CHAP. his former lustre, at least without risk, and in a peaceable IX. 1791. 93. rous views of Russia and Gustavus of Sweden. manner. Such being the views entertained by the two powers More vigo whose situation necessarily led them to take the lead in of Catherine the strife, it was of comparatively little importance what were the feelings of the more distant or inferior courts. In the north, Catherine and Gustavus were intent on warlike measures, and refused to admit into their presence the ambassador who came to announce the King's acceptance of the constitution, upon the ground that the sovereign could not be regarded as a free agent and the courts of Spain and Sardinia received the intelligence coldly. Impressed with the idea, which the event proved to be too well founded, that the King's life was seriously menaced, and that he was, even in accepting the constitution, acting under compulsion, these northern and southern potentates entered into an agreement, the purport of which was, that a force of thirty-six thousand Russians and Swedes was to be conveyed from the Baltic to a point on the coast of Normandy, where they were to be disembarked and march direct to Paris, supported by a hostile demonstration from Spain and Piedmont on the side of the Pyrenees and Alps-a project obviously hopeless, if not supported by the forces of Austria and Prussia on the Rhine, and which the failure of the expedition to Varennes, and the subsequent course of events, caused to be entirely abandoned.1 Oct. 19. 1 Hard. i. 159, 163. Cap. Eur. 88, 89. 94. the emi grant noblesse. Meanwhile the Comte d'Artois, and the emigrant Measures of nobility, taking counsel of nothing but their valour, generously resolving to risk everything to rescue the royal family of France from the dangers which threatened them, and relying on the open support and encouragement afforded them by the courts of Stockholm and St Petersburg, proceeded with the ardour and impetuosity which, in every period of the Revolution, have been the characteristics of their race. Numerous assemblages took place at Brussels, Coblentz, and Ettenheim: the Empress IX. 1791. Catherine, in a letter addressed to Marshal Broglie, CHAP. which they ostentatiously published, manifested the warm interest which she took in their cause; horses and arms were purchased, and organised corps of noble adventurers already began to be formed on the right bank of the Rhine. Twelve thousand of those gallant nobles were soon in arms, chiefly in squadrons of cavalry. Transported with ardour at so many favourable appearances, the exiled princes addressed to Louis an open remonstrance, in which they strongly urged him to refuse his Sept. 10. acceptance to the constitution which was about to be submitted to him; represented that all his former concessions had only induced impunity to every species of violence, and the despotism of the most abandoned persons in the kingdom; protested against any apparent Hard acceptance which he might be compelled to give, and 165. Cap. renewed the assurances of the intention of themselves la Rév. and the Allied powers speedily to deliver him from his 169, 170. fetters.1 1 i. 152, 153, Eur. pend. Franc. i. about the to the Ger The only point that remained in dispute between the 95. Emperor and the French King was, the indemnities to Dispute be provided to the German princes and prelates who had indemnities been dispossessed by the decrees of the National Assembly; man princes but on this point Leopold evinced a firmness worthy of and prelates. the head of the Empire. Early in December he addressed to them a formal letter, in which he announced his own resolution, and that of the Diet, "to afford them every succour which the dignity of the imperial crown and the maintenance of the public constitution of the Empire required, if they did not obtain that complete restitution or indemnification which existing treaties provided." Notwithstanding this, however, the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin still entertained so confident an opinion that the differences with France would terminate amicably, and that Louis, now restored to his authority, would Hard. i. speedily do justice to the injured parties,2 that they not Cap. i. 87. only made no hostile preparations whatever, but with 169, 171. CHAP. drew a large proportion of their troops from the Flemish IX. 1791. 96. provinces. In truth, though they felt the necessity of taking some Difficulties measures against the common dangers which threatened the Allies. all established institutions with destruction, the Allied and fears of sovereigns had an undefined dread of the magical and unseen powers with which France might assail them, and pierce them to the heart through the revolt of their own subjects. The language held out by the National Assembly and its powerful orators, of war to the palace and peace to the cottage; the hand of fraternity which they offered to extend to the disaffected in all countries who were inclined to throw off the yoke of oppression; the seeds of sedition which its emissaries had so generally spread through the adjoining states, diffused an anxious feeling among the friends of order throughout the world, and inspired the dread that, by bringing up their forces to the vicinity of the infected districts, they might be seized with the contagion, and direct their first strokes against the power which commanded them. England, notwithstanding the energetic remonstrances of Mr Burke, was still reposing in fancied security; and Catherine of Russia, solely bent on territorial aggrandisement, was almost entirely absorbed by the troubles of Poland, and the facilities which they afforded to her ambitious projects. Prussia, however anxious to espouse the cause of royalty, was unequal to a contest with revolutionary France; and Austria, under the pacific Leopold, had entirely abandoned her military projects since the throne of Louis had been nominally 1 Cap. i. 99, re-established after the state of thraldom immediately ix. 24, 25, consequent upon the flight to Varennes had been relaxed. 76, 77, 78. Accordingly, the protestation and manifesto contemplated Dum. 410. in the agreement at Mantua never were issued, and the 75. Ann. military preparations provided for by that treaty had not taken place. Of all the powers mentioned in the agreement, the Bishop of Spires, the Elector of Treves, and the Bishop of Strasburg, alone took up arms;1 and their feeble 100. Lac. 26. Th. ii. Bot. i. 73, Reg. xxxiv. 172, 180. contingents, placed in the very front of danger, were dis- CHAP. solved at the first summons of the French government. IX. 1791. 97. revolution war. But it was no part of the policy of the ruling party at Paris to remain at peace. They felt, as they themselves The French expressed it, "that their Revolution could not stand still; ary party it must advance and embrace other countries, or perish in resolve on their own." Indeed, the spirit of revolution is so nearly allied to that of political propagandism and military adventure, that it is seldom that the one exists without leading to the other. The same restless activity, the same contempt of danger, the same craving for excitation, are to be found in both. It is extremely difficult for the fervour excited by a successful revolt to subside till it is turned into the channel of military exploit. Citizens who have overturned established institutions, demagogues who have tasted of the intoxication of popular applause, working men who have felt the sweets of unbridled power, during the brief period which elapses before they fall under the yoke of despots of their own creation, are incapable of returning to the habits of pacific life. The unceasing toil, the obscure destiny, the humble enjoyments of laborious industry, seem intolerable to those who have shared in the glories of popular resistance; while the heart-stirring accompaniments, the licentious habits, the general plunder, the captivating glory of arms, make it appear the only employment worthy of their renown. The insecurity of property and fall of credit which invariably follow any considerable political convulsion, throw multitudes out of employment, and increase the necessity for some drain to carry off the tumultuous activity of the people. It has, accordingly, been often observed, that democratic states have, in every age, been the most warlike, and the most inclined to aggression upon their neighbours; and the Mitford's reason must be the same in all periods-that revolution- Greece. ary enterprise both awakens the passions, and induces the Rep. Ital. necessity which leads to external violence.1 The party of the Girondists, who were at that period 1 History of Sismondi's IX. 1791. 98. Debate on the foreign powers and the emigrants. Nov. 29. CHAP. the dominant one in France, was absolutely bent on war. The great object of their endeavours was to get the King involved in a foreign contest, in the hope, which subsequent events so completely justified, that their cause, being identified with that of national independence, would become triumphant. They expressed the utmost satisfaction at the firm tone adopted by the sovereign in the proclamation against the emigrants. "Let us raise ourselves," said Isnard, "on this occasion, to the real dignity of our situation; let us speak to the ministers, to the King, to Europe in arms, with the firmness which becomes us : let us tell the former that we are not satisfied with their conduct that they must make their election between public gratitude and the vengeance of the laws, and that by vengeance we mean death. Let us tell the King that his interest is to defend the constitution; that he reigns by the people, and for the people; that the nation is his sovereign, and that he is the subject of the law. Let us tell Europe that, if the French nation draws the sword, it will throw away the scabbard; that it will not again seek it till crowned by the laurels of victory; that if cabinets engage kings in a war against the people, we will rouse the people to mortal strife with sovereigns. Let us tell them, that the combats in which the people engage by order of despots resemble the strife of two friends under cloud of night, at the instigation of a perfidious emissary; when the dawn appears, and they recognise each other, they throw away their arms, embrace with transport, and turn their vengeance against the author of their discord. xii. 389, Such will be the fate of our enemies, if, at the moment when their armies engage with ours, the light of philosophy strikes their eyes." 1 Hist. Parl. 390. Th. ii. 38. 99. the Assem "1 Transported by these ideas, the Assembly unanimously Address of adopted the proposed measure of addressing the throne on bly on the the necessity of an immediate declaration of war. Vaublanc was the organ of their deputation. said he, "did the Assembly cast their eyes on the state of occasion. Dec. 1. "No sooner," |