diplomacy, relative to that in other forms of politics, was not so great as previously. Of the men who took charge in 1861, Lincoln was not only without diplomatic experience, but without such knowledge of American international interests as most public Lincoln men had previously possessed. Fortunately he knew it, and seldom intervened; when he did, it seems to have been in all cases beneficially. His profound understanding of human nature reached below diverging national characteristics and touched the common basis of humanity. In a crisis when public opinion so largely controlled the international situation, such an endowment was of inestimable value.1 Seward His secretary of state, William F. Seward, was one of the most complex personalities of his perplexing generation. With an absolute conviction of the ultimate triumph of what he believed to be right, he was perfectly ready to compromise principle for temporary convenience. Yet he was never content to let Providence work alone, but aided it with all the finesse of which his astute mind was capable. With a practicality thus genially founded in philosophy, he nevertheless at times surrendered himself to an intellectual emotionalism as dangerous to a man of his responsibility as it is useful to the orator. The only such deflection during his diplomatic career occurred at its very opening. Before assuming office he said, in an address to the New England Society of New York, that if we were attacked by a foreign power "all the hills of South Carolina would pour forth their population to the rescue." Becoming secretary, he advised, on April 1, 1861, the development of quarrels with Great Britain and France as a means of restoring unity at home. Lincoln made no comment, but when, on May 21, he looked over the draft of Seward's dis 1 Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works, ed. J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, 2 vols., New York, 1894; Abraham Lincoln, a History, by Nicolay and Hay, 10 vols., New York, 1890; Gideon Welles, Lincoln and Seward, New York, 1874. 66 patch to our minister in England incorporating this policy, he took the sting out of it. He cut out a reference to "that hour" when we should 'cease to be friends, and become once more, as we have twice before been forced to be, enemies of Great Britain"; in the description of her conduct he changed "wrongful" to "hurtful"; and he added, “This paper is for your own guidance only and not to be read or shown to any one." From this time Seward's handling of affairs was always competent and sometimes masterly, though he continued to evince an even greater penchant for writing diplomatic notes to be read at home than had the secretaries of the fifties.1 Adams The dispatch of May 21, thus modified by Lincoln, was further toned down by our minister, who wrote that he "tried to act up to [his] instructions at the same time that [he] softened as well as [he] could the sharp edges." The appointment of Charles Francis Adams to the court of St. James was as fortunate, in its lesser way, as the election of Lincoln to the presidency. Of a family, education, and manner to compel the respect of the English, he had, if not the genius of his father John Quincy Adams, at any rate high ability, all the family backbone and sturdy Americanism, and added thereto a somewhat greater tact. Treading a path where any slip was apt to lead to war, and where many of those with whom he associated hoped to see him slip, he maintained himself immune from criticism. His business was to see that nothing happened, and his career was marked by many important things that failed to happen. Sumner Confiding more and more in Adams abroad, Lincoln and Seward relied at home chiefly on Charles Sumner. With a background of foreign travel and a wide English acquaintance, he became in 1861 chairman of the senate committee of foreign affairs, a post which he held till 1871. A scholar, with some knowledge of interna 1 Frederick Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward (2 vols., New York, etc., 1900), vol. ii. tional law, and a cultured gentleman, he was a favorite with the foreign diplomats at Washington, who found him the most congenial of the men high in office. Throughout the war his advice seems to have been sound and useful.1 As important in routine matters as Sumner on critical occasions was William Hunter, chief clerk of the state depart Hunter ment. Holding office from 1829 to 1886, he contributed a continuity of knowledge and practice the value of which it is hard to exaggerate. On April 12 this new administration found itself confronted by a condition of domestic hostility. On April 19, without intending to do so, it recognized that this hostil Blockade ity constituted civil war. It was its purpose to treat the movement as a rebellion, a purely domestic affair. The first essential, however, was to cut off the hostile states from all connection with the outside world. Devoted to the raising of great staple crops, the South purchased many of its necessities instead of producing them; its commerce cut off, therefore, exhaustion would be but a matter of time. Secretary Welles thought that we could accomplish this end by declaring the ports closed; but, as we did not hold the ports, such a regulation would obviously have to be enforced at sea. Accordingly the cabinet decided upon a blockade, which Lincoln proclaimed April 19. In the leading case, that of the Amy Warwick, our own supreme court declared that this blockade could rest upon no other basis than that of a change of status in the South making it enemy's country, and hence that the government's act constituted a recognition of belligerency or a state of war. Upon the maintenance of this blockade depended, so far as human judgment can tell, the success of the attempt to restore the Union by arms. Its effectiveness, as against the South, depended on the navy, as against foreign nations, upon diplomacy.2 1 Charles Sumner, Works (15 vols., Boston, 1875–83), vi. 153–242, 474– 486; "Letters of Richard Cobden to Charles Sumner, 1862-1865," Amer. Hist. Review, ii. 306–319. * Gideon Welles, Diary (3 vols., Boston, etc., 1911), i. 165, 172 ff. The United States now found herself in the reverse of the situation that she had occupied during the Napoleonic wars: Maintenance she was now interested in the rights of bel of blockade ligerents rather than in the rights of neutrals. This change of position did not lead to a change of policy, but to a change of stress. We now admitted, as we had previously contended, that to be legal a blockade must be effectively maintained off the ports blockaded. Questions of course arose as to the definition of effective, but on the whole the navy relieved the diplomatic department of any great anxiety on this point. The blockade, at least after 1861, was reasonably efficient.1 Still, it was not proof against the alert blockade-runner willing to take the risk of capture. It became the custom to Continuous send goods to and from the Confederacy by voyage way of nearby neutral ports, as Nassau in the British Bahamas, a device that made the actual running of the blockade a short though perilous undertaking. A route still safer was that by way of Matamoros, a Mexican port just opposite Brownville in Texas, but communication from this distant border to the interior of the Confederacy was so poor, that the volume of such trade was small. To meet this situation our courts evolved a doctrine of "continuous voyage," asserting that, if the ultimate destination of the cargo was the Confederacy, the vessel carrying it might be seized even on a voyage between two neutral ports, as Liverpool and Nassau. This doctrine somewhat resembled that applied by Sir William Scott, in the case of the Essex, to our trade between the French West Indies and France. Its application during the Civil war, however, was confined to the carrying of contraband. Numerous cases occurred in the Nassau trade, as those of the Dolphin and the Bermuda, which resulted in the condemnation of vessel and cargo. In the case of the Springbok the cargo was condemned, but the ship 1H. L. Wait, "The Blockade of the Confederacy," Century, 1898, xxxiv. 914-928. was released on the ground that there was no "fraudulent connection on the part of the owners with the ulterior destination of the goods." A leading case was that of the Peterhof, seized on its way to Matamoros. The supreme court released the vessel on the plea that the blockade did not apply to the inland trade from Mexico to the Confederacy; but as this decision was not rendered till 1866, it did not affect the conduct of the war. On the whole, the doctrine of "continuous voyage" was acknowledged by European powers and did something to assist in the maintenance of the blockade, though seizures under it were actually few. Paris Our purpose now being to prevent commerce rather than to prey upon it, we had reason to regret our failure to adhere to the Declaration of Paris, which had abolished Declaration of privateering among its signers. While we, in this new crisis, made use of our merchant marine by purchasing vessels and incorporating them into the navy, Jefferson Davis, on his part, issued commissions to privateers. Seward, therefore, promptly announced that we would now adhere to all the rules of the Declaration, without amendment. France and England, however, while welcoming our adhesion, properly reminded us that these rules could not be held to apply to the Confederacy, whereupon Seward, failing in his purpose to have the Confederate privateers declared pirates, withdrew his offer to join in the agree ment. Belligerent rights and neutral duties On the important question of the belligerent right of search our position was developed with the progress of the war. On the other hand, we firmly insisted from the beginning on a rigid interpretation of the duty of neutral nations to prevent their citizens from aiding our opponents. With regard to this duty, however, there was no such general concurrence of opinion as in the case of continuous voyages, and the issue was left to the course of diplomacy. |