consumed half of our tobacco crop and much of our rice. In 1838 Wheaton secured a reduction in the duty on rice. Our tariff of 1842, however, incited retaliation, and in 1844 he made a new arrangement on a reciprocal basis. By this agreement the United States was to impose only rates fixed in the treaty on certain products of the Zollverein, which in return was to reduce to a stipulated rate its duties on tobacco and lard, to forego its contemplated increase in the tax on rice, and to impose no duty at all on raw cotton. These provisions were to apply only to direct trade in German or American vessels. Rejection of Zollverein treaty This treaty, commercially very favorable, was in 1844 recommended by President Tyler to the Senate. Rufus Choate reported for its committee on foreign affairs: "The Committee. are not prepared to sanction so large an innovation upon ancient and uniform practice in respect of the department of government by which duties on imports shall be imposed. . . . The . . . committee believe that the general rule of our system is indisputably that the control of trade and the function of taxation belong, without abridgment or participation, to Congress." Calhoun, who was secretary of state, maintained on the other hand that such rate-making, whether by treaty or by international agreement, was a wellestablished practice: "The only question it is believed that was ever made was, whether an act of Congress was not necessary to sanction and carry the stipulations making the change into effect." Many considerations intervened, such as the unpopularity of Tyler and the Whig objections to any lowering of the customs rates; and the treaty was rejected. Constitutionally the episode is of importance, because the Senate, moved by outside considerations and for once forgetting its esprit de corps, put itself on record as supporting the contention of the House as to the limitations on the treaty-making power.1 1 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Reports (Senate Doc., 56 Cong. ties A more exciting occupation than that of commercial negotiation was that of gunning for claims. These claims Claims trea- were of two classes. One kind had arisen, and continued to grow, from the disturbed condition of Spanish America. Revolution had already become chronic and American citizens and their property were often in the way, often in fact were actively involved on one side or the other. Recognition of the resulting claims for damages was obtained, and indemnity provided for, in treaties with Texas in 1838, Mexico in 1839, and Peru in 1841. The other class of claims was grounded on the maltreatment of American shipping during the Napoleonic wars. Such claims made the basis of a treaty with Denmark in 1830, with France in 1831, with the two Sicilies in 1832, and with Spain in 1834. With the addition of Portugal in 1851 the list was complete and the slate clean. Our claims against Great Britain had been wiped out by the war. The signing of the treaty with France did not, however, secure immediate payment of claims. On the contrary, its Claims treaty execution involved us in the only strictly with France diplomatic embroglio which aroused public interest between 1829 and 1840. Although rising at one time to a point at which even sane men expected war, the affair must in reality be considered as opera bouffe rather than drama. The king and peers of France constitutionally agreed that the nation would pay us, for the release from all our claims for seizure and destruction of property, five million dollars in six annual instalments; but the Chamber of Deputies, as our House of Representatives has so often done, refused to grant the money. Jackson mentioned the matter to Congress in 1833, and sent Livingston as minister to France, especially charged with obtaining payment. It is said that an intimation came from France that Jackson 2 sess., No. 231, pt. 8), viii. 36–37, June 14, 1844. Cf. S. M. Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service (Chicago, 1911), 368-374; and E. S. Corwin, National Supremacy, New York, 1913. had better assume a stronger tone in his next message, of 1834; at any rate, he did so. In seven pages he discussed the question with all his peculiar frankness. "Our institutions," said he, “are essentially pacific. Peace and friendly intercourse with all nations are as much the desire of our government as they are the interest of our people. But these objects are not to be permanently secured by surrendering the rights of our citizens or permitting solemn treaties for their indemnity, in cases of flagrant wrong, to be abrogated or set aside." 1 Interpreting this as a threat of war, French public opinion went up in the air. The government of Louis Philippe, conciliatory but dependent on public opinion, War clouds was forced to prepare for war. French fleets again sailed for our coasts. The French Chamber, with a characteristic Gallic touch, voted the money, but would not pay it until an apology for Jackson's message was tendered. The French minister at Washington was recalled, and Livingston was given his passports. Our government maintained that a presidential message was a domestic document and hence neither justified official umbrage nor allowed official explanation. John Quincy Adams, now a member of the House of Representatives and chairman of its committee on foreign affairs, supported Jackson and reported in favor of retaliatory legislation, thereby losing an election to the Senate from Whig Massachusetts. In the Senate, the placating Clay delayed war preparation and caused conciliatory resolutions to be adopted. In his next annual message, December 7, 1835, Jackson explained that of the year before. "The conception," said he, "that it was my intention to menace or Reconciliation insult the Government of France is as un- with France founded as the attempt to extort from the fears of that nation what her sense of justice may deny would be vain and 1 Richardson, Messages of the Presidents, iii. 126–223; A. Danzat, Du rôle des chambres en matière de traités internationaux. ridiculous." After some demur and an informal mediation by Great Britain, this explanation was accepted by France as satisfactory, relations were resumed, and payment was made. For this result the credit was claimed by the friends of Adams, of Clay, and of Jackson. It certainly belonged to whoever made the happy suggestion of explaining one domestic document by another. If presidential messages are not to be considered as international declarations, we neither insulted France nor apologized; our honor was secure. If they are to be so considered, whatever insult the first contained was atoned for in the second, and French honor was satisfied. boundary Meanwhile our always existing difficulties with Great Britain were again approaching a head: they seem to reNortheastern quire lancing about every quarter of a century. The most important of these concerned the boundary between the crossing of the St. Lawrence by the forty-fifth parallel, and a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix. The treaty of 1783 provided that this line run "to the Highlands; along the said Highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean." The question arose as to whether the St. John, emptying into the Bay of Fundy, flowed into the Atlantic ocean in the sense of the treaty. If it did, then the highlands referred to were those dividing its waters from the tributaries of the St. Lawrence, and quite near the latter; if not, the highlands would be those separating its valley from those of the rivers of Maine. About twelve thousand square miles were involved. The British contended for the second interpretation, holding that the intention had been to divide the river basins, and that this line would give them the whole of the St. John valley. The Americans claimed that the treaty had attempted to define a line already existing,the southern boundary of Quebec as defined by the proclamation of 1763, in which the highlands were expressly men |