This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The changes it contemplates would come gently as the dews of Heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done by one effort in all past time, as in the Providence of God it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this 19th day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixtytwo, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-sixth.

By the President:

Signed,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

THE M'CLELLAN AFFAIR.

Chief among the President's sources of personal annoyance, as well as of grave concern, were the difficulties constantly occurring between General McClellan and the War Department, and between the Commander-in-Chief and his Generals of Corps and Division; all occurring, too, while the failure of General McClellan to make any effective movement made the country sick at heart. The following letters on this subject, like most of Mr. Lincoln's writings, fully explain themselves.

The first refers to General McClellan's complaints as to the re-organization of the army into corps, and to his favoritism, which excited much ill-feeling.

FORTRESS MONROE, May 9, 1865.

MY DEAR SIR:-I have just assisted the Secretary of War in forming the part of a dispatch to you, relating to army corps,

which dispatch, of course, will have reached you long before this will. I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals of division, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from, and every modern military book, yourself only excepted. Of course I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we can not entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets, and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes. The commanders of these corps are of course the three highest officers with you, but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them, that you consult and communicate with nobody but Fitz John Porter, and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just; but, at all events, it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything?

When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that Senators and Representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question; and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them. But to return, are you strong enough, even with my help, to set your foot upon the neck of Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes, all at once? This is a practical and very serious question to you.

Yours truly,

Major-General G. B. MCCLELLAN.

A. LINCOLN.

The following letter was elicited by General McClellan's complaints that he feared he had not men enough to meet the overwhelming force of the rebels, and that General McDowell, who had been ordered to co-operate with him, was not sufficiently under his orders.

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1865.

I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields' command is there, but it is so worn that he can not move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces, under General Anderson, now opposing General McDowell's advance, have, as their line of supply and retreat, the road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridge across the two forks of the Pamunky, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposing you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly 15,000 men; and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the 21st. A. LINCOLN, President.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

The peril in which General Banks was placed by Stonewall Jackson's march up the Shenandoah made it necessary to send General McDowell to his support. Against this General McClellan remonstrated, and received in answer the following letter from the President:

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1865.

Your dispatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg with about 6,000 men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the

rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d, a force of 7,000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Port Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th, yesterday, pushed on to get north of Banks on the road to Winchester. General Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which General Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal with 10,000 troops, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also, that another force of ten thousand is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped bare, as we are here, I will do all we can to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. McDowell has about twenty thousand of his forces moving back to the vicinity of Port Royal, and Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg, both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry; the rest of his forces remain for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their places in some sort, calling in militia from the adjacent States. We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not one at that point. This is now our situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely helpless. Apprehensions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's forces from you.

Please understand this and do the best you can with the forces you have.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

A. LINCOLN, President.

The following dispatch, sent within a few hours of the former, probably convinced General McClellan that Mr.

Lincoln had some reason on his side, as the whole country soon discovered.

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862-2 P. M.

The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive General Banks before him; precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary on the Manasses Gap Railroad, from both north and south; in precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one. Such as would not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defence of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job, and come to the defence of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly.

A. LINCOLN.

One little exhibition of promptitude, followed by success, is to be credited to General McClellan about this time. He sent General Fitz John Porter to operate against a part of the rebel force which threatened General McDowell near Hanover Court House. Porter drove the enemy from his position. Of this creditable but comparatively small affair General McClellan made so much as to elicit the following somewhat ironical expression of gratitude from the long-suffering, goodnatured President.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's victory; still, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central, from Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think, cannot be