SHERMAN BEGINS HIS MARCH. and make Georgia howl."'* On the 11th he wrote that, instead of following Hood, "I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta including the latter city, send back all my wounded and worthless and, with my effective army, move through Georgia smashing things to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of being on the defensive I will be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is fully 25 per cent."† After consultation between Grant, Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck, Sherman's plans were approved on October 13. In approving, Grant said: "If you are satisfied the trip to the seacoast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee, you may make it, destroying all the railroads south of Dalton or Chattanooga as you think best." At this time Sherman did not believe that Hood would enter Tennessee. On October 30, however, Hood began his movement toward the north and caused considerable apprehension in the minds of Thomas and Grant. On October 26 Sherman had learned that Hood's army had appeared before Decatur and as this indicated an invasion of Tennessee, he decided to strengthen Thomas, leave him to take care of Hood, withdraw his own army to Atlanta and prepare for a march to the sea, provided Grant's consent could be obtained. He sent the 4th *Official Records, p. 162. See also Sherman, Memoirs, vol. ii., p. 152. Official Records, p. 202. Ibid, p. 240. 63 and 23d corps back to Thomas and telegraphed on November 2 that "Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent his [Hood's] reaching any country in which we have an interest. No single army can catch him and I am convinced the best results will result from defeating Jeff Davis' cherished plan of making me leave Georgia by manoeuvering." * However, the previous day, in response to a telegram from Sherman representing that Hood's whole force was only from 37,000 to 40,000 while Thomas would have from 63,000 to 70,000, and that he himself had retained only 50,000 for the proposed campaign, Grant replied: "With the force, however, that you have left with General Thomas he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him. I really do not see that you can withdraw from where you are without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say then go on as you propose."† Having obtained this permission Sherman pushed his preparations with the greatest energy. The entire population of Atlanta had already been deported; ‡ the various divisions of the army designed for the march were concentrated at Atlanta; the garrison south of Chattanooga was withdrawn and the railroad destroyed. The machine shops and other buildings of Atlanta useful to the enemy for military operations were also demolished. Every command was carefully inspected and the physically unOfficial Records, vol. xxxix., pt. iii., p. 594. Ibid, pp. 576, 594; Sherman, Memoirs, pp. 165-166. Regarding this see Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. ix., p. 465 et seq.; Hood, Advance and Retreat, pp. 229-242; Sherman, Memoirs, vol. ii., pp. 11-29. 64 SHERMAN'S ORDERS FOR THE MARCH. sound were dispatched to Nashville. In the same way the horses, mules and trains were inspected.* Sherman started on November 15 with 62,204 officers and men. The right wing, General O. O. Howard, consisted of the 15th and 17th corps and the left wing, General H. W. Slocum, of the 14th and 20th. There was no Confederate army between Atlanta and Savannah and the men anticipated a Wheeler's 'vast holiday frolic." cavalry was active on the flanks guarded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, and a considerable force of militia was encountered at Griswoldville. The order for the march clearly presents its organization, its methods of living upon the country and the restrictions placed on its dealings with citizens, the last being the most important: "The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather, near the route traveled, corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meal, or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the wagons at least ten days' provisions for his command, and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants, or commit any trespass; but, during a halt or camp, they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. To regular foraging-parties must be entrusted the gathering of provisions and forage, at any distance from the road traveled. "To corps commanders alone is entrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc.; and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerillas or bush * Sherman, Memoirs, vol. ii., p. 170. † Cox, March to the Sea, p. 42. whackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility. "As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly. Foraging parties may also take mules or horses, to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack-mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their mainte nance. "Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to the several columns may be taken along; but each army commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms. "The organization, at once, of a good pioneer battalion for each army corps, composed if possible of negroes, should be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance-guard, repair roads and double them if possible, so that the columns will not be delayed after reaching bad places. Also, army commanders should practise the habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, marching their troops on one side, and instruct their troops to assist wagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams." * Leaving Atlanta in ruins on November 15, the left wing under Sherman marched by Decatur, Stone Mountain and Covington, then turning toward Milledgeville, the capital of Georgia, which was the first objective and which was reached on the 22d. Meanwhile the right wing commanded by Howard had set out under instructions to threaten Macon and strike THE BATTLE OF GRISWOLDVILLE. the Savannah Railroad at Gordon, about 20 miles east. When Howard arrived at Clinton the cavalry advance made a demonstration on Macon and on November 21, 1864, the entire cavalry force under Kilpatrick took up an advanced position covering all the roads to Macon; and that day and the next all the troops and trains were closed up toward Gordon except the division under C. R. Woods which was directed to take up a strong position on the Irwinton road and threaten Macon and Griswoldville, 8 miles east. On the 22d, in coöperation with Kilpatrick's cavalry, a demonstration was made by Walcutt's brigade of 1,513 men and 2 guns. Some of Kilpatrick's cavalry were in advance of Walcutt and were fiercely attacked by the Confederate cavalry under Wheeler, but with Walcutt's assistance Wheeler was driven from the field and followed by Walcutt beyond Griswoldville. Walcutt was recalled from the pursuit to a position a little east of Griswoldville where, two miles in advance of his cavalry, he formed line along a slight rise of ground with Kilpatrick's cavalry on either side. Scarcely had he thrown up a rail barricade when the Confederate infantry attacked him. That morning under Hardee's order, General G. W. Smith in command of a body of Georgia militia that had been concentrated at Macon, directed General Phillips with a division of infantry and a battery to march from Macon to Gordon and take train for Augusta. 65 He was to halt before reaching Griswoldville to await further orders and not to become engaged with the enemy but to fall back to the fortifications at Macon. Upon hearing of Walcutt's position, however, Phillips attacked him with four brigades, at the same time opening destructively with his artillery. At 2 o'clock the Confederate militia charged to within 75 yards of Walcutt's line but were driven back, and after several other charges had been repulsed in the same manner Phillips abandoned the field, leaving his dead and wounded. The Union loss was 13 killed, 69 wounded and 2 missing. The Confederate loss was 51 killed and 472 missing.* On November 24 the march was resumed with Millen as the next objective, the two wings following the general line of the railroad. On December 3 Millen was reached and the army then started by the four main roads toward Savannah. The effort of the Confederate authorities to organize a force at Augusta to attack Sherman in flank failed and Wheeler's cavalry was practically the only force met with during the march. McLaws' division of Hardee's corps had advanced to Ogeechee Church, but upon Sherman's approach fell back to the city. On December 9 and 10 several Union corps reached the defences of Savannah and occupied a line from the Ogeechee River on the right to the * Official Records, vol. xliv.; Battles and Lead ers, vol. iv., pp. 664, 667; Cox, March to the Sea, pp. 30-31. 66 THE HAVOC WROUGHT BY SHERMAN. Savannah River on the left. Hardee occupied the city with a little less than 10,000 men while Sherman's effective force numbered a little over 60,000. Sherman had started out with over 62,200 officers and men, but on the march 103 had been killed, 428 wounded, 278 missing and 1,338 captured, so that he reached Savannah with 60,057. The march had cut a swath of many miles in width through the richest part of Georgia. The heads of the columns and the flanks swarmed with foraging parties, and a country which was daily scoured to supply food for an army of 60,000 soldiers was of necessity stripped of provisions and everything else needed for the use or comfort of the army. * The crops had been large and had just been gathered and laid by for the winter and as the section had never before been visited by an army, the land was rich in provisions and forage. † Though Sherman attempted to have this foraging done in an orderly manner, the discipline was poor and there were men enough in the army who became robbers and officers enough who winked at their irregularities and shared the loot to make the march a terrible scourge.‡ While orders had been issued forbid *In the connection see T. M. Maguire, A Study in Devastation. General Sherman in Georgia in 1864, in National Review, vol. xxxvii., pp. 901912 (London, 1901). Official Records, vol. lxiv., p. 727; Cox, The March to the Sea, pp. 38-40; Sherman, Memoirs, vol. ii., p. 182. Cox, March to the Sea, p. 40, ding the foraging parties to enter occupied private houses or to meddle with private property not included in supplies and munitions of war, it is certain that a large amount of robbing and pillaging was done, which Sherman mildly censured as follows: "A little loose in foraging they did some things they ought not to to have done.'"* But destruction was a part of the business of the army to impress upon the Georgians that war was a horrible thing. He said that the people of Georgia — "don't know what war means, but when the rich planters of the Oconee and Savannah see their fences and corn and hogs and sheep vanish before their eyes they will have something more than a mean opinion of the Yanks.' Even now our poor mules laugh at a fine corn field and our soldiers riot on chestnuts, sweet potatoes, pigs and chickens." Probably the most important task before Sherman was the severing of railroad communication between the Gulf States and Richmond so as to cut off Lee's source of supplies, the greater portion of which came from Georgia. Nearly 300 miles of railroad were destroyed; the bridges and trestles were burned and the masonry of the culverts was blown up. Stations and machine shops along the lines were burned and a large number of cotton-gins and presses, together with thousands of bales of cotton, were destroyed. At Milledgeville Sherman burned the railroad, buildings *Official Records, vol. xliv., p. 14. † Ibid, vol. xliv., pp. 76, 159, 792. See the reports of Howard and Slocum i. Official Records, vòl. xliv., pp. 76, 159, 792. THE CAPTURE OF FORT MCALLISTER. and the arsenals, but left the State house and governor's mansion unharmed. At Millen the railroad depot, a hotel and three or four large storehouses were burned.* In a report of January 1, 1865, Sherman estimated the damage done to the State of Georgia and its military resources at $100,000,000, adding: "This may seem. a hard species of warfare but it brings the sad realities of war home to those who have been directly or indirectly instrumental in involving us in its attendant calamities." Sherman and Cox both admit that there was much lawless foraging and pillaging, much of which was done by the "bummers" stragglers and adventurers who were under no military control, kept entirely away from the line of march, and avoided camps. Several proclamations and exhortations were issued to the people of Georgia calling upon them to defend their native soil and expel the invader. They were exhorted to remove all stores, horses, cattle, etc., to burn bridges, block up the roads in Sherman's route, and assail the invader in front, flank and rear by day and night. But the people showed "little spirit "§ and inasmuch as the Confederacy was a mere shell it was impossible to oppose Sherman with an effective force. * Official Records, p. 789. † Ibid, p. 13. Sherman, Memoirs, vol. ii., p. 182; Cox, March to the Sea, p. 40. | Official Records, vol. xliv., pp. 867-869. § Ibid, p. 884. ¶ Pollard, Last Year of the War, p. 130. 67 For more than a month the world had practically lost sight of Sherman* and there was much anxiety in the North for his safety. Grant never doubted the result but stated that he "would not have entrusted the expedition to any other living commander.". On December 9 Howard had sent a brief dispatch when the army was within ten miles of Savannah, but the anxiety was not relieved entirely until word was received from Sherman himself that he had captured Fort McAllister, which dispatch was received at Washington on December 18.‡ Fort McAllister had been erected by the Confederates at Genesis Point, 12 miles south of the city, and 6 miles from Ossabaw Sound. This fort prevented communication between Sherman's army and the Union fleet, and Sherman determined to reduce it by assault, assigning his own favorite division of the 15th corps to this task. Hazen reached the vicinity of the fort about 11 A. M. on December 13 and drove in the Confederate skirmishers, but was not ready for the assault until late in the afternoon. At 4:15 nine regiments were deployed within 600 yards of the work and when the bugle sounded the line went forward over exploding torpedoes and under a close and severe fire of artillery and musketry, completing the capture at 5 P. M. when about 250 men surrendered. Official Records, vol. xliv., p. 884. † Ibid, p. 740. Ibid, p. 700. |