protectorate is impracticable, and that annexation must be the future remedy or else Great Britain will be furnished with circumstances and opportunity to get a hold on these islands which will cause future serious embarrassment to the United States. At this time there seems to be no immediate prospect of its being safe to have the harbor of Honolulu left without an American vessel of war. Last week a British gunboat arrived here, and it is said will remain here for an indefinite period." Foster, succeeding Blaine, June 29, 1892, asked Stevens for two series of reports, one public and one confidential. On November 20, 1892, Stevens in one of the latter discussed the terms of annexation. Scenting a revolution, he asked how to use the United States naval force which had been sent to the harbor. Revolution and annexation On January 14, 1893, the queen abolished the constitution drawn up and administered largely by the American element, and proclaimed a new one based on absolutism and native home rule. At 2 P. M., January 16, the American element organized a committee of safety; at 4:30 P. M. the United States forces landed at the request of Stevens. The next day a provisional government was organized and was at once recognized by Stevens; the queen surrendered under protest. Envoys of the new government were sent to the United States by the next steamer, and passage was refused to the envoy of the queen. February 14 a treaty of annexation was drawn up at Washington. Cleveland rejects annexa tion On March 9 President Cleveland withdrew this treaty from the consideration of the Senate and soon after sent a commissioner to investigate the facts of the revolt. The latter could not obtain evidence that Stevens was in collusion with the men who held the very quiet meeting at 2 P. M., January 16, although the landing of our troops at 4:30 P. M., seemed to indicate his complicity. It was clear, however, that the only solid force behind the revolt was the presence of United States marines, and that the leaders had counted upon them. More over, although the only proper pretext for the landing of the seamen was the protection of American citizens and property, yet they were stationed in a portion of the city where there was nothing American to protect. Cleveland recalled Stevens, and December 19 requested the new government to restore the queen. This it refused to do; and even if the majority of the population preferred the native dynasty, their preference was not strong enough, at any rate, to drive them to serious revolt, nor did Cleveland venture to use force. The provisional government became permanent, waiting for a return of Republican control in the United States and a renewed opportunity for annexation.1 1897 Even if Hawaii was theoretically part of the American continent, practically it was far out in the Pacific, and even Our position in if it was still independent, its government was as American as that of Texas between 1836 and 1845. With Alaska and Midway island in our possession, with Hawaii American, and Samoa under our joint control, we were by 1897 halfway across to Asia. The period from 1877 to 1898 was one of flux. No strong current of popular interest or purpose was apparent, and 1877-1898 a the surface of diplomacy was choppy with the period of flux wind of circumstance, but some eddies in the stream indicated new conditions not fully understood. The most important development was that of our interests in the Pacific, a process which had gone on for the most part independently of diplomacy, but which must before many years involve diplomatic action. Similarly, the impending changes in our commercial position arising from the growth of an export trade in manufactures was sure to concern the diplomat sooner or later. Of more immediate moment was the oscillation of our opinions as to the status of the isthmian canal which had become an imminent possibility. Our interest in Spanish America was increasing; there were some signs of a more special interest in the Caribbean, but no one 1 Senate Reports, 53 Cong. 2 sess., ii. No. 227. felt certain what our policy there would be. In a general way, also, it was evident that international associations were becoming closer; but whether we should be a dog in the manger or a gracious participant, and whether participation would mean the abandonment of our policy of self-contained abstinence from European politics, no one could tell. CHAPTER XXIX THE SPANISH WAR WHEN William McKinley became President in 1897, he shared with an overwhelming majority of Americans the view that our destiny was peace and our inThe war spirit heritance complete. The fact that we had, without becoming involved in war, passed through a period when diplomatic leadership was vacillating when it was not weak, and when the virile manhood of the country had been trained to battle, seemed to assure the future. It is possible, however, that the spiritual impulse to war is strongest when the horrors of past struggles have had time to become blurred, when the veteran, respected and reminiscent, embroiders its glories and its satisfactions. Neither the war of 1812 nor the Spanish war was necessary. Those responsible for both justified themselves by referring to causes which had long been in existence. The development of the crisis in each case was in large measure due to the rise of a new spirit. Demonstrations of patriotism The pugnacity and nationalism of Blaine and Olney were due in part to an apprehension, in part to a reflection, of a general militancy and a demonstrative patriotism. During the later eighties and nineties public schools began to teach respect for the flag, assemblies began to rise at the playing of the national anthem or to be chidden for not rising, the comic opera began to exhibit the national emblems and to be condemned for so doing. American history and military drill came to be commonly taught in schools and colleges. A new generation of historians dedicated themselves to the study of our past; patriotic societies awakened the popular interest in the deeds of their ancestors. In a material way this sentiment found expression in the regeneration of our navy, which, from its Civil war bulk and efficiency, had sunk to such a point that in 1891 the prospect of war with Chili caused not entirely unjustifiable panic on the Pacific coast. The occasion that gave point to this national assertiveness was the outbreak of a new revolt against Spanish rule in Cuba. This began in 1895, and in character Cuban insurresembled the ten years' insurrection of 1868 rection to 1878. Cubans themselves were divided, hence the struggle took on the nature of a civil war. The Spanish troops and volunteers were able to drive the insurrectionists to the mountains; but these, running in a long ridge from one end of the island to the other, offered countless fastnesses for refuge and for use as posts from which to attack the plantations in the plains at their foot.1 American as Innumerable causes of friction between the United States and Spain were inherent in the situation. The Cubans planned to conduct the war from the United States as a base. Many Cubans of wealth resided in the United States, and that sympathy for revolution which has never failed among us promised assistance. A Cuban committee headed by the inspiring name of Ethan Allen raised the Cuban flag over its headquarters in New York. Cuban bonds were sold, and the press generally expressed its hope for the success of the movement. Irritating as all this was to Spain, she had no cause to complain unless words were transmuted into action. This Cleveland tried to prevent, by ordering our neutrality laws to be enforced. In spite, however, of an administration that seemed to be conscientiously rigid, aid did reach Cuba. The Spanish govern 1 Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain, Diplomacy; Louis Le Fur, Etude sur la guerre hispano-américaine de 1898, Paris, 1899; J. H. Latané, America as a World Power 1897-1907. (American Nation, vol. xxv.), chs. i.-iv; E. J. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the SpanishAmerican War, Baltimore, 1908; Achille Viallate, Les préliminaires de la guerre hispano-américaine et l'annexation des Philippines par les Etats-Unis, Revue Historique, 1903, lxxxii. 242–291. |