the vastness of the distances rendered, not indeed communication, but traffic by our own roads impossible. All the easier routes lay in foreign countries, and to secure the use of them was the duty of diplomacy.

Gadsden treaty

The favorite idea of the later fifties was that of a railroad. Experts decided that the best line was to the south, involving the use of Mexican territory; but to trust such an enterprise, which must be launched with government aid, to the protection of that still distracted nation seemed impossible. Finally, by the manipulation of a boundary dispute and a liberal use of money, a treaty was arranged in 1853 by James Gadsden which granted us the territory needed in northern Mexico, in return for a payment of ten million dollars. By the same treaty we secured the equal use, even for the passage of troops, of the isthmus of Tehuantepec, over which, the earlier plan for a canal having been given up, it was hoped to run a railroad.

CentralAmerican isthmuses

A real transcontinental railroad, however, was during this period merely a rather wild hope. The more practical Importance of improvement of the situation lay in a canal across one of the narrower isthmuses, as that of Panama or of Nicaragua, entirely outside of our own territory. Even as things were, the greater bulk of our commerce and travel from coast to coast passed over these isthmuses, and its protection was a national obligation.

The importance of these points at which the two great oceans approached each other so closely had been appreciated Formulation of from the time of their discovery; it had been our policy more and more appreciated as it became clear that except here the two continents stretched continuous and immense from the Arctic ice almost to that of the Antarctic. Charles V had considered the possibility of a canal. Miranda had envisaged their international status, and, liberal with his paper kingdom, had offered them to the free use of commerce. Clay, in his instructions to the delegates

to the Panama Congress, had said of the isthmus there, "The benefits of it ought not to be exclusively appropriated to any one nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe.' We did not quite venture to claim this as a right analogous to that of navigating narrow waterways; but the principle was similar, and formed the basis of our policy.

the neutrality of Panama

To turn this policy into action, desire for immediate use was necessary. Our first step, therefore, was a treaty with New Granada or Colombia in 1844, after the Guarantee of Oregon migration had begun. This arrange⚫ment was unsatisfactory, and another treaty was drawn up in 1846. It provided absolute equality of use for the commerce and the citizens of both countries; "and," it went on, "in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an especial compensation for the said advantages-the United States guarantee, positively and efficaciously, to New Granada-the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted-and, in consequence, the United States also guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory." Polk defended this guarantee on the ground that the interests of the United States were highly involved, that capital would not be invested without such security, and that New Granada would not grant us the needed rights on other terms.1

With the discovery of gold in California and the influx of population that followed, the situation became more pressing, and a canal seemed an immediate prob- The Nicaraability. The advantages of the route through guan route Nicaragua over that at Panama were, however, coming to be

1 W. F. Johnson, Four Centuries of the Panama Canal, New York, 1906; J. H. Latané, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America (Baltimore, 1900), 176-220; L. M. Keasbey, The Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe Doctrine, New York, etc., 1896.

L

Influence of
Great Britain

strongly urged.1 By the organizing ability of Commodore
Vanderbilt, that route came to be the more frequented, and
arrangements for its protection became necessary. At this
point we once more encountered our constant rival, Great
Britain. She must supply a portion at least
of the capital required, and she was in the pos-
session of certain special interests that seemed to many in
1849 to give her control of the situation. Of these the first
was the settlement of Belize, now British Honduras, an an-
cient logwood-cutting establishment with elastic boundaries.
Englishmen also were living on the islands of the Bay of Hon-
duras. Moreover, Great Britain had a protectorate, vague
but of long standing, over the, considering the trouble they
gave for forty years, appropriately named Mosquito Indians.
Since these Indians were claimed as subjects by Nicaragua,
the situation was similar to that which would have existed
in the United States when Great Britain was intriguing with
our Indians, had the United States been as weak as Nicar
agua was. The Indians professed to own the mouth of the
St. Juan river, the first step in the overland journey; in 1848
the British seized its port, Greytown, as Mosquito territory.2
Under these circumstances, Clayton began negotiations
with Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer. Fearing a British protest,
Clayton-
he failed to press treaties made without gov-
Bulwer treaty
ernment authorization by our representatives
in Nicaragua and Honduras which promised us exclusive
rights there, and considered himself fortunate to have the
matter taken up on a basis of equality. On April 14, 1850,
Clayton and Bulwer agreed to a treaty which provided that
neither the United States nor Great Britain was to exercise
any exclusive control over any canal that might be con-
structed, that no fortifications should be erected to command

1 D. K. Pangborn, "A Journey from New York to San Francisco in 1850," Amer. Hist. Review, 1903, ix. 104–115.

I. D. Travis, History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Michigan Political Science Assoc., Publications, 1900, iii. No. 8.

it, and that neither party should colonize or assume or exercise dominion over any part of Central America. The prospective canal was to be absolutely neutral, even in case of war between the two countries; and this neutrality was mutually guaranteed, other nations being invited to join in maintaining it. These general principles were also extended to all the other isthmuses of the region.

Bulwer treaty and the Monroe Doctrine

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was at once attacked as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Buchanan declared that it established the doctrine against ourselves rather The Claytonthan against European governments. The Democratic platform of 1856 said, “We can, under no circumstances, surrender our preponderance in the adjustment of all questions arising out of [interoceanic communication]." Though it may well be doubted whether John Quincy Adams would thus have admitted Great Britain to equal partnership, it may be observed that the invidiousness of this partnership might have been somewhat ameliorated had other nations accepted the invitation to join in the guarantee. Adams's second and more practical objection to coöperating with Canning in 1823 had been that his own country wished to acquire territory and Canning's did not. In Clayton's case, the long-expressed intention of the United States was to acquire nothing which all the nations of the globe could not share with us, the free use of the isthmus and its improvement. Subsequently we changed our minds on this latter point, and the treaty became an obstacle.

Petty CentralAmerican negotiations

The fundamental question was, however, lost sight of through the irritating failure of Great Britain to live up to the spirit of the treaty. Clayton acknowledged, before ratification, that Belize should not be regarded as part of Central America, a sensible decision, as this was one of Great Britain's oldest American settlements. This, however, did not content England, who continued to uphold and extend her interests in the region that was undoubtedly covered by the term Central

America. She continued to exercise her protectorate over the Mosquitoes and began to organize a government in the Bay Islands. In so doing she was not even justified by any deep-laid scheme of villainy, it was mere needless troublemaking. Her excuse, that the self-denying section of the treaty was prospective and not mandatory, could not bear examination in light of the text of the treaty, "assume or

exercise dominion over." Webster and Everett handled the case over delicately, and Great Britain continued in possession of what she claimed were her rights. Pierce sent Buchanan to England charged with the matter, but in the opinion of the latter the decision to treat Canadian questions separately at Washington rendered a settlement impossible. The incoming of Lord Palmerston as Prime Minister in 1855, brought an English administration prone to indulge in the art of bluff into opposition with an American administration