In 1872 one of our naval officers secured an agreement with a local chieftain giving us harbor privileges. In 1875 a German agent named Steinberger obtained a commission of inquiry from the United States government, and with this as authority attempted to set up Our first diplomatic relations with Samoa a government under our protection; but our consul secured his deportation. In 1878 we made a treaty with the kingdom. This gave us the right to use the harbor of Pagopago, in the island of Tutuila, as a naval station. We on our part agreed, "If, unhappily, any differences should have arisen, or shall hereafter arise, between the Samoan government and any other government in amity with the United States, the government of the latter will employ its good offices for the purpose of adjusting those differences upon a satisfactory and solid foundation." Although this pledge did not constitute a protectorate, it was from time to time so interpreted by our consuls. At any rate, it seems to have been somewhat of a departure from our tradition of avoiding entangling obligations. the crisis In 1884 the German consul, on pretext of an agreement with King Malietoa, hoisted the German flag over the Approach of royal hut. In 1886 the American consul once more proclaimed our protectorate. Our government, being appealed to under the treaty of 1878, sent a commission to investigate, and in accordance with their report Bayard sought to come to an agreement with the German and British ministers at Washington. A conference was arranged, but failed to agree. Meantime a quarrel between King Malietoa and the German consul culminating opportunely at the time of the arrival of a German warship, the consul deposed and deported the king, and substituted for him another, Tamasese. Uprose at this point Mataafa, a native champion of island rights, and refused to recognize Tamasese. The German warship Adler bombarded Mataafa's villages, while the American consul, Sewall, steamed his launch between the Adler and the shore. Finally, De cember 18, 1888, Mataafa surrounded a German landing party, and killed fifty of its members. the hurricane German public opinion demanded satisfaction and the vindication of German arms; American public sentiment, touched by the heroism of the Samoans, demanded that The crisis and our government protect them; Great Britain, jealous of Germany as a new rival in the colonial field, stood with the United States. All three sent warships, and it was a possibility that any day might bring news that their animosities, stimulated by the tropic heat, had resulted in hostilities. On March 16, 1880, a hurricane descended on Apia, blowing bad feeling away before it. Every one, the sailors of the three nations as well as the natives, showed helpfulness and good feeling, and the air in Samoa cleared. Berlin Meantime, in the real world Bayard and Bismarck were trying to reach a permanent solution of these troubles. Bayard, in accordance with American tradi- General Act of tions, insisted that the basis of such a solution must be the authority of the natives; Bismarck could see no permanence for trade except in European control. At length, and after rather heated controversy, the Washington conference was revived in Berlin. The United States sent a commission headed by John A. Kasson, another veteran in diplomacy, who, like Trescott, was often called in for critical service. In 1889 there was concluded the General Act of Berlin, which recognized the independence of Samoa, but gave preponderance of authority to a chief justice and a president of the municipal council of Apia, to be chosen by the three powers, the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. Trivial as was this affair, its significance as illustrating the interplay of old and new forces in American diplomacy is great. Some importance attaches to the appearance of a new bogy, the German empire. In 1871 that power was supposed to want Samana Bay; the first actual evidence of rivalry with us appeared in the Samoan affair, and other instances were to Implications of the Samoan episode arise. In this case, the real obstacle to agreement was the traditional American belief in the right of local self-government. Had we believed in the extension of the colonial system, division of the islands and compromise would have been easy. In the end, however, the United States, though she saved the form of independence for Samoa, was forced to consent to its violation in substance, thereby becoming herself involved in a very spider's web of entangling alliance. It was the third such international agreement into which we had entered. The first, the treaty of 1866 between Great Britain, France, Holland, Japan, and ourselves, was perhaps only an agreement by concert. It was, however, already proving troublesome, and would doubtless have entangled us seriously in the future had not rising Japan shaken it off. The second was an agreement concerning Morocco, entered into in 1880, including most European powers, and having to do with the protection of foreigners and their native protégés in that country. Apparently harmless in itself, it involved us, though not materially, in the great Algeciras conference that bid fair to plunge Europe into war in 1906. It is important to note that none of these agreements had to do with Europe or the Americas, and that two were concerned with the Pacific.1 American interests in Hawaii Richest and most strategically important of the island groups of the Pacific was Hawaii, where we had possessed from the beginning the really predominant interest. As early as 1820 we had appointed an "agent . . . for commerce and seamen," and in the same year the first of our missionaries arrived there. The latter was particularly well received by the King Kamamaha, the Napoleon of the Pacific, who had consolidated the whole group of islands into a strong kingdom. The missionaries aided him in establishing a civilized government, reduced the language to writing, and codified the laws; their children became land-owners and sugar-planters, an 1 Schurz, Speeches, etc., v. 1-10. opulent and fascinating aristocracy, preserving their Americanism of race and education. Our interests there were still further advanced by the establishment of reciprocity in 1875, and our commerce offered a substantial basis for a claim to priority.1 Diplomatic protection of Hawaii This we had put forth as early as 1842, when Webster said that the government of Hawaii should not be the object of interference by foreign powers. In 1843 a British naval officer made one of those unauthorized seizures of the islands which so often result in the permanent extension of British territory. Legaré instructed Everett to protest, and declared that, if Great Britain persisted, we might be justified even in using force, a warning which practically included Hawaii within the American continents and under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine. The British withdrew. An appearance of interest by France in 1851 led Fillmore to reiterate our views. Although Blaine, or some subordinate, forgot to invite her to the Pan-American Congress in 1889, it may be said to have been the American contention from the time of Webster that Hawaii was constructively and in the general sense American. Because of the priority of our interests, Bayard in 1888 refused to join with England and France in a joint guarantee of the government. Discussion of Our protection was several times asked, and while any such formal arrangement was refused, it was practically extended. Marcy and Seward were anxious for annexation. Fish summed up the situation well in annexation 1873: "There seems to be a strong desire on the part of many persons in the islands, representing large interests and great wealth, to become annexed to the United States. And while there are, as I have already said, many and influential 1 W. F. Blackman, The Making of Hawaii, New York, etc., 1899; L. A. Thurston, A Hand-book on the Annexation of Hawaii, [St. Joseph, Mich., 1897]; M. H. Krout, Hawaii and a Revolution, New York, 1898; Liliuokalani, Hawaii's Story by Hawaii's Queen, Boston, 1898; Chalfant Robinson, History of two Reciprocity Treaties. persons in this country who question the policy of any insular acquisitions, perhaps even any extension of territorial limits, there are also those of influence and of wise foresight who see a future that must extend the jurisdiction and the limits of this nation, and that will require a resting spot in the midocean, between the Pacific coast and the vast domains of Asia, which are now opening to commerce and Christian civilization." The feeling against expansion was too strong to be overcome, however, especially since the advantage of reciprocity made it seem unnecessary. Without annexation, even the navy was provided for: by a Senate amendment to a renewal of the reciprocity treaty in 1884, which was accepted by the Hawaiian government, we were to have the exclusive right to use Pearl harbor as a coaling and repair station. Nevertheless, Blaine in 1881 seriously considered annexation, for the bogy of foreign influence was appearing. In a Blaine and confidential dispatch to our minister, Comly, he said that we must take the islands if the native population continued to decline. "Throughout the continent, north and south," he wrote, "wherever a foothold is found for American enterprize, it is quickly occupied, and this spirit of adventure, which seeks its outlet in the mines of South America and the railroads of Mexico, would not be slow to avail itself of openings of assured and profitable enterprize even in mid-ocean." Before Blaine came in again foreign influence had taken on a definite form. The king had died, and had been sucBritish influ- ceeded by Queen Liliuokalani, who had married ence in Hawaii a Scotchman, and whose successor, the crown princess Kaiulani, was the daughter of an Englishman and had been educated in England. Blaine appointed a personal friend, J. L. Stevens, as minister. On February 8, 1892, Stevens wrote: "At a future time, after the proposed treaty shall be ratified, I shall give you a more elaborate statement of facts and reasons why a 'new departure' by the United States as to Hawaii is rapidly becoming a necessity, that a |