tomer rather than let him go to a rival. Her methods in the use of her influence with Mexico had perhaps been "unfair"; but if these did indicate a slight moral obliquity, and if Aberdeen's letter on slavery was lacking in tactfulness, such lapses did not come from any hostility or from a failure to realize that the friendship of the United States was more important to Great Britain than that of any other country on the American continent. Great Britain was looking after her own interests to be sure, but her ministers, Aberdeen and Peel, were friendly to the United States. Their friendship, moreover, was greatly stimulated in 1846 by the fact that both nations were just taking the first steps in the new policy of free trade, which, if persisted in, would cement their destinies by an ever-increasing bond of trade. ment The British government, therefore, having previously ascertained that its proposal would not be contumaciously Oregon agree- rejected, offered to compromise on the fortyninth parallel to the strait of Georgia, and thence to the ocean, with the right of free navigation on the Columbia. This was more than Great Britain had ever before offered, though less than the United States had expressed its willingness to accept.. It gave us Puget Sound, it gave Great Britain the tip of Vancouver island, thus distributing the best harbors on the northwest coast. Polk accepted this proposal as a basis, and a treaty was drawn up. Before concluding it, however, Polk endeavored to relieve himself of responsibility for compromising in a case in which he had asserted our title to the whole to be "clear and unquestionable," by resorting, as has so seldom been done, to the "advice" of the Senate. That body advised signing, and thereby practically committed itself to ratify the treaty, which was promptly done in June, 1846. Thus was settled the last stretch of our northern boundary, although the division of the smaller islands caused more trouble, which was adjusted by arbitration in 1871. Polk's bluster and the wild speeches in Congress probably made What was at issue in Ore gon? some difference in the result. Whenever we have encountered Great Britain we have been obliged to compromise, but bluff on our part has often hastened agreement. The line decided upon was a reasonable one, and, after the following of the fortyninth parallel to the Rockies in 1818, was probably inevitable, regardless of claims or of diplomacy. The protrusion of Vancouver island south of forty-nine was disagreeable, but on general principles the island was best considered as a whole. In rousing popular agitation Polk was playing with fire; it was a typical example of "shirt-sleeve" diplomacy. On the other hand, a continuance of the joint occupancy in the face of the actual settlement of the region might well have given rise to frontier squabbles more dangerous than the whiff of spread-eagle oratory. Mexico and Texan annexation On April 28, 1846, Polk accepted the British offer as to Oregon, subject to the consent of the Senate; on May 11 he advised war with Mexico. The conjunction of the events was fortunate, but probably not vital, for Great Britain had already signified her intention not to support Mexico. At Polk's inauguration the war had not been expected by those best informed. Webster wrote to his son, March 11, 1845, that Mexico would doubtless "be very angry" over the annexation of Texas, but, he added, "that she will plunge at once into a war, though it is possible, is as yet not thought probable, by the best informed here. . . . Mr. Polk and his cabinet will desire to keep the peace." Although Mexico withdrew her minister, as she had done in 1837, she did not rush into war. There existed, however, at the outset a question that required careful The Texas handling on the part of the United States. As boundary usual, we had annexed not territory alone, but a boundary controversy. The Mexican territory of Texas had been bounded to the south by the Nueces river; the republic of Texas had actually occupied the south bank of this river; the constitution of Texas described the national boundary as the Rio Grande to its source, and thence northward to the fortysecond parallel. This constitutional boundary, which swept in Mexican settlements on the north bank of the Rio Grande near its mouth, together with the important post of Santa Fé in New Mexico, had been fixed in order to provide a basis for compromise. Calhoun had recognized its lack of actuality, and the joint resolutions, seeking to avoid any such difficulty as had arisen with Maine two years before, had given the United States power to settle the boundary. Meantime, the question as to the protection of Texas until her formal admission, which could not be consummated till December, 1845, came up. Calhoun, after the rejection of his treaty, had promised such defence as the President could give while negotiations were in process; but this did not mean much. Polk was in an easier position; for the United States had assented to the annexation, but until July 4, 1845, Texas had not. During the interval he wished to send troops, but President Jones said they were not necessary. When Texas accepted our offer this difficulty was removed,1 and Polk could do as he wished. Taylor in Texas On June 15, 1845, Polk ordered General Taylor to "select and occupy, on or near the Rio Grande del Norte, such site as will consist with the health of the troops, and will be best adapted to repel invasion, and to protect what, in event of annexation, will be our western frontier." Against this order our representative in Texas, A. J. Danelson, protested on the ground that, since Texas had previously accepted a truce leaving Mexico in possession of the north bank of the Rio Grande, and had evinced a disposition to settle the question by negotiation, things might, "to say the least... be left by the United States in the same condition." On July 8 Taylor was ordered not to interfere with existing Mexican military establishments in the disputed region, "unless a state of war should exist." On August 30 he was instructed as follows: "The assembling of a large Mexican army on the border of Texas, and crossing the Rio Grande with a considerable force, will be regarded by the executive as an invasion of the United States, and the commencement of hostilities. An attempt to cross the river with such a force will also be considered in the same light." It was obviously the intention of the administration to insist upon the Rio Grande boundary, at least near the coast. It was not, however, till January 17, 1846, that Taylor was explicitly ordered to the Rio Grande. structions During the same period Polk was endeavoring to open an approach to negotiation with Mexico. An agent, Parrott, accompanied the withdrawing Mexican minis- Slidell's inter, and in June reported that Mexico would not go to war over Texas. Polk thereupon appointed John Slidell minister to Mexico. He was, first of all, to warn Mexico of the insidious designs of foreign nations and of our 1 Rives, The United States and Mexico; William Jay, Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War, Boston, etc., 1849; C. H. Owen, The Justice of the Mexican War, New York, etc., 1908. determination to prevent them. Then he was to insist upon the payment of the claims of American citizens, which had been recognized by a convention of 1839 but which remained unpaid. Realizing the financial inability of Mexico, the government instructed Slidell, “Fortunately the joint resolution of Congress for annexing Texas to the United States presents a means of satisfying these claims, in perfect consistency with the interests as well as the power of both republics." The indisputable character of the Texan claim to the Rio Grande near its mouth, was to be asserted; but a question concerning the right to New Mexico was admitted, and Slidell was authorized to offer to assume claims for five million dollars in return for the title to that territory. fornia The most important portion of the instructions, however, referred to the reopening, but in a new spirit, of the question Polk and Cali- in regard to California which Thompson and Webster had broached in 1843. Under the pressure of events the situation there was rapidly ripening. Rumors of revolt were multiplying, and Polk did not seek to blast the growth. In October, 1845, Larkin, our consul at Monterey, was instructed: "Whilst the president will make no effort and use no influence to induce the Californians to become one of the free and independent states of this Union, yet if the people should desire to unite their destiny with ours, they would be received as brethren, whenever this can be done without affording Mexico any just cause of complaint." Lieutenant Gillespie was sent to confer with Larkin, Commodore Stockton was ordered to report with his squadron at Monterey, and Frémont was exploring California. In the midst of these happenings, Slidell was instructed to call the attention of Mexico to the fact that she had small Mexico and chance of maintaining her hold upon California, California and that Great Britain and France were both ambitious to obtain it. He was to say that the United States would never permit its cession to either of these powers, but |