VI. 1790. 1 Bert. de CHAP. the taking of the Bastille, a new oath was tendered to the soldiers, which bound them never to employ their arms against their fellow-citizens, except on the requisition of the civil authorities. This circumstance, immaterial in itself, became important in its consequences, by accustoming the military to other duties, and the protection of other interests, than those of the sovereign.1 Moll. Mém. i. 23, and Dumont, 202. 39. tablishment guards. With extraordinary rapidity the organisation of the General es national guards, in imitation of that of Paris, was of national completed over the whole kingdom. The middle classes, everywhere attached to the Revolution, because it promised to remove the disabilities under which they laboured, formed the strength of its battalions; and in a few months three hundred thousand men, enrolled and disciplined in the provinces, were ready to support the popular cause. The influence of this immense body of armed men, great in itself, was increased by the democratic constitution under which it was constructed. Formed in a moment of revolutionary fervour, and during the abeyance of the royal authority, it received no regular organisation from any superior power: the privates elected their own officers, and learned the rudiments of discipline from instructors of their own selection; and these, chosen during a period of extraordinary excitement, were of precarious life in the bosom of disgust and humiliation. To fill up the measure of all these horrors, the commandants of places have had their throats cut under the eyes, and almost in the arms, of their own soldiers ! "These evils are great, but they are neither the only nor the worst produced by such military insurrections. The nature of things requires that the army should never act except as an instrument. The moment that, erecting itself into a deliberative body, it shall act according to its own resolutions, the govern ment, be it what it may, will immediately degenerate into a military despotism— a species of monster which has always ended by devouring those who produced it."-See Report, quoted by BURKE, Cons., Works, v. 377. So far, however, was the King from listening to this sound advice, that, under the influence of his superstitious dread of occasioning the shedding of blood, he sent round circulars to all the regiments of the army, with orders that the soldiers should join several clubs and confederations in the different municipalities, and mix with them in their feasts and civil entertainments. "Sa Majesté a pensé qu'il convenait que chaque régiment prît part à ces fêtes civiques, pour multiplier les rapports, et resserrer les liens entre les citoyens et les troupes."-Ibid. v. 382. VI. 1790. course the most vehement supporters of the power of the CHAP. people. Hence the marked and steady adherence of this influential body, through all the changes of the Revolution, to the popular side; and hence the facility with which regular armies were subsequently formed on the same democratic model, on the first call of national danger. The national guard of Paris-thirty thousand strong at ordinary times-under the command of Lafayette, was capable of being increased, by beat of drum, to double that number, all in a tolerable high state of discipline and equipment. But, as usually happens where officers owe their appointment to the privates, his authority became powerless when his commands ran counter to the wishes of his inferiors. On one occasion he resigned the command, and entered an evening party in the dress of the privates. "What, general!" exclaimed the guests; we thought you were commander of the national guard." 1 Toul. i. 88, -"Oh!" said he, "I was tired of obeying, and therefore 126, 127. entered the ranks of the privates.” 1 * 40. A force, more formidable to the actual administration of government or the magistracy, consisted in a multitude and of armed pikemen of artisans and manufacturers in all the great towns, in the towns. armed with pikes, and trained to a certain degree of military discipline. These tumultuous bands, raised in moments of alarm, were always ready for insurrection, and anxious to share in the plunder of the opulent classes. Having nothing to lose themselves, they supported every measure of spoliation and cruelty. The worst of the popular leaders found in them a never-failing support, when the more measured fervour of the national guard was beginning to decline. Their numbers in Paris alone amounted to above fifty thousand; and their power, always great, received an undue preponderance from the disastrous gift from the municipality of two pieces of cannon to each of the forty-eight sections, shortly after The author received this anecdote from his late revered and lamented friend, Professor Dugald Stewart, who was present on the occasion. VI. 1790. CHAP. the capture of the Bastille. These guns were worked by the ablest and most determined of the populace; the higher ranks all shunned that service, from the fatigue with which it was attended. It thus fell into the hands of the most ardent of the lower, and, from their terrible energy, those cannoniers soon acquired a dreadful celebrity in all the bloodiest tragedies of the Revolution.1 1 Lac. vii. 357. 41. preciation of assignats. June 17 to Sept. 29. The agitation of the public mind was, during these Fearful de- changes, increased by the fluctuations which the assignats of the country underwent, and the multitudes whom their progressive depreciation reduced to a state of beggary. Government having once experienced the relief from immediate pressure which paper credit never fails in the first instance to afford, speedily returned to the expedient; and fresh issues of assignats, secured upon the church property, appeared upon every successive crisis of finance. Eight hundred millions of new assignats (£32,000,000), in addition to the 400,000,000 (£16,000,000) already in circulation, were authorised to be issued by a decree of the Assembly, on 29th September 1790. This was done, notwithstanding the warning voice of Talleyrand, at the instigation of Mirabeau, who perceived what a body of Th. i. 254. revolutionary interests and proprietors the measure would soon create.2 2 Hist. Parl. vi. 274. Toul. i. 204. 42. of the Abbé against their further issue. M. Talleyrand and the Abbé Maury clearly predicted Argument the fatal consequences which would ensue from this conMaury and tinued issue of assignats to meet the wants of the treasury. Talleyrand "You ask," said they, "why should that paper money be always below the metallic currency? It is because distrust will always exist as to the proportion between its amount and the national domains on which it is secured-because for long their sales will be uncertain-because it is difficult to conceive when two thousand millions (£80,000,000), the value of these domains, will be extinguished-because silver issuing at par with paper, both will become objects of merchandise; and the more plentiful any merchandise becomes, the more it must decline in price. From this VI. 1790. must necessarily result inextricable confusion-the pur- CHAP. chase of land for a nominal value-the discharge of debts for an illusory payment, and, in a word, a universal change of property, by a system of spoliation so secret that no one can perceive from whence the stroke that ruins him has come. Consider only the effects of an immoderate issue of paper. Not to speak of a circulation of two thousand millions-for no one probably would support such an absurdity-suppose only that the depreciation became ten per cent. The treasury at that rate will gain ten per cent on the whole debt it owes. Is not that national bankruptcy? And, if it continues and increases, will not all debts be thus depreciated, and creditors ruined? Assignats will become an object of commerce and gambling: you will see them rise and fall like bank shares; and, ere long, you will see their holders swallow up the debts of the country, its wealth, and the p. 1114." whole national domains."1 1 Moniteur, 1129; and Sept. 29, p. Sept. 26, 43. argument in Mirabeau exerted himself to the uttermost to support the issue of assignats, and rested his arguments mainly on Mirabeau's its obvious tendency to force on the sales and division of favour of the the national domains. "I reckon among the number of assignats. enemies to the state-as criminal towards the nationwhoever seeks to shake that sacred basis of our social regeneration-the national domains. We have sworn to maintain and complete the constitution: what is our oath if we do not defend the national domains? There is not a lover of freedom, there is not a true Frenchman, who should not strive for this object. Let the sale of the national domains continue; let it continue over the kingdom, and France is saved. It is in vain to assimilate assignats secured on the solid basis of these domains, to an ordinary paper currency, possessing a forced circulation. They represent real property-the most secure of all possessions, the land on which we tread. Why is a metallic circulation solid? Because it is based on subjects of real and durable value, as the land, which is directly or VI. 1790. CHAP. indirectly the source of all wealth? Paper money, we are told, will become superabundant; it will drive the metallic out of circulation. Of what paper do you speak? If of a paper without a solid basis, undoubtedly; if of one based on the firm foundation of landed property, never. There may be a difference in the value of circulation of different kinds, but that arises as frequently from the one which bears the higher value being run after, as from the one which stands the lower being shunned-from gold being in demand-not paper at a discount. There cannot be a greater error than the terrors so generally prevalent as to the over-issue of assignats. It is thus alone you will pay your debts, pay your troops, advance the Revolution. Reabsorbed progressively in the purchase of the national domains, this paper money can never vi. 240, 271. become redundant, any more than the humidity of the atmosphere can become excessive, which, descending in rills, finds the rivers, and is at length lost in the mighty ocean.' 1 Hist. Parl. Moniteur, Sept. 28, 26. fall. 1121, 44. "1 These documents at first bore interest at the rate of Their rapid four per cent; but this was soon discontinued; notwithSept. 29. standing which, they for some time maintained their value on a par with the metallic currency. By degrees, however, the increasing issue of paper produced its usual effects on public credit; the value of money fell, while that of every other article rose in a high proportion; and at length the excessive inundation of fictitious currency caused a universal panic, and it rapidly sunk to a merely nominal price. Even in June 1790, the depreciation had become so considerable as to excite serious panic, and the attention of the Assembly was anxiously drawn to the means of allaying it; but as they continually went on issuing fresh assignats, their value, of course, underwent a still greater reduction. Eight or nine per cent was all that could be got, after some years, for these dangerous documents, and in many cases they would hardly pass for one-fifteenth of their legal value. So |