X. 1792. CHAP. The eagle eye of Dumourier speedily pitched on the sole defensible point, and, placing his hand on the Argonne forest in the map,-"There," said he, "is the Thermopylæ of France if I have the good fortune to arrive there before the Prussians, all is saved." His determination was instantly taken; but it appears that the movement upon that decisive line had been previously recommended by the Executive Council of Paris. He had only delay387, 391. ed executing it from an opinion, that the Allies would be detained several weeks before Longwy and Verdun, 297, 299. and that the best way of arresting their march was to threaten an invasion of the Low Countries.1 1 Dum. ii. Th. iii. 43, 88, 89. Toul. ii. 19. of the Ar which Du mourier seizes. The forest of Argonne is a wooded ridge, extending Description from the neighbourhood of Sédan, in a south-westerly gonne forest, direction, about thirteen leagues. Its breadth varies from one to four leagues. Five roads traverse it, leading into the rich and fertile districts of Evêchés from the open and sandy plains of Champagne. The great road to Paris goes by the pass of Islettes: the other passes were named Grandpré, Chêne-Populeux, Croix-au-Bois, and Chalade. These roads required to be occupied and guarded before they were reached by the enemy-a perilous operation, as it involved a flank movement directly in front of a vastly superior hostile army. The ruinous effect of the delay round Longwy, after the fall of that fortress, was now apparent. Had the Allied forces moved on, instead of waiting there a week in inactivity, the war would have been carried into the plains of Champagne, and the broken ground passed before the French army could possibly have arrived. Clairfait, with the advanced guard of the Allies, was, on the 30th August, only six leagues from Islettes, the principal passage through the forest of Argonne; while the most advanced posts of the French, commanded by Dillon, were distant ten leagues; and the nearest road to reach it lay directly in front of the Austrian advanced posts. Determined, however, at all hazards, to gain the passes, Dumourier, on the 31st, took the bold resolution Aug. 31. X. of pushing on directly across the Austrian vanguard. CHAP. This resolution was entirely successful; the Allies, ignorant of his designs, and intent only on covering the siege 1792. of Verdun, which was going forward, withdrew their advanced posts, and allowed the French to pass; and from the 1st to the 4th September, the whole army defiled within sight almost of their videttes, and occupied the passes, Dumourier himself taking his station at Grandpré, near the centre, with thirteen thousand men. He imme- Personal diately fortified the position, and awaited in tranquillity Jom. ii. 109. the reinforcements which he expected from the interior, Th. iii. 90. the army of the centre, and that of the north.1 observation. Toul. ii. 300. 20. position These expected reinforcements were very considerable, for Beurnonville and Duval were hastening from the army Dumourier's of Flanders with sixteen thousand men ; while Kellermann, here. with twenty-two thousand, was expected in a few days from the neighbourhood of Metz. Large bodies were also advancing from Paris, where the republican government was taking the most energetic measures for the public defence. Camps for the recruits were formed at Soissons, Meaux, Rheims, and Châlons, where numerous volunteers were daily arriving, animated with the greatest enthusiasm; while the sanguinary despots of Paris marched off thousands of citizens, reeking with the blood of the massacres in the prisons, to more honourable combats on the frontier. The whole reinforcements from the interior were ordered to assemble at Ste-Ménehould, a little in the rear of the position of the army. The camp of the French general himself at Grandpré was one of uncommon strength. A succession of heights, placed in the form of an amphitheatre, formed the ground on which the army was placed: at their feet vast meadows stretched forth, in the midst of which the Aisne flowed in a deep stream, forming a valuable cover to the front of the camp. Two bridges only were thrown over the river, each of which was guarded by a strong advanced body. The enemy would thus be under the necessity of crossing the Aisne without the aid X. 1792. 1 Personal Dum.ii.394, CHAP. of bridges, traversing a wide extent of meadow, under the concentric fire of numerous batteries, and finally scaling a rugged ridge broken by wood, strengthened by intrenchobservation. ments, and almost inaccessible. Confident in the strength 396; iii. 2. of this position, Dumourier wrote to the minister of war in these terms:-" Verdun is taken: I am in hourly expectation of the Prussians: the camps at Grandpré and Islettes are the Thermopyla of France; but I shall be more successful than Leonidas."1 Toul. ii. 301. Jom. ii. 110, 111. Th. 93, 94 St Cyr, i. 66. Introd. 21. Dilatory motions of While these energetic measures were going forward on the French side, the steps of the Allies, notwithstanding the Allies, their extraordinary good fortune, were marked by that indecision which, in a war of invasion, and above all in the invasion of a revolutionary power, is the sure forerunner of defeat. It was evident from the position of the French army, and the numerous reinforcements hastening to them from every quarter, that everything depended upon forcing the passes, and throwing them into confusion before their troops were augmented, or the moral energy acquired which, in war, is even more important than numerical strength. Instead of this, the Allied movements were unaccountably tardy, as if they wished to give the French time to collect their forces, and complete their means of defence, before any decisive operations were commenced. Though Verdun capitulated on the 2d September, the army did not advance till the 5th, when it remained in position on the heights of Fromerville till the 11th, wasting in inactivity the most precious days of the campaign. At length, being informed of the occupation of the passes by Dumourier, and having completed his 2 Jom. ii. preparations, the Duke of Brunswick, on the 12th, moved a part of his forces to Landres, and remained there in 67. Introd. perfect inactivity till the 17th, threatening the left of the French position. 115, 118. St Cyr, i. 2 Misinformed as to this movement, Dumourier withdrew a considerable part of the forces which occupied the pass of Croix-au-Bois, one of the five which traversed the forest of Argonne, and was situated on the left of the line, CHAP. to support the centre at Grandpré, where an attack was X. 1792. anticipated. The consequence was, that on the 12th 22. seizes the pass of Bois. Clairfait established himself in that important post, and Clairfait thus broke the French line, and threatened to take it in rear. Sensible of his error, the French general detached Croix-auGeneral Chazot to retake the position; but the Austrian general not only maintained his ground, but defeated and threw back his opponents from the central corps of the army, so as entirely to turn the left of the French position. The situation of Dumourier was now highly critical. His force in the central camp at Grandpré did not exceed six- Sept. 15. teen thousand men, while the whole Prussian army was in his front, and the Austrians under Clairfait were rapidly defiling into his rear. Kellermann, whose march from Metz had been unaccountably slow, had not yet arrived; and it was evident that he could not effect a junction but in the rear of the position in the Argonne forest; while the detachment intrusted with the defence of the pass of Chêne-Populeux, unable to resist the attacks of the Austrians, abandoned Dum. iii. its position, and fell back towards Châlons. "Never," St Cyr, i. says Dumourier, "was the situation of an army more Jom. ii. 120, desperate France was within a hairbreadth of destruc-iii. 101, 102. tion."1 To complete his misfortunes, 1 20, 21, 23. 67, 69. 121. Th. Dumourier Ménehould, French In this extremity the French general resolved to eva- 23. cuate entirely the line of the Argonne forest, and to fall Retreat of back with all his forces to the position of Ste-Ménehould, to Stea few leagues in his rear. Everything depended upon and rout of gaining time. The heavy rains were already commencing, part of the which promised ere long to render a further advance of the army. Allies extremely difficult, if not impracticable. The camp, in consequence, was raised at midnight on the 15th; and on the 17th the whole army was collected in the rear, at Ste-Ménehould, where he resolved to remain firm till the expected reinforcements arrived. His forces did not exceed twenty-five thousand men, but their position was X. 1792. CHAP. defended by a numerous and excellent artillery; while the reinforcements, which were daily expected, promised to raise their numerical amount to seventy thousand combatants. During the retreat, however, an incident occurred which had wellnigh brought destruction on the whole army. General Chazot, who commanded the rearguard of ten thousand men, was attacked at Vaux by fifteen hundred Prussian hussars, and four pieces of horse-artillery. The French troops instantly took to flight, disbanded themselves, rushed through the main body in the utmost confusion, and numbers fled as far as Rheims and Sept. 17. Paris in the most dreadful alarm. But for the exertions of General Duval, who succeeded in reorganising part of the rearguard, and of General Miranda, who restored order in the main body, the whole column would have been irretrievably routed. The Prussian cavalry, however, not being supported, were at length obliged to retire, astonished at their easy success, and lamenting that so favourable an opportunity had been lost of destroying their whole opponents. If two thousand more Allied horse had followed up this success, the whole French army would have been irretrievably routed. As it was, many of their troops fled thirty leagues and upwards from the field of battle, spreading consternation wherever they went, and declaring that all was lost. At six in the evening, after the troops had taken up their ground near Dammartin, a new panic seized the troops: the artillerymen, in haste, harnessed their horses to escape beyond the little river Bionne, and all the camp was in confusion. At length some degree trod. Th of order was restored, by the dragoons in the general's Dum. iii. escort striking the fugitives with the flats of their sabres; Jom. ii. 123. great fires were lighted, and the army rested in groups around them without any distinction or order.1 1 St Cyr, i 69, 71. In iii. 104, 105. 30, 31, 38. I have been obliged," said Dumourier, in his letter to the Convention, "to return from the camp of Grandpré. During the retreat an unaccountable panic seized the army; ten thousand men fled from fifteen hundred Prussian hussars; the loss did not amount to fifty men; everything is |