as is sufficient to explain the general principles of the Gnostics is easily deduced from the accounts that we have of that heresy. Also the Greek philosophy, having been originally derived from that of the orientals, and having always retained the same fundamental doctrines, with no very considerable variations, and those easily distinguished, is another guide to us in our investigation of this subject.

But we have happily preserved to us one work of a singular construction, in which the principles of this philosophy are represented such as they were, before they were incorporated into Christianity, by a writer tolerably near to the time of the first promulgation of it, at least as near to it as any other certain account of the principles of the Gnostics, except what may be collected from the New Testament itself. And what makes this work an unique of its kind, and therefore more deserving of our notice, is, that it appears to have been written by a person who was unquestionably an Unitarian; whereas every other account that is now extant of the principles of the Gnostics, or of those from which they were derived, is from persons who were either Trinitarians, or had adopted those principles which afterwards led to the doctrine of the Trinity.

The work I mean, is the Clementine Homilies, written probably about the time of Justin Martyr; and it is pretty remarkable, that the author of the Clementines, as the work is generally called, does not appear to have known any thing of Justin's doctrine of the personification of the logos, which was borrowed from Platonism; and yet in the compass of his work there is an account of every other system that made any considerable figure in those times. The author himself appears to have been well acquainted with philosophy, and has evidently borrowed from it a variety of opinions which are sufficiently absurd. It may, therefore, be presumed, that this writer, who was a man of learning and ability, well acquainted with the different systems that prevailed in his time, and with the arguments by which they were supported, had never heard of any such doctrine; and that no questions relating to religion were much agitated in his time by Christians, except against the Heathens on the one hand, and the Gnostics on the other. Of all these a very full detail is given in this work, in which speakers are introduced on both sides, who exhibit in the best light the principles of their respective systems.

It is possible that this writer might be mistaken in his account of the opinions of persons who lived about a century

before his time, and it is evident he has ascribed to Peter several opinions which he could not have entertained; but he would naturally (since he must have wished to gain credit to his theological romance, for such his work properly is) endeavour to give to every personage introduced into it such opinions and arguments as he thought would pass for theirs. Since, however, this is the only account that we have of the tenets of those oriental philosophers so near to the time in which their doctrines were most in vogue, I shall give a separate view of them as they are exhibited in this work; and it will be seen, that the principles here ascribed to Simon Magus were in general the very same with those which were afterwards entertained by the christian Gnostics, though Simon is not here represented as a Christian, but an open opposer of Christianity.

Beausobre says that this work is a well-written romance, composed by a christian philosopher who wished to publish his theology under the names of Peter and Clement.*

Cotelerius, the editor, says, that "though it abounds with trifles and errors, which had their source in a half-christian philosophy and heresy, especially that of the Ebionites, it may be read with advantage, both on account of the elegance of the style and the various learning that it contains, and likewise for the better understanding the doctrine of the first heretics."†

It was an opinion very prevalent among Christians, that Simon Magus was the father of all heresy, and it is probable that the opinions which he maintained, being adopted by Christians, were the true source of those heresies which went under the general name of Gnosticism. Thus much may be learned from the work before us, in which Peter is represented as saying, "There will be, as the Lord said, false apostles, false prophets, heresies, pretensions to power, which, as I conjecture, have their origin from Simon, who blasphemes God, and who will concur with him in speaking the same things against God."‡

Histoire de Manicheisme, I. p. 461. (P.) "C'est un roman bien écrit, composé par un chrétien philosophe, qui a voulu débiter sa théologie sous le nom de S. Pierre ou de S. Clément." Pt. ii. L. ii. Ch. vii.

+"Et vero quæ damus Clementina, licet nugis, licet erroribus scatent, à semichristiana philosophia et heresi, præcipuè Ebionitica, profectis, non sine fructu tamen legentur, tum propter elegantiam sermonis, tum multiplicis doctrinæ causa, tum denique ad melius cognoscenda primarum hæresion dogmata." Pref. (P.) Έσονται γαρ, ως κυριος είπεν, ψευδαποςολοι, ψευδείς προφήται, αιρέσεις, Φιλαρο άι τινες, ως τοχάζομαι, απο το τον Θεόν βλασφημένος Σίμωνος την αρχήν λαβεσαι, εις τα αυτά τη Σιμωνι καλα το Θε8 λεγειν συνεργησωσιν. Hom. xvi. Sect. xxi. p. 729. (P.)

χιαι

This Simon is represented as having supplanted one Dositheus, who preceded him as a teacher of the same doctrines.* The successor of Simon was Menander, whose disciple was Saturninus, of Antioch, and was followed by Basilides, of Alexandria. These were the first Christian Gnostics.

The age of Simon Magus is fixed by the history of the book of Acts, in which mention is made of his interview with Peter. The severe reproof given him by Peter, might be supposed to have silenced him; but he is represented as being indefatigable in teaching his opinions afterwards. Theodoret speaks of him as sowing his heretical thorns when Paul was writing his second epistle to Timothy.‡

The great principles of the oriental philosophy, as far as they affected Christianity were these, viz. That matter is the source of all evil, that the Supreme Being was not the maker of the world, that men had souls separate from their bodies, and that these souls had pre-existed. And it must be owned that the reasoning by which the authors of this philosophy had been led to adopt these principles were very specious. It was a fundamental maxim with the oriental philosophers, as it also was with Plato, who borrowed from them, that the Supreme Being is perfectly good, and therefore that he could not be the Author of any thing evil. In this work Simon is represented as saying, "If God be the author only of what is good, we must conclude either that evil has some other origin, or that it is unoriginated."§ It is on this subject that he is represented as speaking with the greatest confidence, saying to Peter, "Since you acknowledge, from the Scriptures, that there is an evil being, tell me how he was made, if he was made, and by whom, and for what purpose."||

But as it is evident that there is much evil in the world, and the principles of it seem to be interwoven into the very constitution of nature, these philosophers concluded that the visible universe must have had some other author, who must either have been derived from the Supreme Being, or have been eternal and underived. The latter, however, was so

Hom. ii. Sect. xxiv. p. 627. (P.)

+ Euseb. Hist. L. iv. C. vii. p. 147. (P.)

† Σιμων ήρξατο κατ' εκείνον τον καιρον τας αιρετικας κατασπείρειν ακανθας. In 2 Tim. ii. 8. Opéra, III. p. 497. (P.)

§ Ουκεν ει ο Θεος μόνων των καλων αίτιος εςιν, τε λοιπ8 τι εσιν νοείν, η ότι το Hom. xix. Sect. xii. πονηρον ἕτερα τις εγέννησεν αρχή, η αρ' αγεννητον εσιν.

p. 747. (P.)

|| Επει εν ευγνωμονησας ὁμολογησας είναι τον πονηρον, απο γράφων, και λεγε το πως γεγονεν, είπερ γεγονεν, και ύπο τινος, και δια τι. Ibid. Sect. iii. p. 744. (Ρ.)

bold an hypothesis, that it does not seem to have been adopted very early. At least, the more general opinion was, that matter only had been eternal, and that its nature was such, as that nothing perfectly good could be made out of it; so that, however it might be modified by the Supreme Being, every system into which it entered must necessarily contain within itself the seeds of evil.

In the same system it was generally supposed that all intelligence had only one source, viz. the divine mind; and to help out the doctrine concerning the origin of evil, it was imagined, that though the Divine Being himself was essentially and perfectly good, those intelligences, or spirits, which were derived from him, and especially those which were derived from them, were capable of depravation. It was farther imagined, that the derivation of these inferior intelligent beings from the Supreme was by a kind of efflux, or emanation, a part of the substance being detached from the rest, but capable of being absorbed into it again. To these intelligences, derived mediately or immediately from the divine mind, the authors of this system did not scruple to give the name of gods, thinking some of them capable even of creative power, that is, a power of modifying matter: for creation out of nothing was an idea that they never entertained. In this work Simon Magus supposes two of these inferior gods to have been sent out by the Supreme God, and that one of them made the visible world, and the other gave the law to the Jews.*

As these divine intelligences were capable of animating the bodies of men, it was supposed that this was occasionally done by them, as well as that all souls had come into this world from a pre-existent state, and generally for the punishment of offences committed in that state. Simon himself claimed to be one of those superior powers, as it is likewise said, that he maintained his wife Helena to be another of them. We read, Acts viii. 9, that he said, that "himself was some great one," and the people said of him, ver. 10, "This man is the great power of God." In this work likewise, he claims to be a great power, duvauis, even superior to the Being that made the world; and he intimates, that he

Σίμων σήμερον καθα συνελαξαῖο, ἕτοιμος εςιν απο των γραφων, επι πανίων ελθων, αποδεικνύειν μη τείον είναι Θεον ανωτατον, ὃς ἔρανον εκλισε, και γήν, και πανία εν αυτοις" αλλα αλλον τινα αγνωςον και ανω αίον, ως εν απορρήτοις ονία Θεον θεων· ὃς δυο επεμψε θεους· αφ' ων ὁ μεν εις εςιν ὁ κοσμον κλισας, ὁ δὲ Ἱερος, ὁ τον νόμον δες. Hom. iii. Sect. ii. p. 634. (P.)

was a christ, or a person anointed, or set apart for some great office, calling himself sws, as if he should always continue, having no cause of corruption in himself. In another place he calls himself the son of god, † meaning, probably, that he was some principal, or immediate emanation from the Supreme Being.

When, upon this ground, Simon would, for argument's sake, insinuate that Jesus Christ, being called the Son of God, and said to proceed from him, must therefore claim to be a god, Peter replied that, "upon this principle, all souls, which are the breath of God, must be gods; and," says he, "if they must be called gods, what great matter is it for Christ to be a god in that sense, as he has no advantage over others?" This, I would observe, is a very different kind of answer from what would have been given by a Trinitarian, or one who had adopted the doctrine of the personification of the logos.

No other peculiar principles of Simon's appear in this piece, except that he denied the resurrection, § which was also done by all the Christian Gnostics afterwards. They had too bad an opinion of matter, and consequently of the body, which was composed of it, to think the resurrection a desirable thing.

It may not be possible to imagine every thing that might have been urged by the patrons of this oriental philosophy in its favour; but we may easily perceive in this work, that the principal sources of their mistakes were such as have been represented above, especially their fixed persuasion concerning the pure benevolence of the Supreme Being; considering what their idea of this pure benevolence was. For it was such as was incompatible with justice; so that the very admission that God was just, was with them a proof that he was not that good being whom they placed at the head of the universe.

In this work Simon says, "It is the property of men to be, some good, and others bad, but it belongs to God to be

Και φρενώθεις θελειν νομίζεσθαι αναβαίη τις είναι δυναμις, και αυτά τε τον κόσμον κλισανίος θες ενιοτε δε και χρισον ἑαυτον αινισσόμενος, έςωία προσαγορεύει ταυλη δε τη · προσηγορια κεχρηται, ως δη ζησόμενος αεί, και αίλαιαν φθορας, το σωμα πεσειν, εκ έχων και είε θεον τον κλισανία τον κοσμον, ανωβαίον είνα λέγει. Hom. il. Sect. xxii. p. 626. (P.)

† Συ δε και τα σαφως λεγομενα μη συνίων, ύιον ἑαυτον ειπειν θελεις. Hom. xviii. Sect. vii, p. 739. (P.)

1. Ει δε προσφιλονεικων με ερεις, και αυτας θεος ειναι και τι τ87ο εξι μεγα και Χριςού, τῷ θεῷ λέγεσθαι; τελο γαρ εχει, ὁ και πανίες εχεσιν. Hom. xvi. Sect. xvi. p. 728. (Ρ.) § Ouvenes nyepalive. Hom. ii. Sect. xxii, p. 626. (P.)