European claims The question of claims is more difficult and important. These are of two kinds. One rests upon the duty of every government to protect with all its power the lives of its citizens legally resident in a foreign country. The recent (1914) attitude of the Wilson administration in connection with the killing of a British subject, Benton, by the Mexican revolutionists indicates that we do not assume responsibility in such cases, but that under certain circumstances we do undertake to act as intermediary. The question of property is a different one; or at least, if the destruction of personal and tangible property is analogous to the destruction of life, that of public debts may be differentiated. Such debts give rise to many perplexing questions. They are sometimes contracted by governments that fail to establish themselves; through non-payment of interest many of them, as those of Santo Domingo and Honduras, mount to proportions beyond any immediate possibility of payment; and, worse still, being in most cases contracted for temporary purposes, they have not usually increased the capacity of the debtor countries to meet them. In 1902 Luis M. Drago, foreign minister of Argentina, presented to the United States government the view that "the Drago Docpublic debt cannot occasion armed intervention trine nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power." This "Drago Doctrine" was a slight modification of the principle advanced by his fellow country-man, Carlos Calvo, that “the collection of pecuniary claims made by the citizens of one country against the government of another country should never be made by force." It has excited much discussion among diplomats and students of international law. It is true, however, that capitalists have in the past loaned money with the expectation that their own country would if necessary help them collect it, and that the borrowing countries have in consequence received more than they otherwise would have done 1 House Docs., 58 Cong. 2 sess., No. 1, p. 4.. and at lower interest rates. Hay refused to accept Drago's views, and in the case of Venezuela, which called forth the suggestion, failed also to take the position assumed by Blaine in 1881 with reference to the same country. He did not protest, as in many previous similar cases we had Forcible colnot protested, at the blockade of the Vene- lection of debts zuelan coast by a joint German, British, and Italian squadron. It is important to observe, however, that the United States was fully and officially informed that this blockade was for the sole purpose of collecting the claims in question, which included both government loans and destruction of private property; and that the matter was submitted to arbitration at our suggestion and by our active assistance. In 1907 the United States submitted the Drago Doctrine to the Hague Conference, in the modified form, that force should not be used in such cases unless the creditor nation had first proposed arbitration and this had been refused or ignored by the nation against which the claim was made. In this form it was endorsed by the Conference. Roosevelt's doctrine of police power The possibilities of such interference, particularly when the debts were obviously beyond the unassisted resources of the debtor country, excited much anxiety in the United States. So long as we recognized the principle of the forcible collection of debts, the only method of preventing the occasional, and perhaps at times long-continued, presence of foreign fleets in American waters was to assume the duty of collection ourselves. Even the Drago Doctrine would not prevent the enforcement of claims for the destruction of private property. In messages of 1903 and 1904 President Roosevelt said: "That our rights and interests are deeply concerned in the maintenance of the [Monroe] Doctrine is so clear as hardly to need argument. This is especially true in view of the construction of the Panama Canal. As a mere matter of selfdefence we must exercise a close watch over the approaches to this canal, and this means we must be thoroughly alive to our interests in the Caribbean Sea." "When we announce a policy, such as the Monroe Doctrine, we thereby commit ourselves to the consequences of the policy." "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power." This policy of intervention to prevent wrongdoing, whether to our own citizens or to those of other countries, resembled The "Big the policy advocated by Blaine. The absence Stick " of any sugar-coating in its pronouncement, however, justifies the popular differentiation in terms, Blaine's being known as the "Elder Sister" policy and Roosevelt's as the "Big Stick." The conspicuous example of this new extension of the Monroe Doctrine our assumption of responsibility for the Santo Do- good behavior of Latin America-occurred in mingo the case of the negro republic of Santo Domingo. In 1905 President Roosevelt made a treaty with its government whereby we were to undertake the adjustment of its obligations and the administration of its customs houses. This agreement was not ratified at once, or in its first form, by the Senate, but in 1907 a convention which preserved the main features of the plan was accepted. New protectorates This action added, at any rate for the time being, a new protectorate to our list, and thereby increased our territorial hold on the Caribbean. In 1911 somewhat similar arrangements were made by Secretary Knox with Nicaragua and Honduras. Although circumstances have thus far prevented their execution, the drawing up of a new treaty with Nicaragua, on practically the same basis, by Secretary Bryan in 1913 indicates that such trustee ship may be regarded as an accepted national policy. While we do not absolutely prohibit European intervention for the collection of debts, we aim to make such intervention unnecessary by acting as intermediary. The "Big Stick" has also been evident in the frequent and penetrating applications of our police power for the defence of our own interests. In Cuba, by United States intervening in 1908 and by threatening in- intervention tervention in 1912, we have, in accordance with the Platt amendment, insisted on peace and order. In Venezuela we threatened to use force to establish our claims, which were subsequently submitted to the Hague conference. We forcibly intervened in Honduras, and have continually used force in Nicaragua in the hope of establishing peace. In the case of the latter country, at least, we have ourselves exercised a latitude of interference which we would not permit to European powers without vigorous protest. It remains the theory of the United States that such intervention shall not control the right of the people to constitute their own government, but we approach the position of insisting that they shall have a stable government. So far as European powers are concerned, we do not prohibit their intervention to protect the lives and property of their subjects; but we insist, as against them, that their intervention shall be strictly confined to that purpose, and as against the American nation involved, that it shall be in a condition to render such intervention unnecessary. Japan and It is not, however, European nations alone that we wish to keep from interference in American affairs. With the rise to power of Japan and the immense potentialities of immigration from that country and from China, the attitude of these countries toward America has become a matter of concern. There is no doubt that we shall apply to them all the prohibitions that we maintain against Europe, although in their case we have not the justification of non-interference in Asia. It |