niards would never have been believed; that had the British beenwithdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been imputed to their retreat, and it was necessary to risk this army to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves. It was for this reason that I made the march to Sahagun. As a diversion, it succeeded; I brought the whole disposable force of the French against this army, and it has been allowed to follow me, without a single movement being made to favour my retreat.--The people of the Gallicias, though armed, made no attempt to stop the passage of the French through their mountains. They abandoned their dwellings at our approach, drove away their carts, oxen, and every thing that could be of the smallest aid to the army. The consequence has been, that our sick have been left behind; and when our horses or mules failed, which, on such marches, and through such a country, was the case to a great extent, baggage, ammunition, stores, &c. and even money, were necessarily destroyed or abandoned! I am sorry to say, that the army, whose conduct I had such reason to extol on its march through Portugal, and on its arrival in Spain, has to 'tally 'changed its character since it began to retreat. I can say nothing in its favour, but that when there was a prospect of fighting the enemy, the men were then orderly, and seemed pleased and determined to do their duty. In front of Villa Franca, the French came up with the reserve, with which I was covering the re freat of the army; they attacked it at Calcabelos, I retired, covered by the 95th regiment, and marched that night to Herresias, and from thence to Nogales and Lugo, where 1 had ordered the different divisions which preceded, to balt and collect. At Lugo, the French again came up with us. They attacked our advanced posts on the 6th and 7th, and were repulsed in both attempts, with little loss on our side. I heard from the prisoners taken, that three divisions of the French army were come up, commanded by Marshal Soult; I therefore expected to be attacked on the morning of the 8th.' It was my wish to come to that is sue; I had perfect confidence in the valour of the troops, and it was only crippling the enemy that we could hope either to retreat or to embark unmolested. I made every preparation to receive the attack, and drew out the army in the morning to offer battle. This was not Marshal Soult's object. He either did not think himself sufficiently strong, or he wished to play a surer game by attacking us on our march, or during our embarkation. The country was intersected, and his position too strong for me to attack with an inferior force. The want of provisions would not enable me to wait longer, I marched that night; and in two forced matches, bivonacing for six or eight hours in the rain, I reached Betanzos on the 10th inst. At Lugo, I was sensible of the impossibility of reaching Vigo, which was at too great a distance, and of fered no advantages to embark in the face of an enemy. My inten tion was then to have retreated to the peninsula of Betanzos, where I hoped to find a position to cover the embarkation of the army in 'Ares or Rede Bays; but having sent an officer to reconnoître it, by his report I was determined to prefer this place. I gave notice to the admiral of my intention, and begged that the transports might be brought to Corunna; had I found them here on my arrival on the 11th, the em barkation would easily have been effected, for I had gained several marches on the French. They have now come up with us, the transports are not arrived; my position in front of this place is a very bad one; and this place, if I am forced to retire into it, is commanded within musket-shot, and the harbour will be so commanded by cannon on the sea coast, that no ship will be able to lay in it. In short, my lord, Gen. Stewart will inform you how critical our situation is. It has been recommended to me to make a proposal to the enemy, to induce him to allow us to embark quietly, in which case he gets us out of the country soon, and this place, with its stores, &c. complete; that otherwise we have the power to make a long defence, which must cause the destruction of the town. I am averse to make any such proposal, and am exceedingly doubtful if it would be attended with any good effect; but whatever I resolve on this head, I hope your lordship will rest assured, that I shall accept no terms that are in the least dishonourable to the army or to the country. I find I have been led into greater length, and more detail, than I thought I should have had time for; 1 have written under inferruptions, and with my mind much occupied with other matter. My letter, written so carelessly, can ou ly be considered as private. When I have more leisure, I shall write more correctly; in the mean time, I rely on General Stewart for giving your lordship the information and detail, which I have omitted. shall regret his absence, for his services have been very distinguished; but the state of his eyes make it impossible for him to serve, and this country is not one in which cavalry can be of much use. If I succeed in embarking the army, I shall send it to England; it is quite unfit for further service until it has been refitted, which can best be done there. JOHN MOORE. I The following are the most impor tant extracts from the other letters of Sir J. Moore. Letter 1, is dated Lisbon, Oct. 91 1808, acknowledging to Lord Castle reagh, to whom they are all addressed, the receipt of his appointment to the command of an army of 30,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, to be employed in the north of Spain, and stating his determination to proceed by land, in conformity with the advice of the Spanish gencrals. Letter 2, is dated Lisbon, Oct. 18. In it he says" It is impossible to be more anxious than I am to get forward, but it is needless to take forward troops without the means to enable them to act; and however light the equipment I have fixed, yet the difficulty of procuring is very considerable. Add to this a commissariat, extremely zealous, but quite new and inexperienced in the important duties which it now falls to their lot to execute." Letter 3, is dated Lisbon, Oct. 27. It states, that he has sent Gen. Hope with the artillery, cavalry, and a corps of infantry, total 6,000, by the great road leading from Badajos to Madrid; that he has written to General Baird, to march from Corunna to Astorga, proposing himself to march to Sala- 8,0001." Letter 4, is dated Salamanca, Nov. 24. It states the arrival of the troops there in good order. It concludes thus "The information which your lordship must already be in possession of, renders it perhaps less necessary for me to dwell upon the state of affairs in Spain, so dif ferent from that which was to be expected. Had the real strength and composition of the Spanish armies been known, and the defenceless state of the country, I conceive that Cadiz, and not Corrunna, would have been chosen for the disembarkation of the troops from England, and Seville or Cordova, not Salamanca, would have been selected as the proper place for the assembling of this army. "The Spanish government do not seem ever to have contemplated the possibility of a second attack, and are quite unprepared to meet that which is now made upon them-their arinics all inferior even in number to the French; that which Blake comminanded, included Romana's corps, did got exceed $7,000 men, a great proportion of them mere peasantry. The armies of Castanos and Palafox united do not exceed 40,000 men, and are not, I suspect, of a better description, and until lately they were much weaker. In the provinces no armed force whatever exists, either for immediate protection or to reinforce the armies. The French cavalry from Burgos, in small detachments, are overtunning the province of Leon, raising contributions, to which the inhabitants submit without the least resistance. The enthusiasm of which we have heard so much no where appears; whatever good will there is (and I believe amongst the lower orders there is a great deal) is taken no advantage of. "I am at this moment in no communication with any of the generals commanding the Spanish armies. I am ignorant of their plans, or of those of the government. General Castanos, with whom, after repeated application, I was desired to communicate, for the purpose of combining the operations of the British army; was deprived of his command at the moment I had begun The my correspondence with him, Marquis of Romana, who is appointed his successor, is still at St. Ander. It is difficult for me to form any plan for my self beyond the assembling of the army. I shall then be in a state to undertake something; and if the Spaniards, roused by their misfortunes, assemble round us, and become once more enthusiastie and determined, there may still be hopes of expelling the French. It is my wish to lay before your lordship, for the information of government, things exactly as they are. It answers no good purpose to represent them otherwise, for it is thus that we must meet them. I feel no despondency myself, nor do I wish to excite any in others, but our situation is likely soon to become an arduous one. Reverses must be expected; and though I am confident this army will always do its duty, yet ultimate success will depend were upon the Spaniards themselves, and VOL. V. their enthusiastic devotion to their cause, than on the efforts of the British, who, without such aid, are not sufficiently numerous to resist the armies which will be immediate opposed to them." Letter 5, is dated Salamanca, Nor. 29.-It announces the total defeat of the army of Castanos and Palafox. Sir J. M. conceives that by this event his junction with General Baird is become quite impracticable; and that even although united, after the specimens of the little resistance made by the Spaniards, the British army alone could have no chance of resisting the formidable numbers that will be immediately brought against it. By persevering longer," says he, “ L shall certainly sacrifice the army, without benefitting Spain. I have therefore determined to retire." He concludes with saying, "If landed at Cadiz, we may still be useful." Letter 6, is dated Salamanca, Dec. 5. In this letter, after announcing the success of the French at Samosierra, he says "Your lordship may believe that it was not without much reflec tion and extreme reluctance, that I determined to withdraw the army from Spain, and to abandon a cause, for the success of which the government are so much interested, and the public mind so highly exalted. "As long as there remained an army, and any hope of resistance on the part of the Spaniards, I was determined to persevere, at all risks, in the junction of the army; and then, if General Casi tanos had received a check, or been forced to retreat, it was my intention if nothing better offered, to march upon Madrid, from whence, getting behind the Tagus, we should have given the Spaniards an opportunity of rallying as round us, and have shared their fortunes. This intention I mentioned to your lordship in my letter of the 24th, and I imparted it as a question to Mr. Frere for his opinion. But the sudden defeat of General Castanos's army left nothing either to aid me, or to prevent the fur ther progress of the enemy. "The British army was at that moment on its march to collect at this place and Astorga, General Hope, with the head of his division, was at Villa Castrin, and from the collected manner in which it was necessary for him to march, he could not have joined me sooner than he has done. Sir David Baird's corps could not be collected at M TR united, to Burgos. He adds, "While there is a chance I'll remain, but Ma drid may fall, and the ground be suddenly cut from under my feet. I hope a better spirit prevails in the southern provinces. Here no one stirs, and yet they are all well inclined." Letter 9, dated Salamanca, Dec. 10, states the fall of Madrid, but his determination to advance to Tordesillas, and thence to Valladolid. His army good, that of Romana, he is informed by Gen. Baird, very bad. The letter thus concludes" Until affairs in Spain bear a more promising aspect, I should think your lordship will approve of keeping at Corrunna or Lisbon a sufficient quantity of transports for the re-embarkation of the army." Astorga before the 4th of this month; it was thus impossible for this army to have been united before the 13th or 14th, and still later before it could be ready to undertake an offensive movement. This time was more than sufficient to enable the enemy to finish the destruction of what little Spanish force remained, and to turn the greatest part of his army against the British, which, when united does not exceed 26,000 men, and which probably he would be able to attack whilst detached and separated. I consider the British army as standing alone; that its union could not be attempted without great hazard; or, if effected, that it could not withstand the great force that would be brought against it. It was vain, I thought, to expect, that, under such circumstances, it could retrieve the Spanish cause; and though I knew the army would cheerfully attempt whatever I ordered, I thought my duty called upon me not to expose it to a contest in which its best efforts could not promise to be successful. It may fairly be said, that the British army never reached Spain: it cannot, in the true sense, be called an army, until it is united and prepared to act; the Spanish forces were defeated, and their cause lost, before the British, so constituted, could come to their assistance. "I feel the weight of the responsibility which has fallen to me, I had nothing but difficulties to choose; whether I have chosen the least, and that which will be the least disapproved by his Majesty and my country, I cannot determine my wish has been to decide right. I reflected well upon the diftain a victory, unless it should rouse ferent duties I had to discharge; and if I have decided wrong, it can only be because I am not gifted with that judgment which was imputed to me when I was entrusted with this important command." Letter 7, is dated Salamanca, Dec. 5.-It states, that, in consequence of the general opinion entertained, from the resistance of Madrid, which is also Mr. Frere's, he ordered Sir David Baird to suspend his march. Letter 8, dated Salamanca, Dec. 8, states, that in consequence of the resistance of Madrid, and the hope expressed, in which, however, he parti cipated very slightly, he had ordered General Baird, who was retreating to advance to Benevente, with intent to join him and Romana there, and march Letter 10, is dated Salamanca, Dec. 12.-It states, that he has not heard from the Marquis Romana, and must give up the co-operation of his corps for the present; that he is determined however, to advance, to create a diver sion, if the Spaniards can avail them selves of it; but that the French have from 80 or 90,000 men in the north of Spain. In case of retreat, he requests transports to proceed first to Corunna for orders, and then rendezvous at Vigo. The British army is from 27 to 28,000 men, including two regiments coming from Portugal. Letter 11, dated Toro, Dec. 16, communicates an intercepted letter from Berthier to Marshal Soult, which induced him to direct his force against Soult; but expects no good to the general cause, even though he should ob the Spaniards. Desires the transports from Portugal to be sent to Vigo. The intercepted letter orders Soult to make himself master of Leon, to drive the English into Gallicia, and seize Benes vente and Zamora. It appears from it, that Bonaparte thought Sir John Moore was retreating to Lisbon. Letter 12, dated Benevente, Dec. 28, announces his abandonment of his design to attack Soult, and his retreat, in consequence of information of the French marching in force from Madrid, Letter 13, is dated Astorga, Dec. 31. It says, "I arrived here yesterday, where I found the Marquis de Romana, with a great part of his troops. With respect to me, my lord, and the Britis troops, it is come to that point which I have long foreseen, From a desire to do what I could, I made the movement against Soult: as a diversion, it has answered completely: but as there is nothing to take advantage of it, I have risked the loss of the army to no purpose. "I have no option now but to fall down to the coast as fast as I am able. I found no provisions here; the little which had been collected had been consumed by Sir D. Baird's corps in their passage, and there is not two days bread to carry the army to Villa Franca, There is no means of carriage; the people run away; the villages are deserted; and I have been obliged to destroy great part of the ammunition and military stores; for the same reason I have been obliged to leave the sick; in short, my sole object is to save the army. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GEN. SIR JOHN MOORE AND MR. FRERE. Copy of a Letter from the Right Hon. J. H. Frere to Lieut. General Sir J. Moore, K. B. dated Talavera de la Reyna, Dec. 3, 1808. SIR, Though I have little to add to the general representation respecting the means of resistance at present existing in Spain, which I had the honour of stating in my letter of the 30th of last month, yet the report which is just brought me by of the state in which he left Madrid, is so strong a confirmation, or more properly speaking, so much exceeds every thing which I had ventured to say of the spirit and resolution of the people, that I cannot forbear representing to you in the strongest manner the propriety, not to say the necessity, of supporting the determination of the people of this country by all the means which have been entrusted to you for that purpose. I have no hesitation in taking upon myself any responsibility which may attach itself to this advice; and I consider the fate of Spain us depending absolutely for the present upon the decision which you may adopt. Is for the present; for such is the spirit and determination of the people, that if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of their ultimate success! say You will see by the date of this, that the junta are removed from a situation in which they were exposed immediately to be made prisoners. They have de termined to remove to Badajoz, where SIR,-In the event which I did not wish to pre-suppose, of your continuing in the determination already announced to me, of returning with the army under your command, I have to request that the bearer of this, whose intelligence has been already referred to, may be previously examined before a council of war. I have the honour to be, &c. J. H. FRERE. Extract of a Letter from Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Moore, K. B. to the Right Hon. J. H Frere, dated Sulamanca, Dec. 6. SIR,I had the honour to receivė, on the 2d inst. your letter of the 30th fult, in answer to that which I addressed to you on the 27th of November, Had this army been united, and ready to act at the time of General Castanos's defeat, much as I think it would have been risking it, it was my intention to have marched on to Madrid, and to have shared the fortunes of the Spanish mas tion. If I could not have sustained miŷself there, I thought that by placing myself behind the Tagus, I might give the broken armies and people of Spain, if they had patriotism left, an opportu nity to assemble around me, and to march forward to the relief of the capital. That this was my intention is known to the officers with me who are in my confidence it is known also to Lord Castlereagh, to whom I imparted it in one of my late letters. I wished to have my opinion confirmed by yours, which was my reason for addressing you on the 27th; but had you seen the affairs of Spain in a different light, and had you been adverse to the enemy being committed in the heart of Spain, your opimion upon, such a subject would, I may say, certainly have decided me to have altered my intention. With respect to the determination which I made on the evening of the 28th, upon receiving from Mr. Stuart the account of Castanos's defeat, I should, had you been with me, have communicated it to you; but should never have thought of asking your advice or opinion, as that determination was foundad on circumstances with which you could |