that we left to Spain in that ocean is further evidence of her desires. As the Philippines were not in America, our non-transfer corollary of the Monroe Doctrine did not apply to them; but it was obvious that the value of a naval station there would be much diminished if surrounded by the possessions of a strong naval power like Germany. the islands That the question of the disposition of the islands was not more complicated was due to Admiral Dewey's knowledge of Conditions in international law and his tact. He found an insurrection going on there similar to that which we had found in Cuba; but, while maintaining friendly relations with the insurrectionists and coöperating with them, he refrained from recognition. It was evident that, should the forces of Spain be withdrawn, widespread murder and destruction of property would take place; on the other hand, should we leave the islands in the hands of Spain, we would leave civil war, and would abandon the islanders, who under their leader Aguinaldo had been coöperating with us. The suggestion of Carl Schurz, that we turn the islands over to Belgium or Holland, was hardly within the cognizance of practical international politics, if indeed it was consistent with international morality. It was this situation which seemed to Admiral Dewey to involve us in some responsibility. It can hardly be that a question of this magnitude was left to the commissioners, particularly under a President so American pub- notably characterized by keeping his ear to the lic opinion ground as was McKinley. It is impossible to believe that the decision was not made at Washington, and in accordance with the pressure of what the administration believed to be public opinion. When Dewey won the battle of Manila Bay, the idea of expansion so far afield was novel to the great majority of Americans. As the sentiment for "all Mexico" developed during our war with that country, so an expansionist feeling developed in the United States dur ing the summer and fall of 1898. Engendered by the reasons already given, it received direction from two forces particularly powerful at the White House-the influence of capital seeking new fields for exploitation, and the enthusiasm of the missionary element filled with the idea of the good that we might do there. With many to whom the diffusion of Christianity by the organized work of religious bodies was not a leading purpose, a general belief in the civilizing function of our race, just then set forth in Kipling's White Man's Burden, was a deciding consideration.1 The Spanish commissioners were forced to accept the American proposition, sugared as it was by the payment of twenty millions. The annexation of territory Terms of the not a part of the American continents, thickly treaty populated by a foreign race, and not likely ever to become predominantly American constituted in each particular a departure from our previous policy. The last two differences the Philippines shared with Porto Rico, included in the same treaty.2 An additional divergence was made in the provision that the civil rights and political status of the inhabitants "of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." Their religious freedom only was secured by the treaty. In all previous annexations provision had been made for incorporation into the United States, except in case of Alaska, and there all except the native Indians were to have the rights of citizens of the United States. For the first time we were acquiring colonies. What 1 Herbert Croly, M. A. Hanna (New York, 1912), 279–280, attributes much influence to Senator Orville Platt. "Whitelaw Reid, Problems of Expansion, New York, 1912; H. von Holst, The Annexation of our Spanish Conquests, Chicago, 1898. The Russian treaty provided: "The inhabitants of the ceded territory... with the exception of uncivilized native tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights. . . of citizens of the United States." The Spanish treaty declared of native Spaniards that, if they did not assert their Spanish citizenship, they should be considered "to have adopted the nationality" of the territory in which they might reside; and it added, the Federalists had contended for in the Louisiana debate was now the national policy. The treaty was signed on December 10, 1898. "The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." CHAPTER XXX IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN Imperialism THE Spanish war brought to light, and accelerated in progress, a spirit which may properly be called imperialism. That democratic regard for simplicity which had prevented the appointment of foreign representatives of the highest official rank yielded, in 1893, to the appointment of ambassadors, though not so far as to provide for their maintenance on an equality with those of other nations. The attempt to give a similar titular precedence to our naval officers, who often perform semi-diplomatic functions, made slower progress; Dewey, as a special reward, was made admiral (1899), and the grade of vice-admiral has just (1915) been created. After the war, moreover, the regular army was increased to double its previous size. Although this enlargement had special reference to the occupation of the Philippines, the steady and very much greater increase of the navy has been based on more general grounds. Rousevelt This spirit was voiced by Rear-admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, and by Theodore Roosevelt. Both trained historians, and with a wide knowledge of other peo- Mahan, ples and of world politics, they were able to avoid many of the errors and inconsistencies which had marred the programs of Blaine and Olney. Mahan in a series of studies of naval history published between 1883 and 1913, pointed out the importance of sea power in the world's history, its relations to the future of the United States, and the necessity of our maintaining a large navy and securing strategic bases for naval operations. He tried to bring public sentiment to a realization of the fact that the United States could not safely remain forever aloof, and that it should not confide too trustingly in the hope for universal peace. His books received even more attention abroad than at home, and belong as much to the international literature of the discussion of peace and war, which now began to divide the world of thought, as to the literature of American history. These views were shared by Roosevelt, who from his return from Cuba at the close of the Spanish war for a dozen years rode a wave of popularity whose crest seemed ever to mount higher. As President from 1901 to 1909, he was able to give them effect. The navy, whose record against Spain had made a profound impression on international opinion, was increased until it eventually ranked just after those of Great Britain and Germany; its efficiency was tested and at the same time thrust upon the attention of the world by its circumnavigation of the globe by order of the President in 1907. The impression which this latter event made whether at home or abroad, was scarcely so great as that created by the brilliant and dashing personality of President Roosevelt himself. It seemed evident that a nation so equipped and so led, and that of its own choice, would play a larger part in world movements than the United States had done in the past. Hawaii The war probably had no effect on the fact or the form of Hawaiian annexation. McKinley, to be sure, shortly after his inauguration, conveyed to Carl Schurz the impression that the subject would not be pressed; 1 but those best informed realized that the return of the Republican party meant annexation. The war, nevertheless, hastened the process. July 7, 1898, a treaty negotiation was cut short by the passage of a joint resolution providing for annexation on the old terms of incorporation into the United States. A new note was struck, however, by the protest of the Japanese government, based on the disturbance of the balance of power in the Pacific, and on the possible effect 1 Schurz, Speeches, etc., vi. 270, 271. |