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The other passage is a very obscure one, at the close of the epistle to Hermias, Erastus and Coriscus, in which mention is made of "God the governor of all things," and also of his Father; but as no explanation is added, his meaning is not easily discovered. Writing to the three persons abovementioned, and expressing his wish that their friendship might remain unalterable, he advises them, among other methods, to take a joint oath, "by God the governor of all things that are, and that are to come, and the Lord the Father of the governor, and of the cause, whom, if we truly philosophize, we shall all know, as far as happy men can attain to."*

If the construction of the Greek be attended to, we shall see that such a distinction is not made between the governor and the Father as we should have expected, if they had been distinct persons. It will be seen that a person being his own father occurs in the writings of the later Platonists, and the conclusion of this passage speaks of no more than one person.

But though Plato himself did not proceed so far as to personify these ideas, or any thing else belonging to the divine mind, it may easily be conceived how this might come to be done by his followers, especially from their calling these ideas, the causes, as well as principles, of things. Diogenes Laertius, in his Life of Plato, says, that he made the terms idea, form, kind, pattern, principle and cause (as, I think, his words are most naturally rendered into English) to be synonymous.t "Ideas, he supposed to be causes, and principles, of things being naturally what they are."+ It also appears from Aristotle, that ideas were usually called the causes of things; and the notion of a cause, and that of a proper author or person, are nearly allied. It being a favourite principle with the ancients, that the divine mind was immoveable, and therefore could not go forth to the work of creation, but that something else must do this; this second principle seems to have been personified for this purpose. But this was not done by Plato; for he made ideas to be as immoveable as the divine mind itself. In the affected mysterious way of expressing himself, which he frequently

Επιμνύντας- -και των παντων θεων ἡγεμονα των τε οντων και των μελλόντων, το τε ἡγεμονος και αιτις Πατέρα, Κυριον, επομνύντας, όν, αν οντως φιλοσοφωμεν, εισομεν παντες σαφως, εις δυναμιν ανθρώπων ευδαιμονων. (Ρ.)

† Την γε εν ίδεαν, και είδος ονομάζει, καὶ γενος, και παραδειγμα, και αρχήν, και αιτιον. Vita Platonis, p. 225. (P.)

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† Τας δε ιδεας ύφιςαται αιτίας τινας, και αρχας, το τοιαυτ' είναι τα φυσει συνεςωτα ὅσαπερ εςιν αυτα. Ibid. p. 232. (Ρ.)

adopted, he says, that "idea" (for he sometimes used this term in the singular, and sometimes in the plural number) "neither moves nor remains;" meaning, perhaps, that it had no relation to space, and that "it is both one and many.

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The Christian fathers have called the second principle, or logos, the Son, and the supreme Being himself the Father; but in the system of Plato, the sun has the appellation of Exyou, or the offspring of the Deity; and in one place the whole universe is called his only-begotten Son. The sun,' he says, “he created analogous to himself; for he himself in the intellectual world bears the same relation to the mind, and the things perceived by the mind, that the sun in the visible world bears to the eye, and the objects perceived by the eye."†

His explanation of this analogy displays much confusion in his ideas on the subject. "As the sun," he says, "gives the eye a power of seeing, and the objects a power of being seen; so that which gives truth to things that are known, and power" (that is, of knowing) " to him that knows, is the idea of the good" (or of God) "being the cause of knowledge and of truth, as perceived by the mind."‡

Plotinus has the same idea, viz. that the good is both the cause of being, and of its appearing to be; just as the sun is both the cause of sensible things, and also of their being perceived by the senses, though itself be neither sight nor sensible things.§

Plato also says, that "as light and vision resemble the sun, but are not the sun, so knowledge and truth resemble the good, but are not the good; the good itself being something more venerable." In this and the preceding passage, it is observable, that he makes the good, and the

Και την ιδέαν, ούτε κινέμενον, ουτε μενον· και ταυτο, και έν, και πολλα. Vita Platonis, p. 25. (P.)

+ Τουτον τοινυν, ην δ' εγώ, φαναι με λεγειν τον τε αγαθε εκγονον, όν τ' αγαθόν εγεννησεν ανάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ, τιπερ αυτό εν τῷ νοητῳ τοπῳ προς τε νεν και τα νοεμενα, οὗτος οὗτον εν τῷ δρατῳ προς τε οψιν και τα δρωμενα. De Rep. L. vi. p. 433. (Ρ.)

* Τετο τοίνυν το την αληθειαν παρέχον τοις γιγνωσκομενοις, και τῳ γιγνωσκοντι την δυναμιν αποδίδον, την τε αγαθε ιδεαν φαθι είναι, αιτίαν δ' επίσημης εσαν και αληθείας, ὡς γιγνωσκόμενης μεν бье 18. Ibid. (P.)

§ Δια τετο ε μόνον λέγεται της εσίας αλλά και το δρασθαι αυτην αιτιος εκείνος είναι ώσπερ δε ὁ ἥλιος το έρασθαι τοις αισθητοις και το γενέσθαι αιτιος ων αιτιος πως και της σψεως εςιν, εκεν ετε οψις ετε τα γινόμενα· ούτω και ή τε αγαθε φυσις αιτία εσίας και να En. vi. L. vii. C. xvi. p. 709. (P.)

Η Ώσπερ εκεί φως τε και οψιν ἡλοειδη μεν νομίζειν ορθον, ἥλιονδε δε ηγείσθαι εκ ορθώς ἔχει· οὕτω και ενταυθα αγαθοειδή μεν νομίζειν ταυτ' αμφοτερα ορθον, αγαθόν δε ηγείσθαι οπότερον αυτών εκ ορθον αλλ' ετι μειζωνως τιμητειν την αγαθε έξιν. De Rep. Lo vi. p. 433. (P.)

idea of the good, to be synonymous. This, I hope, may serve as a specimen of the metaphysical acumen of Plato, and indeed of the ancients in general.

This comparison of the Divine Being, and his influence in the moral world, to the sun and his rays in the natural world, which Plato did not pursue to any great length, being taken up and carried on by Philo, and the Christian fathers, contributed greatly to the formation of the doctrine of the Christian trinity. According to the philosophy of the ancients, rays of light were something emitted by the sun, but still belonging to him, and never properly separated from him; but after being emitted in the day, were drawn into their source at night. As by these rays objects become visible, so that they serve as a medium of communication between the eye and the visible object, in like manner Plato must have supposed that the medium by which the mind distinguishes intellectual objects was a divine influence, or something emitted from the Deity, and drawn into him again at pleasure; and by making the mind, or understanding, to be one thing, and the soul itself another, he gave a further handle for the hypothesis of a divine efflux different from the Divine Being himself. This ves, therefore, synonymous to logos, was afterwards supposed to be that principle which was occasionally emitted from the Divine Being whenever any thing external to him was to be produced, himself being supposed to be immoveable.

The Christian doctrine of the Trinity was, moreover, brought forward by another maxim, which I do not find in Plato himself, but which was understood to be his doctrine, since it appears in the works of Julian, who was a great admirer of Plato. It is that, with respect to the Deity, there is no difference between powers, or properties, and essence. "Whatever," he says, "has been said concerning the divine essence, must be understood of his powers; for the essence of God is not one thing, and his power another, nor indeed is his energy a third. For whatever he wills, that is, and also has power and energy.' Again, he says,†

When we would explain the essence of God, we must

* Κοινως μεν δη τα προσθεν εν ρηθεντα περί της εσίας αυτε, ταις δυνάμεσιν προσήκειν ὑποληπίεον· 8 γαρ αλλο μεν εςιν εσία Θε8, δυναμις δε άλλο, και τη Δια, τρίτον παρα ταυία ενεργεια πανία γαρ απερ βελείαι, ταυία εςι, και δυναται, και ενεργει. Juliani Opera, Orat. iv. I. p. 142. (P.)

† Πρωίον εν όσαπερ έφαμεν, την εσίαν αυτε παράτησαι βελόμενοι, ταυθ ̓ ἡμιν ειρήσθαι, και περι των δυναμεων και ενεργειων νομίσεων, επει δε εν τοις τοιθίοις ο λογος εοικεν αντιτρέφειν όσα και περι των δυνάμεων αυτ8 και ενεργειων εφεξής σκοπέμεν, ταυία εκ εργα μόνον, αλλά και εσίαν νομίζειν. Ibid. p. 149. (Ρ.)

be understood to say the same concerning his power and energy, for they are synonymous. For whatever we say concerning his power and energy, they are not to be considered as works, but as essence.

Plato, therefore, having spoken of ves, or logos, as a thing distinct from the Divine Being himself, as a power or property belonging to him, and all divine powers and properties. being substance, a substantial person was easily made of this divine power. So miserably have men bewildered themselves for want of proper distinctions, and a true use of words. Such metaphysics as these of the ancients excite a smile of contempt in us, who have been better instructed by the happier sagacity of Locke, and others of the moderns. We think it wretched trifling; but, alas, ha nuga seria ducunt! Hence arose the doctrine of the Trinity; and from this doctrine infinite confusion in the Christian system.*

As the world, meaning the universe, or the soul of the world, is commonly reckoned the third principle in the Platonic Trinity, I shall consider Plato's own ideas of it; that it may be seen whether it has any correspondence to the Holy Spirit, the third principle in the Christian Trinity. According to Plato, the world was made by God, out of pre-existent matter, and as, according to his general system, every body has a soul, the universe was also provided with one. But as the visible body of the universe was modified by the supreme Being, it should seem that the soul of the universe did likewise receive some modification from him; but with respect to this circumstance he has not been sufficiently explicit. The universe, however, when completed, was by Plato styled a God, and the only-begotten Son of the supreme God.

Having spoken of God as essentially "good, and the parent of nothing but what was good and excellent; and as nothing could be excellent without intelligence, nor intelligent, without a soul; for this reason," he says, "he gave a mind to the soul, and a soul to the body, and so constituted the whole world after these, the most perfect and excellent in nature. So that we may justly say, that the world is, through the providence of God, a living creature, that it has a soul, and reason."† That this living creature might be

* "And a fatal obstacle to its reception with men of understauding among ourselves, as well as with Jews and Mahometans." Theol. Repos.

† Θεμις δε ετ' ην, ετ' εςι τῳ αρισῳ δραν αλλο πλην το καλλιςον, λογισάμενος εν ευριστ κεν, εκ των καλα φυσιν ὁραίων, έδεν ανοηίον, τε vev εχονία, όλον όλο καλλιον εσεσθαι ποτ' έργον, μεν δε αυ χωρίς ψυχης, αδυνατον παραγενέσθαι τῳ. Δια δε τον λογισμόν τονδε, τον μεν δε ψυχή, ψυχην δε εν σωματι συνιςας, το παν ξυνεπεκίαινεῖο, ὅπως ὅτι καλλιςον ε η καλα το παράδειγμα αρισον τε έργον απεργασμενος· οὕτως εν δη καλα λογον τον εικεία δεί

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like the most perfect living creature, he did not make two or more of them; but this one only-begotten heaven,' (meaning, probably, the whole system, including the sun, moon and stars,) "which has been, is, and will be."*

Then, speaking of the constituent parts of the world, earth, air, fire and water, he says, " he left nothing out of "he it, with this view, that it might be a whole and perfect living creature, consisting of perfect parts, and moreover one; there being nothing left, out of which another could be made, and not subject to old age or disease." He then speaks of it as made in a perfectly spherical form. But his reasons for this are as little to the purpose as those which I have here given relating to its other properties.

From this it should seem that, according to Plato, the matter out of which the world was made was not created by God, but found by him, having been from eternity, coexistent with himself: but, as he elsewhere observes, σε in a confused, disorderly state." Justin Martyr says, that he supposed matter to have been uncreated.§

According to Athanasius, Plato supposed matter to be self-existent. For he reproaches him with the weakness of his God, as not being able to produce any thing, unless he had matter to work upon; just as a carpenter is unable to make any thing till he be supplied with wood. ||

Theodoret indeed says, that, according to Plato, God made matter, which was co-eternal with him. But in this he must have been mistaken.

The world being made, Plato speaks of a soul being given

λεγειν, τονδε τον κοσμον ζωον εμψυχον εννεν τε, τη αληθεια, δια την τε Θε8 γενέσθαι προς νοιαν. Timaeus, p. 477. (Ρ.)

*

Ινα εν τόδε καλα την μονωσιν όμοιον η τῳ πανίελει ζωῳ, δια ταύτα είε δυο, στ' απειρες εποίησεν ποιων κοσμες αλλ' εις δε μονογενης ερανος γεγονώς, εςι τε και εσείαι. Ibid. (P.)

†. Των δε δη τετίαρων ἐν ὅλον έκαςον ειληφεν ἡ τε κόσμε συςασις εκ γαρ πυρος παντος, ύδαλος τε και αέρος, και γης συνεζησεν αυτον ὁ ξυνιςας· μερος εδ ̓ ἐν εδενος εδε δυναμιν εξωθεν απολείπων ταδε διανοηθείς πρωτον μεν ινα όλον ότι μάλιςα ζωον τελεον εκ τελεων των μέρων είη προς δε τούλοις ἐν, ἅτε ουκ ὑπολελειμμένων εξ ών αλλο τοιυτ' αν γενοιτο. Ibid. p. 478. (P.)

† Αλακίως, εις ταξιν αυτό ηγαγεν εκ της αλαξιας. Ibid. p. 477. (Ρ.)

§ Δια τετο γαρ και αγεννητον την ύλην εφησεν ειναι. Ad Graecos, p. 19. (Ρ.)

|| Αλλοι δε, εν δις εςι και ο μεγας παρ' Έλλησι Πλαίων, εκ προϋποκειμενης και αγενητου ύλης πεποιηκεναι τον Θεον τα όλα διηγούνται μη αν γαρ δυνασθαι τι ποιησαι τον Θεον, ει μη προϋπεκειῖο ἡ ύλη· ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ τεκίονι προϋποκείσθαι δει το ξύλον, ινα και εργάσασθαι δυνηθη· ουκ ισασι δε τους λεγοντες, ότι ασθένειαν περιτιθεασι τῷ Θεῷ· ει γαρ ουκ εςι της ύλης αυτος αιτιος, αλλ' εξ υποκειμενης ύλης ποιει τα ονία, ασθενής ευρισκεται, μη δυναμενος ανευ της ύλης εργασασθαι τι των γενομένων. De Incarnatione, Opera, I. p. 54. (P.) Π Των γαρ αλοπωλαίων, Πλαίωνος μεν ανέχεσθαι, και αιτιον της ύλης τον Θεον λεγοντος, και ξυναιδίον τε Θες την ύλην αποκαλενιος, και τας ιδέας εκ τ8 Θες και ξυν τῷ Θεῷ φασο κοντος είναι τον δε τε Θες λόγον, και το πανάγιον πνευμα μη πείθεσθαι, και εκ τ8 Θερ φυναι, και ξυν τῷ Θεῷ είναι. Græcæ Affectiones, Disp. ii. Opera, IV. p. 757. Ed. Hal. (P.)

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