infinite satisfaction for offences of infinite magnitude, is most fully expressed in the synod of Dort, held in 1618. "God," say they," is not only supremely merciful, but supremely just. But his justice requires that our sins, be"ing committed against his infinite majesty, must be pun"ished not only with temporal, but with eternal pains, both "of body and mind; which pains we cannot escape till the "justice of God be satisfied. But when we could not make "satisfaction, God gave his only begotten Son to satisfy for "us; and he was made sin and a curse upon the cross in "our stead."

Notwithstanding the satisfaction, thus supposed to be made to the justice of God, by the sufferings of Christ, it is evident that there must be some method of appropriating the benefit of these sufferings to individuals; for otherwise all mankind would have an equal claim to it. And since it would favor the doctrine of human merit too much, to suppose that the merit of Clarist's suffering was always ap plied to persons of a certain character and conduct, advan tage was taken of an expression of the apostle Paul, that we are saved by faith alone; interpreting it, as if it were something altogether independent of good works, or even of a good disposition of mind, which always precedes good works, and constitutes whatever merit they have. This application of the merits of Christ was, therefore, said to be made by something to which they gave the name of faith, but at the same time they disclaimed its being either of the nature of a work, or of faith in the usual sense of the word, viz. the belief of a truth. They therefore contented themselves with defining it by its effects; and this has been done, as might be supposed, very differently, and generally in figurative language, which conveys no determinate ideas, and therefore leaves the mind in great uncertainty, whether it be possessed of it or not.

In the Saxon confession, faith is defined to be "not the "knowledge of any historical fact, but the embracing of all "the articles of faith, and especially this, I believe the re"mission of sins, not to others only but to myself also." It is also there called, "an acquiescing confidence in the me'diator." In the synod of Dort, it is called, an instrument by which we lay hold of "the righteousness of Christ;" and it is always supposed to be something that is imparted by God, and nothing which can be acquired by man him

self. So also that repentance on which salvation is promised, is said, in the Augustan confession, to be "the free gift of God, and to be given not on account of any works "that we have done, or may do."

It is evident, that the more careful divines have been to explain faith, as something that is neither of the nature of a work, nor yet the proper belief of any thing, the more inexplicable and uncertain they have left it. In consequence of this, persons of a warm imagination more readily fancy that they have experienced this kind of inward operation, or feeling; while persons of more sober minds have often great doubts and distress on this account. This act of faith, as it is sometimes called, is also represented either as coincident, or the same thing with the new birth, without which no man can be called a child of God, or an heir of eternal life. But when the phraseology of scripture, and the reason of the thing, are considered, we cannot but be satisfied, that faith is the belief of the gospel, or of those historical facts which are contained in the writings of the evangelists, and that the new birth is that change of character and conduct which is produced by that belief.

This improved doctrine of satisfaction being held up by the reformers in opposition to the popish doctrine of merit, did not a little embarrass the divines of the church of Rome, among whom that doctrine had never been brought to any certain standard, so that there has always been room for great diversity of opinion on the subject.

In the debate about imputed righteousness in the council of Trent, it was agreed by all the divines, that Jesus Christ had merited for us, and that his merit is imputed to us; but Dominicus a Soto maintained that the term ought to be exploded, because neither the Fathers nor the scriptures ever used it, and especially because the Lutherans had abused it, affirming that imputed righteousness is the sole justification of man. He added, that it cut off all the necessity of satisfaction, and equalled the meanest of all saints to the blessed virgin.

At length the council condemned certain assertions of Luther, especially that God converts those whom he will, even though they resist; and some in the writings of Zuinglius, viz. that in predestination and reprobation, men have no power but only the will and pleasure of God; that the justified cannot fall from grace, &c. After much debating

on the subject, the decrees of this council were so framed, that it it was hoped they might have satisfied all parties. But in consequence of this, there was so much ambiguity in them, that they decided nothing; and the controversy among the catholics themselves went on just as before; persons of the most opposite sentiments appealing to the same decrees of this council.

Among other things it was determined by them, that the grace by which men are justified is merited by Christ. And upon the whole it is evident, that their decrees are in favor of that set of opinions which is termed orthodox, in all the established churches among the reformed.

We are not to conclude that because this doctrine of satisfaction for sin by the death of Christ was held up by almost all the reformers, as an article of so great magnitude and importance, that therefore it was soon so reduced to a system, as that there was no diversity of opinion about it. Nay it appears that some very essential points belonging to it were then, and indeed still are, undetermined; and they are things of such a nature, as, in fact, leave great doubts with respect to the very foundation of the doctrine itself.

Calvin makes it essential to the satisfaction of Christ, that his death should be both voluntary (which indeed others had said before him) and also that he should be condemned in a court of justice. "Had Christ been killed," said he, "by robbers, or in a sedition, his death would have "been no kind of satisfaction; but by being condemned be"fore a judge, it is plain that he assumed the character of "a guilty person." I should imagine, however, that many very orthodox persons of this day would think, that there might have been the same merit in the death of Christ, with respect to his making satisfaction for the sins of men, if the malice of his enemies had brought him to any kind of violent death, though there had been no sentence of an iniquitous court of justice for the purpose.

It is now generally thought that the scene of Christ's meritorious sufferings, when he actually bore the sin of men, and suffered the punishment due to them, was either in his agony in the garden, or in his death upon the cross;. but Calvin says, "nothing would have been done by the mere death of Christ, if he had not also afterwards de"scended into Hell, where he sustained that death which

"is inflicted by an angry God on the wicked." To this he applies what the author of the epistle to the Hebrews says of Christ's praying with strong cries and tears, which he says was lest he should be swallowed up by the wrath of God as a sinner. In another place, however, he says that in general Christ takes our sins, and purchases righteousness for us by the whole course of his obedience. But this is a thing about which those who now believe the doctrine of atonement are not agreed.

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It is evident, however, that Calvin believed the real descent of Christ into hell, not for the sake of preaching to the spirits in prison, or, as the primitive Fathers understood it, to those who died under the old dispensation, but that he might there suffer the proper torments of the damned, and bear the wrath of God that had been merited by the sins of men. Yet he says, that "God was not really angry with Christ, though he made him bear all the effects of his "anger." He would certainly, however, have been the proper object of God's anger if, as he maintains, " the stain (that is the guilt) as well as the punishment of sin, was "laid upon him, so that it ceased to be imputed to men." If God was neither displeased with men because their guilt was transferred to Christ, nor with Christ to whom it was transferred, what was the object of his anger, and how was his justice really satisfied?

A more difficult question, and to which it is impossible that any satisfactory answer, should be given, is how the sufferings of Christ can be deemed infinite, so as to make atonement for sins of infinite magnitude, when the divine nature of Christ, to which alone infinity belongs, is impassible, and his human nature could bear no more than that of any other man? It must be exceedingly difficult to conceive how any supposed union of the two natures can be of any avail in this case, unless, in consequence of that union, the divine nature had borne some share of the sufferings, which the scheme requires to be infinite, and this idea is justly disclaimed as impious. Osiander, the Lutheran, maintained that Christ, as man, was obliged to obey the law of God himself, and therefore that he made expiation for sin, as God; but Stancarus, another Lutheran divine, in opposition to him, maintained that the office of mediator belonged to Christ as man only. Both these opinions Mosheim says are dangerous. This is not the only case in which we see

men bewildering themselves, and puzzling others, by departing from the plain path of truth and common sense.

Such, however, is the constitution of things, that we are not authorized to expect any great good, without a proportionable mixture of evil. The case of Luther, and of Calvin too, was such, that the reformation of the errors and abuses of popery could not have been expected of them, or of their followers, but on principles equally erroneous. Happily, however, other persons, unconnected with them, were able, even at that time, to hit the happy medium between the popish doctrine of merit, as a foundation for the abuses of penance, indulgences, &c. and that of the total insignificance of good works to procure the favor of God. If by our good works we can procure the favor of God to ourselves, which is the uniform language of the scripture, and yet no portion of one person's merit be considered as capable of being transferred to another (which, indeed, is in the nature of things impossible) the very foundation of the popish doctrine of supererogation, and consequently of indulgences, is overturned; and yet no one false or dangerous. principle is introduced in its place.

Faustus Socinus, who distinguished himself so much in recovering the original doctrine of the proper humanity of Christ, as to give occasion to all who now hold that doctrine to be called by his name, saw clearly the absurdity of what was advanced by the other reformers concerning satisfaction being made to the justice of God by the death of Christ. Indeed, it immediately follows from his principles, that Christ being only a man, though ever so innocent, his death could not, in any proper sense of the word, atone for the sins of other men. He was, however, far from abandoning the doctrine of redemption in the scripture sense of the word, that is, of our deliverance from the guilt of sin by his gospel, as promoting repentance and reformation, and from the punishment due to sin, by his power of giving eternal life to all who obey him. But, indeed, if God himself freely forgives the sins of men upon their repentance, there could be no occasion, properly speaking, for any thing farther being done to avert the punishment with which they had been threatened. What he says on the subject is as follows:

"We are saved, however, from the punishment of our "sins by Christ, because by his great power in heaven and