treaty

Wiser politicians took it up and changed the basis of argument. In a strong letter Jackson roused the public apprehension of England's political ambitions, and the Defeat of the Democratic convention had the good sense to unite northern with southern interests by joining Oregon with Texas. Referring to our lost settlement at Astoria and our claim to Texas abandoned in 1819, the convention resolved, "That our title to the whole of the territory of Oregon is clear and unquestionable; that no portion of the same ought to be ceded to England or any other power; and that the reoccupation of Oregon and the reannexation of Texas at the earliest practicable period are great American questions."

tion

The election of the Democratic candidate, James K. Polk, was accepted as a national mandate in favor of annexation. But, if annexation was to come, many believed Annexation by that it must come quickly. Texas was now the joint resoluscene of a dramatic contest between the American representative, Duff Green, specially sent to hold the republic in line, and Elliot and Saligny, the British and French representatives respectively, who, backed by their governments, had dropped the slavery question and were promising recognition by Mexico on condition of a promise by Texas to maintain her independence. In order to hasten action by the United States, it was proposed that, since a two-thirds majority for a treaty could not be secured in the Senate, annexation be brought about by a joint resolution of the two houses. The constitutionality of such a method was at least obscure, for previously the power to annex had been implied from that to make treaties. The constitutional argument, however, played little part in the discussion of the main question, which absorbed most of the session from December, 1844, to March, 1845. At length, on March 1, the resolution was passed, but added to it was a curious amendment allowing the President either to proceed with annexation by the authority thereby given or to negotiate a treaty.

Texas

This double-headed proposition was accepted by a balancing number of senators with the understanding that the Tyler annexes whole matter would be left to Polk for settlement, and with the purpose that he should find himself fully empowered to act quickly. Tyler, however, anticipated action by Polk by dispatching a messenger to Texas announcing that she might enter the union on the terms of the joint resolution. Polk acquiesced in the accomplished fact, and the centre of interest shifted from Washington to Texas.1

Texas

The proposal to Texas was that she be admitted as a state, with such government as should be adopted by the people Struggle for and assented to by the United States. This plan, in contrast with Calhoun's treaty, which resembled previous annexation treaties in merely providing for admission to statehood at some future time, virtually constituted an enabling act, pushing statehood one step further forward. It provided that Texas should hold her public lands for the payment of her debt; whereas Calhoun had agreed that the United States would receive the lands and pay the debt. The question of boundary it left open to settlement by the United States. It further provided that Texas was not to be divided into more than four states, of which those north of the parallel of 36° 30′ should not permit slavery,-points for which there were no equivalents in the Calhoun treaty. The president of Texas, Anson Jones, received the proposal with dignity. He encouraged Elliot to press Mexico for recognition, and when the Texan convention met, July 4, 1845, he offered it the alternatives of independence, recognized by Mexico on condition that it be maintained and with the special friendship of Great Britain and France, or annexation. Without hesitation the convention chose the latter, and in December Texas became a state of the Union. Although chagrined at the result, Great Britain and France were nevertheless, as they had indeed repeatedly 'T. H. Benton, Thirty Years' View, 2 vols., New York, 1854-56.

declared, not prepared to resist forcibly; hence nothing now remained necessary for a complete settlement of the question but acceptance by Mexico.1

Polk came into office with the intention of securing Texas, Oregon, and California. To the accomplishment of this formidable task he brought, not great intellec

Polk

tual ability, but an iron will, a directness of purpose, and a conviction of the morality of his intentions inherited from his Scotch-Presbyterian ancestry,-just the equipment for the man of action after discussion has cleared and defined the issue.2 He found the first part of his three-fold undertaking practically finished, and he accepted the results. Of the two remaining tasks, the Oregon controversy, of which the details had been worked out by Gallatin in 1827, had just been still more closely defined in a correspondence between Calhoun and Pakenham.3

In these letters the British practically acknowledged our title from the forty-second parallel to the south bank of the Columbia, and we practically acknowledged The Oregon their rights north of the forty-ninth parallel. question Within the undistributed middle lay Puget Sound and the tip of Vancouver island. Both countries claimed Spanish recognition of their claims, the British by the Nootka Sound convention of 1790, we by our treaty of 1819. By discovery and exploration we had the stronger claim to the Columbia valley, the British to that of the Fraser. In actual settlements Great Britain had held the advantage; but the United States was gaining, though most of her settlers sought the valley of the Willamette, a southern branch of the Columbia. In 1844 Aberdeen offered to arbitrate, but the United States refused.

1 Anson Jones, Memoranda and Official Correspondence relating to the Republic of Texas, New York, 1859.

2 J. K. Polk, Diary, ed. M. M. Quaife, 4 vols., Chicago, 1910.

Calhoun, Works, vol. v.

Calhoun expected that Polk would request his continuance in the position of secretary of state, but Polk failed to do so, Polk's Oregon for his views differed fundamentally from those policy of Calhoun. Calhoun feared both the intentions and the power of Great Britain, he believed that she I could and would maintain her views by force. He was of

that generation of American statesmen who, confident in our growing strength, preferred to leave such disputes open, trusting to the future. Polk intended to settle the question at once, and chose as his secretary James Buchanan, a man of like mind.

Polk revives the Monroe Doctrine

The latter offered Great Britain the line of 49°, which had been satisfactory to Calhoun. Upon its rejection, which had been anticipated, Polk took up the question in his message of December, 1845. Referring to the Monroe Doctrine, which he was the first President to revive, he said: "It should be distinctly an

nounced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or established on any part of the North American continent." He rejected the idea of any balance of power as applied to America. Finally he asked Congress to authorize the termination of the joint occupancy with a year's notice, as provided in the convention of 1828. He declared that our title "to the whole Oregon Territory" had already been "asserted, and, as is believed, maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments."

Oregon policy of Congress

Congress debated the proposal with unusual seriousness and ability. Polk's views found an echo in a style of expansionist oratory new to the country and not confined to Congress. The phrase "Fiftyfour-forty or fight" rang through the land. Calhoun and Webster, on the other hand, pleaded for moderation, expressing their belief that the President's policy would result in war, and that war would end in the loss of Oregon to the British fleet. In the end the President was authorized to give notice of the termination of the joint occupancy; but this notice was to be joined with the declaration that it was hoped that the step would lead to a speedy amicable adjustment of the differences between the two governments,-an apparent invitation for a proposal of compromise.1

The British government was still under the leadership of Sir Robert Peel, whose friendliness to the United States had resulted in the Webster-Ashburton treaty.

British policy

It was, indeed, the same government whose machinations, real and exaggerated, in Texas and California had been so effectively used in furthering Texan annexation. The desire of Great Britain to prevent that annexation, however, had been no more inimical than the desire of a merchant to secure a new cus

1 See speeches by Calhoun and Webster in their Works; also Joseph Schafer, "The British Attitude toward the Oregon Question, 1815–1846,” Amer. Hist. Review, 1911, xvi. 273–294.