for 1177., expressing, at the time, that 50l. was for the value of the land, and 671. the residue, towards such part of the bill of costs of the plaintiff's attorney as had not been allowed by the Master on the taxation. Mr. Serjeant Lens now shewed cause, on an affidavit of the plaintiff's attorney, which stated that his bill of costs, produced on the execution of the writ of enquiry, was not only reasonable and fair, but that he was entitled to a verdict for the whole of the monies which had been disallowed by the Master on taxation; but that the jury, under the direction of the under-sheriff, thought otherwise, and allowed a part of it only. Mr. Serjeant Bosanquet, in support of the rule, referred to the case of Doe v. Davis, where Lord Kenyon is reported to have said, that (a) " where there was a judgment by default in an action of ejectment, the plaintiff might, in an action for mesne profits, go into evidence and recover the costs of such judgment, as well as the mesne profits of the estate; but that where the ejectment had been defended, and the plaintiff had recovered, and taxed his costs, that he could not recover above his taxed costs. And in this case, it appears, that the plaintiff has taxed his costs, and received 1771. 7s. 8d. as the amount thereof. The Court being of opinion that the distinction in that case was properly taken, ordered the rule to be made .absolute to reduce the damages to the sum of 50l. as prayed for, being for the value of the land only; thereby disallowing the extra costs. Rule absolute accordingly (b). (a) 1 Esp. Rep. 358.— -(b) See Gulliver v. Drinkwater, 2 Term Rep. 261. IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. 1823. THE KING v. JOHN WAIT. Wednesday, power of attor of stock stand THE prisoner was convicted before Mr. Justice Bayley Where a person and Mr. Baron Garrow, at the last Old Bailey sessions, name of his coforged the of uttering a forged power of attorney for selling stock, trustee to a which was standing in the joint names of the prisoner and John Cox. The power purported to be executed by the prisoner and John Cox, and the attestation imported that it was executed in the presence of the subscribing witnesses by the above-named John Wait, (the prisoner,) land, and the and John Cox (a). The subscribing witnesses proved forgery being (a) The power was as follows :—“ Know all men by these presents, that we, John Wait, of St. James's, Gloucestershire, gentleman; and John Cor, of Wrington, Somersetshire, attorney, do jointly, and each of us doth separately, for ourselves and for the survivor of us, make, constitute, and appoint John Underhill, of the Stock Exchange, gentleman, our true and lawful attorney, for us, and in our names, and in our behalf, and also for and in the name and on the behalf of the survivor of us, to sell, assign, and transfer all or any part of 2,1891. 17s. 1d., being all our interest or share in the capital or joint stock of Three per Cent. Annuities, created by an act of par liament of the 25th year of the reign of his Majesty King George the Second, entitled, "An act for converting the several annuities therein mentioned into several joint stocks of annuities transferrable at the Bank of England, to be charged on the Sinking Fund," &c. and by several subsequent acts: also to receive the consideration money, and give a receipt or receipts for the same, and to do all lawful acts requisite for effecting the premises; hereby ratifying and confirming all that our said attorney shall do therein by virtue hereof; and in case of the death of both or either of us, this letter of attorney, as to all matters and things which after our respective decease shall be done by our said attorney, by virtue of, or under colour, or in pursuance thereof, shall, so far as the Governor and Company of the Bank of England are interested or concerned, be as binding upon our respective executors and administrators, as the same would have been upon us if living, unless notice in writing of our respective deaths shall have been previously given to ney for the sale ing in their joint names in the books of the Company of the discovered, the stock was not sold;-Held, on an indictment for forco-trustee was a gery, that such competent witness to prove that the signature of his name to the |