and intercourse of the British, with the immense regions extending Westerly even to the Pacific Ocean." The furtraders and the Indians had fought well during the war, the latter especially had suffered; now both demanded that protection which they had persistently been claiming from the British government since 1783.

Under these circumstances, Castlereagh issued his instructions, July 28, 1814. Maritime law was not to be The rival in touched. The boundary should be "rectified"

structions

so to give the British a road from Halifax to Quebec, with Sackett's harbor to command the St. Lawrence, Fort Niagara to command the river of the same name, and Moose island and Eastport to command the mouth of the St. Croix. The Indians should be included in the treaty, and should be assured of a mutually guaranteed boundary,that fixed by Wayne's treaty of 1795. The United States must give up its privileges in the fisheries, and the navigation of the lakes; England, having access to the Mississippi through the Indian country, must continue to enjoy its navigation. The American instructions, prepared by Monroe, January 14, 1814, were to obtain first of all an acknowledgment of the American position on points of maritime law, though a compromise was suggested on the subject of impressment whereby Great Britain was to yield the right and the United States was to forbid British born sailors to serve in American vessels. Indemnity was to be secured for illegal captures. The commissioners were to urge "the advantages to both countries which are promised by a transfer of the upper parts and even the whole of Canada to the United States," and were to point out that experience had shown that Great Britain could not "participate in the dominion and navigation of the lakes without incurring the danger of an early renewal of the war."

These differences seemed to preclude the possibility of agreement, especially since the British terms were presented in the form of an ultimatum. On August 24, the American

Check

While thus delaying commissioners, parGallatin asked what

commissioners returned a "unanimous and decided negative," in a very able vote setting forth that the English claims were "founded neither on reciprocity, nor any of the usual bases of negotiation, neither that of uti possedetis nor of status quo ante bellum." Openly, but not hastily, they prepared to leave Ghent. they talked much with the British ticularly in regard to the buffer state. would become of the hundred thousand Americans already living within the boundary proposed. Goulburn, perhaps hearing of them for the first time, thought that the line might be slightly changed, but that on the whole the Americans could shift for themselves: the Indians would treat them well; he knew an Indian who was very intelligent. Adams said that such a treaty provision was opposing a feather to a torrent. Population, he declared, was increasing: "As it continued to increase in such proportions, was it in human experience, or in human power, to check its progress by a bond of paper purporting to exclude posterity from the natural means of subsistence?" Bayard, the Federalist, told Goulburn that, when it became known that the negotiation had broken off on such terms, the Federalist party in the United States would be overwhelmed.

Desire for peace in England

In the end the Americans succeeded in making an impression on the British commissioners, and through them on the ministry. Since England had been put in the position of continuing the war for conquest, the ministry became satisfied that if the negotiations ended at this point the war would become “quite popular” in America. "It is very material," they said, “to throw the rupture of the negotiations, if it take place, upon the Americans." It was, indeed, feared that the war might become unpopular in England: the Times did not represent the whole nation. The same elements of distress which, anxious for the American market, had all too late forced the recall of the orders in council, would be

little inclined to forego their trade much longer for remote accessions of territory in the wilds of America. The ministry, moreover, was full of anxiety over the wrangles of the late allies at the Congress of Vienna, where events were rapidly shaping themselves for a new European alignment,— England, France, and Austria against Russia and Prussia— and a new war. Moved by these considerations, it sent new instructions to Ghent, September 1. Far from satisfactory in themselves, these new terms put the British in the awkward position of having retreated from an ultimatum. The American commissioners were quick to take advantage of this weakness. They refused to treat on the proposed new basis of uti possedetis, that is to say the situation then existing. Under these circumstances the duke of Wellington was asked if he would go to America. He expressed his willingness, but declared that nothing could be accomplished while the Americans held the lakes, and said that England was not justified by the military situation in demanding any territory. The ministry once more receded, and offered to negotiate on the basis of status quo ante bellum, or the condition before the war. Indeed, it is difficult to see how they could do anything else. If they doubted the support of public opinion in demanding important posts and a buffer state, they could scarcely expect it in fighting for the apparently trivial bits of American territory which they were holding in 1814.

Maritime law

On the other hand, the American commissioners found that in insisting on an adjustment of maritime law they ran into the stone-wall of British determination. Fortunately, however, they were instructed from America, where Madison was oppressed by the impending British attack on New Orleans, the harrying of the coast and burning of Washington, and the prospect of the Hartford convention, to omit such clauses from the treaty if

necessary.

With these points out of the way, negotiations progressed

Fisheries versus the Mis⚫sissippi

rapidly. On the question of fisheries, it is true, the American commission divided. Adams and Russell wished to restate the terms of 1783, which meant that the British right to navigate the Mississippi must be conceded also. Clay, mindful of the usefulness of that river to the British fur-traders, and afraid that such a right would be used by Great Britain to back a claim for territorial access to the Mississippi by pushing south the northern boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, was unwilling to admit the privilege. Finally, at Gallatin's suggestion, both points were omitted, and on December 24, 1814, the treaty was signed.

losses

Great triumph of American diplomacy as the treaty was in the light of the British instructions, yet, considered from the point of view that the Americans began the Gains and war to obtain satisfaction for what they considered infractions of maritime law, it registered a defeat. It is more important, however, to note that from 1815 until the present year (1914), Great Britain was at war with European powers for only three years (1853 to 1856), and so the treaty marked the end of our suffering as neutrals from her exactions for a hundred years. The West more nearly obtained what it wanted. The treaty provided: "The United States engage to put an end, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians," on the basis of 1812, if they should agree. No provision guaranteed these boundaries, however, and though the United States continued to press them westward, Great Britain never after meddled in the matter. The Indian power east of the Mississippi was broken, and never again within the United States did any Indians play a part as a factor in American diplomacy. The general restoration of property, moreover, included the raising of the United States flag over the post of Astoria, although the property title to it had passed into the hands of the British Northwestern Company, to be absorbed later

into the Great, or Hudson Bay, Company. By this recognition was added a third link to our claim to Oregon.

The treaty provided also for the settlement of the numerous points of dispute that had arisen regarding the exact location of the boundary between Canada and

Boundary commissions

the United States. Once more, as in the case of the Jay treaty, these questions were to be determined by semi-judicial process, that is, by commissions of two members each, or, if the commissions failed to agree, by arbitration. Four such commissions were arranged for. The first one was to divide the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, in submitting one of which, Moose island, to question, the Americans suffered the only defeat, so far as details were concerned, in the framing of the treaty. This commission worked satisfactorily on the whole, although the final water boundary was not determined until an arbitration of 1908. Another commission ultimately fixed the boundary from the crossing of the forty-fifth parallel and the St. Lawrence through Lake Huron. The problems of the boundary from the St. Croix to the St. Lawrence and from Lake Huron to the Lake of the Woods proved too complicated; the commissions charged with them failed to agree, and subsequent arbitration was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, another long step had been taken in clearing up the ambiguities and vagueness of the treaty of 1783.

1815

From the peace of Ghent the United States emerged, not a "great power" in the conventional sense, but a nation of Our position in assured position. Thereafter our strength was sufficient for our defence, and our safety ceased to depend on the oscillations of the European balance of power. The way was open for us to enter into the European National exist- system as a participating member, or to pursue ence and terri- our own path without serious molestation. There were just as many unsettled stretches of our boundary as in 1783, but their vagueness was now an advantage to our growing power rather than a danger. The

tory