Dec. 22. 1808. Judge Advocate-Generals Office, Dec. 27, 1808. In consequence of the following letter from his royal highness the commander in chief, to Gen. Sir David Dundas, as president, viz. Horse Guards, Dec. 25. SIR. The judge-advocate-general having delivered to me to be laid before his Majesty, the several papers and documents, containing all the examinations and preceedings taken before the board of enquiry, of which you are the president, together with your report and opinion upon the whole of the late operations of his Majesty's forces in Portugal, as connected with the armistice and subsequent convention of Cintra; I think it incumbent on me to state to you, that although the report is fully detailed, and perfectly explanatory of all the transactions as they appeared in evidence before you; yet, upon a due consideration of the whole matter, it certainly appears that your opinion upon the condition of the armistice and convention, which the words of his Majesty's warrant expressly enjoin should be strictly examined, enquired into, and reported upon, has been altogether omitted. I feel it my duty, therefore, to call your attention to these two principal features of this important case, the armistice and convention, and to desire that you may be pleased to take the same again into your most serious consideration, and subjoin to the opinion which you have already given upon the other points submitted to your examination and inquiry, whether, under all the circumstances which appear in evidence before you, oŋ the relative situation of the two armies, on the 22d of August, 1808, it is your opinion that an armistice was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that armistice were such as ought to have been agreed upon; and whether upon a like consideration of the relative situation of the two armies subsequent to the armistice, and when all the British forces were landed, it is your opinion that a convention was advisable, and if so, whether the terms of that convention were such as ought to have been agreed upon. I am the more desirous that you should resume the consideration of these two points, the armistice and convention, as it appears upon the face of your report, that a difference of opinion exists among the members of the board, which may probably produce a dissent from the majority upon these very questions. You will be pleased, therefore, to desire such of the members as may be of a different opinion from the majority upon these two questions, to record upon the face of the proceeding their reasons for such dissent. I am, Sir, yours, Commander in Chief. Gen. Sir D. Dundas, K. B. The board met this day at the judgeadvocate-generals's office, when the said letter having been read, they agreed that the following questions should be put to each of the members of the board: Do you or do you not approve of the armistice as concluded on the 22d of August 1808, in the relative situation of the two armies? Approve. Disapprove. Do you, or do you not approve of the convention as concluded upon the 31st of Aug. 1808, in the relative situation of the two armies? Approve. Lt.-Gen. Nugent Disapprove. Gen. Craig OL. NICHOLLS, L. G. OL. NICHOLLS, L. G. I approve of the armistice, after a due consideration of the relative situations of the two armies on the evening of the 22d of August, but I cannot fully approve of the whole of the convention, after a due consideration of the relative situation of the two armies at that time; because it does not appear to me that, in the progress of the negociation, sufficient stress was laid upon the great advantages which had resulted, or were likely to result, from the former successful operations of the British army in the field, from the considerable reinforcements which had joined it, subsequent to the commencement of the negociation, from the cause in which the British army was engaged being the cause of Portugal, which gave good reason to reckon upon the good will, if not upon the active assistance, of the majority of the inhabitants; and, also, from the unusual readiness which, as it appears to me, was manifested by Gen. Junot to enter into negociation, and by the French negociator to accede to terms as they were proposed, and to such construction as Lieutenant Gen. Sir Hew Dalrymple put upon them in some instances, where there might have borne a difference of interpretatation. I therefore think it probable, for the above reasons, that if less favourable terms to the French army had beeen insisted upon, they would have been acceded to. PEMBROKE, Lieut. Gen. I feel less awkwardness in obeying the order to detail my sentiments on the nature of the convention, because that I have already joined in the tribute of applause due in other respects to An armistice simply might not have been objectionable, because Sir Hew Dalrymple, expecting hourly the arrival of Sir John Moore's division, might see more advantage for himself in a short suspension of hostilities, than what the French could draw from it. But as the armistice involved, and in fact established the whole principle of the convention, I cannot separate it from the latter. That Sir A. Wellesley has stated, that he considered his force, at the commencement of the march from Mondego river, as sufficient to drive the French from their positions on the Tagus. force is subsequently joined by above 4000 British troops, under Generals Anstruther and Ackland. The French make an attack with their whole disposable strength, and are repulsed with heavy loss, though but a part of the British army is brought into action. It is difficult to conceive that the prospects which Sir A. Wellesley entertained could be unfavourably altered by these events, even had not the certainty of speedy reinforcements to the British army existed. It is urged, that had the French been pushed to extremity, they would have crossed the Tagus, and have protracted the campaign in such a manner as to have frustrated the more important view of the British generals-namely, sending succours into Spain. This measure must have been equally feasible for the French if no victory had been obtained over them; but I confess that the chance of such an attempt seems to me assumed against probability. Sir Hew Dalrymple notices what he calls "the critical and embarrassed state of Janot," before that general has been pressed by the British army; and, in explanation of that expression, observes, that the surrender of Dupont, the existence of the victorious Spanish army in Andalusia, which cut off the retreat of the French in that direction, and the universal hostility of the Portuguese, made the situation of Junot one of great distress. No temptation for the translation of the war into Alentejo presents itself from this picture; nor does any representation give ground to suppose that Junot could have contemplated the measure as holding forth any prospect but ultimate ruin, after much preliminary distress and disgrace. The strongest of all proofs as to Junot's opinion, arises from his sending the very morning after the battle of Vimiera, to propose the evacuation of Portugal; a step which sul ficiently indicated that he was satisfied be could not only make no effectual defence, but could not even prolong the contest to take the chance of accidents. He seems, indeed, to have been without any real resource. It appears in evidence, that of the troops left by him in Lisbon and the forts, a considerable proportion were of very doubtful quality. Those troops on whose fidelity he could confide, had been dismayed by a signal defeat, and they were sensible that they had no succour to look to from abroad. To the British gencrals it was known, when the armistice was granted, that 10,000 men under Sir J. Moore, as well as the 3d and 428 regiments of foot, with the 18th dragoous, might be immediately reckoned upon; and although much advantage had not been drawn from the Portugueze troops, their support, and the general violence of the country against the French, cannot be laid out of this calculation. The disparity of force and of circumstances was then such as could leave no doubt that the issue must be favourable to us. I do not omit advertence to the difficulties urged as possible to occur in furnishing the British army with bread. But, putting aside the obvious solution, that such a temporary privation is not ruinous to an army where cattle can be procured in the country, this difficulty cannot be well pleaded, if admission is to be given to the speculation, that the heavy cannon necessary for battering forts St. Julien and Cascacs were to be got ashore in the bays of the rock of Lisbon. The question then comes to this: whether the convention did (as has been asserted) secure all the objects which were proposed in the expedition? If it did not, it was not what his Majesty was entitled to expect from the relative situation of the two armies. I humbly conceive it to have been erroncous to regard the emancipation of Portugal from the French, as the sole or the principal object of the expedition. Upon whatever territory we contend with the French, it must be a prominent object in the struggle to destroy their resources, and to narrow their means of injuring us, or those whose cause we are supporting. This seems to have been so little considered in the convention, that the terms ap-. pear to have extricated Junot's army from a situation of infinite distress, in which it was wholly out of play, and to have brought it in a state of entire equipment, into immediate currency, in a quarter too, where it must interfere with our most urgent and interesting concerns. Had it been impracticable to reduce the French army to lay down its arms unconditionally, still an obligation uot to serve for a specified time might have been insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been prescribed as the place at which they should be lauded, in order to prevent the possibility of their reinforceing (at least for a long time) the armies employed for the subjugation of Spain. Perhaps a stronger consideration than the merit of those terms presents itself. Opinion relative to the British arms was of the highest importance, as it might influence the confidence of the Spaniards, or invite, the nations groaning under the yoke of France, to appeal to this country, and co-operate with it for their deliverance. The advantages ought, therefore, to have been more than usually great, which should be deemed sufficient to balance the objection of granting to a very inferior army, Hopeless in circum stances, and broken in spirit, such terms us might argue, that notwithstanding its disparity in numbers, it was still formidable to its victors. No advantages seem to have been gained that would not have equally followed from forcing the enemy to a more marked submission. The gain of time as to sending succours into Spain cannot be admitted as a plea; because it appears that no arrangements for the reception of our troops in Spain had been undertaken previous to the convention; and this is without reasoning on subsequent facts. The convention in Egypt, which has been advanced as a parallel case, ap pears to me inapplicable. No object a suspension, in whole, or in part, beyond the dislodgement of the French of the several embargo laws. Our from Egypt was there in question. In ministers at London and Paris were the present instance, the operation of the convention upon the affairs of Spain instructed to explain to the respecwas a consideration of primary interest; tive governments there, our disposiand in that view, the inevitable effect tion to exercise the authority in such of some of the articles offers itself to manner as would withdraw the premy mind as liable to material objection. text on which the aggressions were I trust that these reasons will vindi- originally founded, and open the cale me from the charge of presumption, way for a renewal of that commerin maintaining an opinion contradictory cial intercourse, which it was alto that professed by so many most respectable officers: for, even if the reasons leged, on all sides, had been relucbe essentially erroneous, if they are contantly obstructed. As each of these clusive to my mind (as I conscientiously governments had pledged its readiaffirm them to be), it is a necessary con- ness to concur in renouncing a measequence that I must disapprove the sure, which reached its adversary through the incontestible rights of neutrals only, and as the measure had been assumed by each as a retaliation for an asserted acquiescence in the aggressions of the other, it was reasonably expected that the occasion would have been seized by both, for evincing the sincerity of their professions, and for restoring to the United States its legitimate freedom. The instructions to our ministers, with respect to the different belligerents, were necessarily convention. Dec. 27. MOIRA, General. AMERICA. PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. Washington, Nov. 7.-Both houses made a quorum this forenoon, and having appointed a committee to inform the president from each house, they adjourned after their committees had returned with an answer, that he would send a writtencommunication to-morrow (Tues day). Nov. 8.-This day, as usual, at noon, the following message, with the several documents accompanying it, was presented to both houses: modified with a reference to their different circumstances, and to the condition annexed by law to the quiring a degree of security to our executive power of suspension, recommerce, which would not result from a repeal of the decrees of France. Instead of a pledge, therefore, for a suspension of the embargo as to her, in case of such a repeal, it was presumed that a sufficient inducement might be found in other considerations, and particularly in the change produced by a Compliance with our just demands, by one belligerent, and a refusal by the other, in the relations between this other and the United States. To Great Britain, whose power on the ocean is so ascendant, it was deemed not inconsistent with that condi on, to state, explicitly, that on her rescinding her orders in relation to the commerce of the United States, their trade would be opened with her, and remain shut to her enemy, in case of his failure to rescind his decrees also. From France no answer has been received, nor any indication that the requisite change in her decrees is contemplated. The favourable reception of the proposition to Great Britain was the less to be doubted, as her orders of council had not only been referred for their vindication to an acquiescence on the part of the United States, no longer to be pretended; but as the arrangement proposed, whilst it resisted the illegal decrees of France, involved, moreover, substantially the precise advantages professedly aimed at by the British orders. The arrangement has, nevertheless, beeu rejected. This candid and liberal experiment having thus failed, and no other event having occurred on which a suspension of the embargo by the executive was authorised, it necessarily remains in the extent original ly given to it. We have the satisfaction, however, to reflect, that in return for the privations imposed by the measure, and which our fellowcitizens in general have borne with patriotism, it has had the important effects of saving our mariners, and our vast mercantile property, as well as of affording time for prosecuting the defensive and provisional mea sures called for by the occasion. It has demonstrated to foreign nations the moderation and firmness which govern our councils, and to our citizens the necessity of uniting in support of the laws and the rights of their country; and has thus long frustrated those usurpations and spoliations which, if resisted, involved war; if submitted to, sacrificed a vital principle of our national independence. Under a continuance of the belligerent measures, which, in defiance of laws which consecrate the rights of neutrals, overspread the ocean with danger, it will rest with the wisdom of congress to decide on the course best adapted to such a state of things; and bringing with them, as they do, from every part of the union, the sentiments of our constituents, my confidence is strengthened that in forming this decision, they will, with an unerring regard to the essential rights and interests of the nation, weigh and compare the painful alternatives out of which a choice is to be made. Nor should I do justice to the virtues which on other occasions have marked the character of our fellow citizens, if I did not cherish an equal confidence that the alternative chosen, whatever it may be, will be maintained with all the fortitude and patriotism which the crisis ought to inspire. The documents containing the correspondence on the subject of the foreign edicts against our commerce, with the instructions given to our ministers at London and Paris, are now laid before you. The communication made to con gress at their last session, explained the posture in which the close of the discussions relating to the attack by a British ship of war on the frigate Chesapeake, left a subject on which the nation had manifested so honourable a sensibility. Every view of what had passed, authorised a belief that immediate steps would be taken by the British government for redressing a wrong, which, the more it was investigated, appeared the more clearly to require what had not been provided for in the special mission. It is found that no steps have been taken for the purpose. On the contrary, it will be seen in the documents laid before you, that the inadmissible preliminary which obstructs the adjustment is still adhered to; and, moreover, that it is now brought into connexion with the distinct and irrelative case of the orders of council. The instructions which had been given to our minis |