Rational Individualism: The Perennial Philosophy of Legal InterpretationThis book is a study of the theory of legal interpretation that underlies the legal systems of Europe, England, and the United States. The principles of interpretive jurisprudence are traced through Greek and Latin philosophers and legal theorists and Renaissance Italian glossators and commentators. In addressing human nature, these principles have a self-sustaining logical integrity. They are defensible as a worthy tradition of legal respect for the value of the individual. |
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Page 6
... authority ; statutes are relatively useless until one knows how the courts are going to interpret them . What all the varieties of legal positivism have in common is that they identify law with the documents or instruments in which it ...
... authority ; statutes are relatively useless until one knows how the courts are going to interpret them . What all the varieties of legal positivism have in common is that they identify law with the documents or instruments in which it ...
Page 36
... authority of the legislator against the tenor of reason for the sake of some special benefit.16 The first text from Paul is the principium of a slightly longer quotation ( D.50,17,141 ) which appears among the " various rules of ancient ...
... authority of the legislator against the tenor of reason for the sake of some special benefit.16 The first text from Paul is the principium of a slightly longer quotation ( D.50,17,141 ) which appears among the " various rules of ancient ...
Page 42
... authority is derived from the authority of law itself ( de auctoritate iuris nostra pendet auctoritas ) and accordingly declares that " It is an utterance worthy of majesty that the Emperor acknowledge himself bound by the reigning laws ...
... authority is derived from the authority of law itself ( de auctoritate iuris nostra pendet auctoritas ) and accordingly declares that " It is an utterance worthy of majesty that the Emperor acknowledge himself bound by the reigning laws ...
Page 44
... authority indeed , which has been approved to such a degree that it has not been necessary to lay hold of it in writing.36 37. ( Id . , 1 Inquests ) If a question of the interpretation of a law arises , one must especially look into the ...
... authority indeed , which has been approved to such a degree that it has not been necessary to lay hold of it in writing.36 37. ( Id . , 1 Inquests ) If a question of the interpretation of a law arises , one must especially look into the ...
Page 45
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Contents
1 | |
29 | |
THREE The Reconstruction of Roman Jurisprudence | 59 |
FOUR The Continental Tradition | 89 |
1 | 98 |
Renaissance Treatises on Interpretation | 109 |
Humanists Nationalists and Vernacular Codes | 115 |
FIVE The AngloAmerican Tradition | 125 |
SIX Philosophical Implications of the Tradition | 165 |
SEVEN The Rational Strength of the Tradition | 195 |
EIGHT Contemporary Issues | 223 |
Bibliography | 257 |
Latin Texts of the Glosses | 269 |
About the Author | 279 |
Index | 287 |
Other editions - View all
Rational Individualism: The Perennial Philosophy of Legal Interpretation Roger Simonds Limited preview - 1995 |
Rational Individualism: The Perennial Philosophy of Legal Interpretation Roger T. Simonds Limited preview - 2022 |
Common terms and phrases
abrogate according Accursius actually ambiguity Amendment applied argument Aristotle authority Bartolus Cambridge canon law Celsus century Chancery cited classical clause Code common law conflict consistency principle Constitution contract Corpus iuris Corpus iuris civilis courts custom Digest distinction doctrine earlier Edited effectiveness principle emperor English equity established example exemplum fact follow gloss glossators Hence hermeneutic human idea imperial important infra intent interpretive jurisprudence iure judicial jurists justice Justinian Justinian's lawyers legal instruments legal interpretation legal literature legal positivism legal system legal theory legal tradition leges legis legislation libro literal logical meaning metaphysics modern Modestinus moral natural law notion Papinian particular perennial philosophy person philosophy political possible practical problem provisions purpose quae question quod radical reason Renaissance Roman law rule says sense statute sunt teleological things thought tion topic treatises Tribonian Ulpian University Press valid words written law
Popular passages
Page 216 - Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.
Page 215 - Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.
Page 226 - A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.
Page 226 - Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the 10th amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word "expressly...
Page 216 - For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.
Page 234 - ... fetter and degrade the state governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress...
Page 227 - The subject to be regulated is commerce: and our constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce undoubtedly...
Page 226 - Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.