X. 1792. CHAP. with the exception of two hundred men, being either killed or made prisoners. Custine, upon this disaster, after making a feeble attempt to defend the course of the Nidda, repassed the Rhine, and cantoned his troops between Bingen and Frankenthal, leaving a garrison of ten thousand men to defend the important fortress of Mayence. On their side, the Allies also put their troops into winter quarters, of which they stood much in need— the line of their cantonments extending through Frankfort and Darmstadt, with an advanced guard to observe that frontier city.1 1 Jom. ii. 282, 292. Toul. iii. 116, 117, St Cyr, 11, 12. 16. Hard. ii. 77, 98. 64. on these events. Thus terminated the campaign of 1792, a period fraught Reflections with the most valuable instruction to the statesman and the soldier. Already the desperate and energetic character of the war was made manifest. The contagion of republican principles had gained for France many conquests; but the severity of republican rule had rendered the delusion, in the countries which they had overrun, as shortlived as it was fallacious. In many places their armies had been welcomed, upon their arrival, as deliverers; in none had they been regretted, on their departure, as friends. The campaign, which opened under such untoward auspices, had been marked by the most splendid successes on the part of the Republicans; but it was evident that their conquests had exceeded their strength, and it was remarked that at its close their affairs were declining in every quarter.2 In the north, the army of Dumourier, which had just completed the conquest of Flanders, had fallen into the most disorderly state: whole battalions had left their colours, and returned home, or spread themselves as bands of robbers over the conquered territory; the horses and equipments were in wretched condition, and the whole army, weakened by license and insubordination, was fast tending to decay. 292, 317. The armies of Beurnonville and Custine, paralysed by the division and inactivity of their chiefs, were in little better circumstances, and their recent failures had gone far to 2 Jom. ii. 192. 3 Jom. ii. Dum. iii. 230. X. 1792. weaken the energetic spirit which their early successes CHAP. had aroused; while the troops who had overrun Savoy and Nice, a prey to their own disorders, were suffering under the consequences of the plunder and devastation which had inflicted such misery on the conquered districts. 65. sults to which the war was evidently causes of the success. But it was evident, from the events which had occurred, that the war was to exceed, in magnitude and importance, Great reany which had preceded it, and that consequences beyond all example momentous were to follow its continuance. The campaign had only commenced in the beginning of to lead, and August, and before the close of the year, an invasion, the republican most formidable which had ever threatened the existence of France, had been baffled, and conquests obtained greater than any achieved by its preceding monarchs. Flanders, the theatre of such obstinate contests in the reign of Louis XIV., had been overrun in little more than a fortnight, the Transalpine dominions of the house of Savoy severed from the Sardinian crown, and the great frontier city of Germany wrested from the Empire, almost under the eyes of the Imperial and royal armies. All this had been accomplished, too, under the greatest possible apparent disadvantages. The French armies had taken the field in a state of complete insubordination; disgrace and discomfiture had attended their first efforts: the kingdom was torn by intestine faction, a large portion of its nobility in the ranks of the invaders, and few of its generals had seen any service, or were in a condition to oppose the experienced tactics of the enemy. But to counterbalance these apparently overwhelming disadvantages, the Republicans possessed elements hitherto unknown in modern warfare the energy of popular enthusiasm and the vigour of democratic ambition. Experience soon demonstrated that these principles were more powerful than any which had yet been brought into action in human affairs, and that the strength they conferred would be equalled only by the development of passions as strong, and feelings as universal. The French triumphed as long as they con 1792. CHAP. tended with kings and armies; they fell, when their X. tyranny had excited the indignation, and their invasions roused the patriotism of the people. But it was not immediately that this formidable opposing power arose ; and political lessons of the utmost moment for the future guidance of mankind, may be gathered from the commencement of this memorable war. 66. of acting against a set. 1. The first conclusion which presents itself is, the absoNecessity lute necessity, when attacking a country in a state of revovigorously lution, of proceeding vigorously in the outset, and not revolution suffering early success to convert democratic energy into in the out- military ambition. These two principles are nearly allied; the one rapidly passes into the other; but at first they are totally distinct. After a little success in war, a revolutionary state is the most formidable of all antagonists; before that has been obtained, it generally may, without much difficulty, be vanquished. No armies could be in a worse state than those of France at the commencement of the campaign of 1792, and the reason was, that the license of a revolution had dissolved the bands of discipline. None could be more formidable than they were at Arcola, because success had then turned political fervour into the career of conquest. In attacking a revolutionary state, the only wise and really economical course is to put forth a powerful force at the outset, and never permit, if possible, a transient success to elevate the spirits of the people. Bitterly did the Austrian and Prussian governments regret the niggardly display of their strength at the commencement of the war. They could easily have then sent forward a hundred thousand men for the invasion of Champagne, while sixty thousand advanced through Alsace, and as many from the Low Countries. Two military monarchies, wielding a united force of above four hundred thousand men, could assuredly have made such an effort for a single campaign. What a multitude of evils would such an early exertion have saved; 375, 386. the French conscription, the campaign of Moscow, the rout of Leipsic, the blood of millions, the treasures of ages!1 1 Jom. i. X. 67. success been gained. 2. Even with the forces which they possessed, had the CHAP. Allies duly improved their advantages at the outset, the Revolution might unquestionably have been vanquished 1792. in the first campaign. A little less delay in the advance Ease with to the Argonne forest would have prevented the French which early from occupying, with their inexperienced force, its broken might have defiles, and compelled them to yield up the capital, or fight in the plains of Champagne, where the numerous cavalry of the Prussians would have proved irresistible: a little more vigour in pressing on the retreating column from Grandpré to Ste. Ménehould would have dispersed the whole defending army, and converted the passion for freedom into that of terror. Fifteen hundred Prussian hussars there routed ten thousand of the best troops of France; the fate of Europe then hung on a thread: had the Duke of Brunswick fallen on the retiring army with a considerable force, it would have all dissolved, and the reign of the Revolution been at an end. The French military historians all admit this, and ascribe the salvation of France, at this crisis, entirely to the feeble counsels or secret negotiations of the allied army. If a Blucher, a Diebitch, or an Archduke Charles, had been then at the head of the allied armies, with unfettered hands, where would have been the boasted strength of the Revolution? 68. Dumourier. 3. The occupation of the defiles of the Argonne forest by Dumourier has been the subject of the highest pane- Faults of gyric from military writers; but it brought France to the brink of ruin, by the peril to which his army was exposed in the subsequent retreat to Ste. Ménehould. A very competent authority, Marshal St Cyr, has censured it as a perilous and useless measure, which, by dividing the French force in front of a superior enemy, exposed them 1St Cyr, to the risk of being beaten and cut to pieces in detail.1 et seq. In truth, the inability of Dumourier to defend the passes of that forest, adds one to the numerous instances on record, of the impossibility of defending a range of broken ground, however strong, against a superior and enterprising enemy. The reason is, that the defending force is Mém. i. 64, CHAP. necessarily divided to guard the different passes, whereas X. the attacking may select their point of assault, and, by 1792. bringing overwhelming numbers there, compel the abandonment of the whole line. This is just what Napoleon did in the Maritime Alps, Soult in the Pyrenees, and Diebitch in the Balkan. The only example of the successful maintenance of such a position is that of Wellington at Torres Vedras; but that was not the defence of a range of mountains, so much as a great intrenched camp, adequately guarded by fieldworks at all points. Unquestionably, by keeping his forces together, Dumourier would never have exposed them to the imminent hazard which occurred in the retreat of his detached columns from Grandpré to the camp in the rear-a movement which, if executed in presence of an enterprising enemy, would have proved fatal to France. Had Napoleon been in the Duke of Brunswick's place with so superior a force, he would speedily have penetrated through the other defiles of the Argonne forest, and compelled Dumourier to lay down his arms in his so-called impregnable camp. 69. Extreme danger of France at of the Revo the revolt of 4. The wretched condition and inglorious exploits of the French armies at the commencement of the war is a striking proof of the extreme peril to national independence, the outset which arises from soldiers taking any part in civil dissenlution, from sions, and forgetting, for the transient applause of the the army. multitude, the obedience and fidelity which are the first of military virtues. The revolt of the French Guards, the treachery of the army under Louis XVI., brought the national independence to the brink of ruin. The insubordination, the tumults, the relaxation of discipline consequent on such a revolt, dry up the sources of military prowess till they are removed, the nation has no protection against its enemies. Let not future ages calculate upon again meeting with the genius of Dumourier, the timidity or interested designs of the Duke of Brunswick, or the blind selfishness of the allied counsels. Had matters been reversed-had the French commander headed the |