X. 1792. mitting him irrevocably against the Revolution.* The CHAP. objectionable passages were introduced against his will by the direct authority of the Emperor and the King of Prussia; and so strongly impressed was the Duke of Brunswick with the unhappy consequences likely to arise from the publication of such a manifesto, that he tore to pieces the first copy brought to him for his signature, and Hard. i. ever after called it "that deplorable manifesto." Certain it is, that if issued at all, it should only have been at the pend.laRev. Franç. i. gates of Paris and after a decisive success in the field;1 316. and that to publish it at the outset merely of feeble and shall be punished on the spot, according to the laws of war, and their houses burned or demolished. Those, on the other hand, who shall immediately submit shall be taken under their Majesties' especial protection. "VIII. The town of Paris and all its inhabitants, without distinction, are hereby warned to submit without delay to the King; to put that prince at entire liberty, and to show to them, as well as all the royal family, the inviolability and respect which the law of nature and of nations binds on subjects towards their sovereigns. Their Imperial and Royal Majesties will render all the members of the National Assembly, of the departments, of the district, of the municipality, and of the national guard of Paris, responsible for all events, with their heads, under military tribunals. They further declare on their faith and word as Emperor and King, that if the chateau of the Tuileries is forced or insulted, or the least violence or outrage committed on the King, Queen, or royal family, and if provision is not immediately made for their safety, preservation, and liberty, they will inflict a signal, rare, and memorable vengeance, by delivering up the city of Paris to military execution and total overthrow, and the rebels guilty of such attempts to the punishment they have merited. On the other hand, if they promptly submit, their Imperial and Royal Majesties engage to use their good offices with his most Christian Majesty to procure the pardon of their crimes and errors."-Proclamation of the DUKE OF BRUNSWICK, Coblentz, 25th July 1792. Moniteur, August 1, 1792. JOMINI, Histoire des Guerres de la Révolution, ii. 355. Pièces Justificatives, No. 5. "There is no power," said the Prussian manifesto, "interested in the balance of power in Europe, which can behold with unconcern that great kingdom become a prey to anarchical horrors, which have in a manner annihilated its political existence,† there is no true Frenchman who must not desire to see such disorders terminated. To put a period to the anarchy in France, to establish with that view legal power on the base of monarchical authority, to secure by this means the other powers from the incendiary efforts of a frantic Jacobin band, such are the objects which the King, in conjunction with his ally, proposes to himself in this noble enterprise, not only with the general concurrence of the powers of Europe, who recognise its justice and necessity, but with the approbation and well wishes of every friend to the human race.' --HARD. i. 425, 426. * Mr Burke was of the same opinion. "We may regard France," said he, "" as now rearly blotted out from the political map of Europe."-Speech in the House of Commons, 9th Feb. 1790. -Works, v. 5, 6. 427, 432. Cap. Eur. X. CHAP. languid military operations, was the height of imprudence, which, if not followed by victory, could lead to nothing but disaster. 1792. 15. France, and of the forces. July 30. On the 30th, the whole army broke up and entered Invasion of the French territory. The Allied forces consisted of fifty disposition thousand Prussians, in the finest condition, and supported French by an unusually large train both of heavy and field artillery; forty-five thousand Austrians, the greater part of whom were veterans from the Turkish wars; six thousand Hessians, and upwards of twelve thousand French emigrants, dispersed by a most injudicious arrangement into separate corps-in all, a hundred and thirteen thousand men a formidable army, both from its numerical force and its warlike qualities, and fully adequate, if ably and energetically led, to breaking down any force which the French government at that period could array against it. The French armies destined to oppose this invasion were by no means equal, either in discipline or equipment, to their antagonists; and they were soon paralysed by intestine divisions. The army of Lafayette, now not more than twenty-eight thousand strong, was posted in the neighbourhood of Sédan; Beurnonville between Maubeuge and Lille, with thirty thousand; Kellermann, with twenty thousand, at Metz; Custine at Landau, with fifteen thousand; and Biron in Alsace, with thirty thousand -in all, a hundred and twenty-three thousand men, but extremely defective both in discipline and equipment. Above twelve thousand of the officers who formerly commanded the national armies had joined the ranks of the Jom. i. 4; emigrants, and those selected to supply their place had as 266. Ann. yet no experience in the military art. But the revolution Reg. xxxv. of the 10th August changed the command of the armies, ii. 86, 87; and ultimately proved fatal to the Allies, not less from the energy which it imparted to the government than the ability which it brought to the head of military affairs.' Lafayette, having in vain endeavoured to raise the standard of revolt against the Jacobins, was compelled to 1 Compare and Toul. ii. 45. Jom. and Bert. de Moll, i. Th. ii. 37, 174, 179. 39. St Cyr, i. 39. X. 1792. fly for safety to the Austrian lines; and Luckner having CHAP. disobeyed the Convention, the command of both their armies was intrusted to Dumourier-a man whose ardent spirit, indefatigable activity, and boundless resources, were peculiarly fitted to rescue France from the perilous situation in which it was placed. A triple barrier of strong fortresses defends France from 16. advance the Allies. invasion on its eastern frontier. The centre of this line, Line of where an attack was threatened from the Allied forces, adopted by is covered by Thionville, Bitsch, Sarre Louis, Longwy, and Montmedy, in front, and Metz, Verdun, Sédan, and Mézières, in the rear; while the woody heights of the Argonne forest, occupying a space of fifteen leagues between Verdun and Sédan, offer the most serious obstacles to the passage of an army. It was by this line that the Allies resolved to invade the country-which was the most judicious that, considering the amount of their troops, they could have adopted; for experience has since proved, that a force of not less than two hundred and fifty thousand men would be requisite to make a successful irruption from the side of Switzerland or Flanders. Everything seemed to announce success, and tended to recommend the most vigorous measures in seizing it. The French armies, scattered over an immense line, from the Alps to the ocean, were incapable of uniting for any common operation; and their state of disorganisation was such as to render it extremely doubtful whether they were either disposed or qualified to combine for effecting it. Three fortresses only lay on their road-Sédan, Longwy, and Verdun-all in a wretched state of defence; after which the army had nothing but the Argonne forest and a fertile plain to traverse on the road to Paris. In these circumstances, a powerful and rapid attack on the centre seemed the most prudent, as well as the most effectual Jom. i. 90, means of dispersing the forces of the Revolution, and 86.' Th. iii. reaching the heart of its power, before any effective array ii. 295. could be collected for its defence.1 There can be no ques VOL. II. 2 G 91; and ii. 40. Toul. X. CHAP. tion of the wisdon of the plan of operations; but the Allies were grievously mistaken in the degree of vigour required for carrying it into execution. 1792. 17. Tardy ad the Allies. vance of Longwy and Verdun The invading army advanced with slowness, and apparent timidity, in a country which they professed to consider as the scene of certain conquest. At length, after an inexplicable delay of above a fortnight, the fortress of surrender. Longwy was invested on the 20th August; and a bomAug. 20. bardment having been immediately commenced, the garrison, which was partly composed of volunteers, and divided in opinion, capitulated on the 23d. At the same time, intelligence was received of the flight of Lafayette from the army which he commanded, and that he had sought refuge from the violence of his soldiers within the Austrian lines. Everything seemed to announce success; and if the Duke of Brunswick, taking advantage of the consternation of the moment, had fallen with the bulk of his forces upon the army around Sédan, now destitute of a commander, there can be no doubt that a blow might have been struck which would have spread such consternation among the revolutionary party as would have led to the rapid termination of the war. Instead of doing so, however, the Allied army, following the preconcerted plan of operations, advanced on the great road, and, after another unaccountable delay of six days around Longwy, moved forward on the 29th, and on the 30th invested Verdun. On the 2d September this important fortress 1 Th. iii. 42, capitulated, after a feeble resistance; and there now 101, 102. remained no fortified place in a state of defence on the road to Paris.1 Sept. 2. 98. Jom. i. * After such extraordinary and unhoped-for good fortune 66 * In the course of the march the King of Prussia met a young soldier with his knapsack on his back and an old musket in his hands. "Where are you going?" said the King. "To fight,” replied the soldier. 'By that answer," replied the monarch, "I recognise the noblesse of France." He saluted him, and passed on. The soldier's name has since become immortal; it was FRANCOIS CHATEAUBRIAND, then returning from his travels in North America to share in the dangers of the throne in his native country.-See CHATEAUBRIAND, Mémoires, 83, Fragments. X. 1792. fail to 18. occupy the Argonne as the capitulation of the only fortresses which lay on their CHAP. road, after an investment of a few days each, it is difficult to account either for the subsequent inactivity or ultimate disasters of the Allied army. The force around Sédan, The Allies now under the command of Dumourier, did not exceed twenty-five thousand men, little more than a fourth part fr of the Duke of Brunswick's troops; and the other armies were so far distant, that on it almost exclusively depended the salvation of France. But the dilatory conduct of the Allies, joined to the enterprise and genius of Dumourier, neutralised all these advantages. Nothing could rouse the Duke of Brunswick from his extraordinary circumspection -not even the urgent representations of the King of Prussia, who longed for decisive operations.* Everything depended upon the immediate occupation of the defiles of the Argonne forest, the last remaining barrier between a victorious army of ninety thousand men and the capital. These wooded heights were only six leagues in advance of the Allies, and it was of the utmost importance to reach them before the enemy; for, if once the war was carried into the plains beyond, there was little chance that the illdisciplined troops of France would be able to withstand the numerous and magnificent cavalry of the Prussians. * The advantages which lay open to the invading army at this juncture, are thus set forth by the person of all others best qualified to appreciate them— General Dumourier. "How did it happen," says he, "that, after the fall of Longwy, on the 23d August, the enemy did not instantly resolve to march on Stenay and Monzow, and there annihilate the French army, or draw over the troops of the line to their side, in the perplexity in which they were after the dethronement of the King? Nothing is more certain than that, if they had done so, the French army would have disbanded; nay, there is reason to believe, that if some of the popular officers of the old regime had presented themselves at the advanced posts, a great part of the troops of the line, especially the cavalry, would have joined the Allied army. "When you are about to invade a country torn by a revolution, when you know that you may rely on a large party in its bosom, when you would deliver a king in fetters, it should be a fixed principle, especially with a large army, to multiply your forces by rapidity of movement, and arrive like a clap of thunder at the capital, without giving the people time to recover from their consternation. After Longwy was taken, if the army of Sédan had been dispersed, no obstacle remained, either to the prosecution of a methodical campaign or an immediate march to Paris."-DUMOURIER, iii. 32. |