proposition from you." To Franklin he wrote, May 28: "You will treat for yourselves and every one of the powers at war with England will make its own treaty. All that is necessary for our common security is that the treaties go hand in hand, and be signed all on the same day." As to the necessity of standing together Franklin agreed with him. He wrote Congress, "The firm united resolution of France, Spain and Holland, joined with ours, not to treat of a particular, but a general peace, notwithstanding the separate tempting offers to each, will in the end give us command of peace." The first commission to Grenville having been to France alone, Vergennes refused to treat with him; whereupon, June 15, Grenville was invested with additional power to treat with any other prince of state that might be concerned. This seemed sufficient to Vergennes, and the final negotiations appeared about to begin.1

cions

Kaleidoscopically the situation changed. On June 23 Jay arrived from Spain, and at about the same time Franklin Jay's suspi- became to a considerable degree incapacitated by an attack of gout. Jay's suspicions of France, already aroused, were rapidly augmented. He insisted that Grenville's new commission was still unsatisfactory, that it must acknowledge the independence of the United States, but Vergennes argued that this was not necessary. Early in September the same Rayneval who was defending the views of Spain in the negotiation between Jay and d'Aranda was despatched on a secret mission to England. Actually sent over to test the English views about Gibraltar, he refused to discuss the affairs of the United States; 2 but Jay not unnaturally suspected that he was sent to bargain for a peace on the terms of dividing the West between England and Spain. At about the same time Jay received from British sources the translation of a mémoire

1 For the opening negotiations, see particularly Franklin's Works, viii. 1-119.

2 Doniol, La participation de la France, v. 132–133, 255–256, 603-626.

of Barbé Marbois, French secretary of legation at Philadelphia, which, like the Dutch treaty, had been rescued from the waves into which it had been thrown from a captured ship, and which presented an argument against the American claim to share in the Newfoundland fisheries. Jay concluded that France was planning to buy a peace from England favorable to Spain and at the expense of the United States. He believed that his country must depend upon itself alone, and that, in the illness and pro-French weakness of Franklin, the responsibility rested on him. Accordingly, on September 11, without consulting Franklin, he sent Vaughan, one of the English agents in Paris, on a secret mission to the English government. The coöperation between France and the United States was no longer complete.1

In England, also, the situation had changed. The death of the Marquis of Rockingham in June left no Whig leader who could manage Fox and Shelburne together. Shelburne Fox retired, and the control of the ministry treats with Jay fell to Shelburne on July 2. Grenville was recalled from France and Alleyne Fitzherbert was sent in his place. A master of finesse, Shelburne, who had been seeking an opportunity to separate England's enemies, welcomed the news brought by Vaughan, and accepted the suggestion of Jay. Independence was recognized in a new commission to Oswald, and instructions were given as to terms which seemed to insure success. The negotiation was to be secret from France. Shelburne told Oswald, September 23, "We have put the greatest confidence, I believe, ever placed in man in the American commissioners. It is now to be seen how far they or America are to be depended upon. I hope the public will be the gainer, else our heads must answer for it, and deservedly."

On September 27 Vaughan returned to Paris, and the American commissioners had to decide whether to accept the offer. To do so involved the breaking of their instructions

Jay, Papers, ii. 366–452.

Americans negotiate separately from France

from Congress, which authorized them to treat only with the full knowledge of the French ministers and to govern themselves by their advice. The very form of these instructions seemed to Jay to confirm his suspicions of a malign and pervasive French influence in Congress itself, and he hesitated not On October 26 John Adams arrived from his successful mission in Holland, and proved to be, as Jay wrote, ‘a very able and agreeable coadjutor." He sided with Jay, and together they outvoted Franklin. The negotiations therefore began, their progress being kept secret from Vergennes.1

a moment.

Boundaries

In the conduct of the negotiations the American had the advantage over the British representatives both in ability and in local knowledge. They might have obtained even better terms than they did, had not the British government from time to time braced the backbone of its commissioners. The boundaries agreed upon were almost identical with those described by Congress. On the northeast the St. Croix was substituted for the St. John, a change that somewhat curtailed the limits of Massachusetts. West of the St. Lawrence it was agreed to compromise between the 1763 and 1774 boundaries of Quebec. The American commissioners offered to accept either the extension of the fortyfifth parallel to the Mississippi, or a line through lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, Superior, and the Lake of the Woods, to the northwestern point of the latter, and thence due westward to the Mississippi. Fortunately the British chose the latter, a selection which ultimately proved even more advantageous to the United States than the line from Lake Nipissing would have been. The western boundary was the Mississippi, the southern was the northern boundaries of the Floridas, that of West Florida being considered as the thirtyfirst parallel. By a secret article, however, it was agreed that, should Great Britain retain West Florida, the northern

1 John Adams, Works, iii. 300–387.

boundary of that province should run eastward from the mouth of the Yazoo, or in other words along the parallel of 32' 28".

Fisheries, debts, and loyalists

The question of the fisheries fell to the lot of John Adams, who had special instructions on that subject from the legislature of Massachusetts. Master of the facts, he succeeded in incorporating into the treaty a recognition of American rights to fish on the "Banks," and sufficient in-shore privileges to make fishing profitable. The navigation of the Mississippi was also obtained. The American commissioners readily agreed to an article that creditors on either side should "meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted," a provision which had special reference to debts due by Americans to British merchants when hostilities began. The most troublesome question was that concerning the loyalists, whose property had been confiscated and who had been subjected to various persecutions. Naturally, the British government felt a proper regard for their interests; but, since the laws against them had been made by the states, Congress could not promise restitution. A compromise was finally reached by the agreement that Congress would "earnestly recommend" restitution and the repeal of all laws not in harmony with "that spirit of conciliation which, on the return of the blessings of peace, should universally prevail." With a provision for the mutual restoration of property the preliminary articles were concluded and signed, November 30, 1782.

Effect of the treaty on France

Triumphant in their negotiations with England, the commissioners had now to face France. Although they had broken their instructions from Congress, they had not violated the letter of the French compact, for they had not signed a definitive treaty. In spirit and in effect, however, they had done so. When the news of the articles reached London, the British