were added John Marshall, a Federalist, and Elbridge Gerry, a Republican. On the day on which Talleyrand took office they received their instructions.

French revolu

macy

Arriving in Paris at the very crest of the Revolution, they found themselves confronting a situation unparalleled since the last century of the Roman republic. tionary diplo- Triumphant France was surrounded by nations buying peace; the dazzling private expenditure which betokened the coming empire tempted public officials to demand private douceurs for the favor of their nod. The world seemed melting into new shapes at the whim of those who from moment to moment dominated Paris. America was a minor consideration; she was treated as were other powers. Even the astute Talleyrand, master of finesse, could see the need of no more subtile weapon than the threat, to be parried by the bribe.

tions

He refused to receive the commissioners until redress of grievances was made and the President's message of May 16, Secret negotia- 1797, dealing with the French situation, atoned for. Privately, however, he met them, and introduced them to certain individuals as possessing his confidence. These persons explained that as a preliminary to negotiation France expected the United States to buy from her, at par, certain Dutch bonds worth about fifty cents on the dollar,-two satellite republics were to combine to feed the great one. To set the whole in motion, a million francs, it was hinted, would be expected by the proper officials. This proposal was not so likely to surprise a trained diplomat at that time as now, if indeed anything in the Paris of 1798 could have surprised a trained diplomat. It was in effect a renewal in a different form of the loan proposition of 1794 so warmly endorsed by Monroe. We had not hesitated to buy peace from the Barbary pirates, and there was really no need of being more scrupulous about corrupting Talleyrand's morals than theirs. Pitt himself was at this very time seriously considering the purchase of

peace on similar, but dearer, terms.1 I believe, however, that Americans remain glad that their commissioners were shocked, and that Pinckney replied, "No! no! no! not a sixpence!" Pinckney and Marshall at once broke off negotiations. Gerry lingered for three months more, but without being trapped into any concessions by Talleyrand; then he too left France, in August, 1798.

The X, Y, Z

ence

Meanwhile the commissioners' dispatches had been received in America. On March 19 Adams announced that they rendered peace no longer possible. In April they were published, the letters X, Y and correspondZ being used to designate the intermediaries; and their contents convinced a large majority of Americans that Adams was right. Congress authorized an increase in army and navy, and on June 21 Adams was widely applauded for his announcement that he would "never send another minister to France without assurances that he will [would] be received, respected, and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation."

Although peace was at an end, war was not begun. It was hoped that we might hang between the two. On July 7 Adams declared our treaties with France sus

American re

pended. An act of June 12 had already sus- prisals pended all commercial intercourse with her, and on June 15 merchant vessels were authorized to arm and to defend themselves against search, seizure, or interference by French vessels. On July 8 authority was given to naval vessels to capture any armed French vessels, and the president was empowered to commission privateers to do the same. As practically all French merchantmen sailed armed, this licence offered a wide field. Three hundred and sixty-five privateers were commissioned, France lost ninety ships, and several naval duels were fought.2

1 Adams, Influence of Grenville on Pitt's Foreign Policy, 67.

2 G. W. Allen, Our Naval War with France, Boston, etc., 1909; G. N. Tricoche, "Une page peu connue de l'histoire de France, la guerre francoaméricaine (1798-1801)," Revue Historique, 1904, lxxxv. 288–299.

trade

In order to avoid the losses to American merchants which would come from a closing of the trade with the West Indies, West Indian Adams, June 26, 1799, declared suspended the suspension of French commerce in the case of certain ports of San Domingo. That colony was then under the control of Toussaint L'Ouverture, and its political connection with France was but slight. It is probable, also, that American merchants even continued to supply the more loyal islands of Guadaloupe and Martinique by means of collusive captures. Hostilities therefore brought little inconvenience to the United States, and, as for danger, Adams said that he no more expected to see a French army in America, than in heaven.1

The Blount conspiracy

Although we did not consider ourselves at war with France, we were fighting her. The policy of isolation had been in part deviated from. Were we going to give it up wholly by becoming the ally of England, and so be enmeshed in the general European conflict? There were many circumstances that rendered such an event probable and many men who desired it. The new British minister, Liston, proved pleasing. He won confidence at once, in 1797, by helping to disclose a project of William Blount, senator from Tennessee, for a joint expedition of frontiersmen and the British fleet to seize Louisiana and put it under the control of Great Britain. Impeached by the House of Representatives, Blount resigned to escape conviction, and was promptly elected governor of his state; his plan serves to show how minds in the West were turning. Since Spain was loath to live up to the treaty of 1795, it was becoming doubtful whether that settlement would prove permanent; Great Britain, therefore, in becoming the enemy of Spain, became the natural friend of the frontiersman.

For similar reasons Miranda left France, now the ally of Spain, and sought England, where in 1797 he was once more deep in the confidence of Pitt. His plans resembled those

1 Hildreth, United States, v. 267–270.

of 1790, except that the United States had swum into his ken. He would now give the Floridas and New Orleans to that country, "the Mississippi being in every re- Miranda's spect the best and most solid barrier that one plan can establish between the two great nations which occupy the American continent." England was to have Porto Rico and other islands. To all these nations-England, the United States, and Spanish America-the use of the isthmuses of Panama and Nicaragua was to be guaranteed. The instruments to secure all this were to be the United States army, the English navy, and Spanish-American discontent.1

These plans were accepted with enthusiasm by Rufus King, who communicated them to Pickering, our secretary of state, and to Hamilton, who under Washing- Federalists' ton commanded the new army. The plan plans for war pleased Hamilton. He wrote to Senator Gunn of Georgia, December 22, 1798: "This, you perceive, looks to offensive operations. If we are to engage in war, our game will be to attack where we can. France is not to be considered as separated from her ally. Tempting objects will be within our grasp." King wrote, October 20, 1798, "Things are here, as we could desire: there will be precisely such a cooperation as we wish the moment we are ready;" and again, on January 21, 1799: "For God's sake, attend to the very interesting subject treated of in my ciphered dispatches to the Secretary of State of the 10th, 18th, & 19th instant. Connect it, as it should be, with the main object, the time to accomplish which has arrived. Without superstition, Providence seems to have prepared the way, and to have pointed out the instruments of its will. Our children will reproach us if we neglect our duty, and humanity will escape many scourges if we act with wisdom and decision." On March 22 he wrote less hopefully to the secretary of state, "one is tired with beholding, and with endeavoring in vain to account for the blindness that even yet prevents an honest 1 Robertson, Miranda, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1907, i. 189–539.

and general confederacy against the overbearing Power of France." On March 12, 1799, Dr. Edward Stevens was appointed consul-general to San Domingo, to enter into relations with Toussaint L'Ouverture, and to coöperate with the English consul in encouraging the independence of the island. It is significant that Hamilton was at this time in touch with Wilkinson.1

Dr. Logan's mission for peace

Whatever advantages this plan might have secured to the United States, it certainly involved the abandonment of the policy of neutrality. It involved also the risk of internal disunion. How widely apart the opposing factions in the nation were already leaning is indicated by the mission of Dr. Logan, a Philadelphia Quaker, who went to France in 1798 to treat for peace upon his own account. Instead of passports he carried letters from Jefferson and from Thomas McKean, chief justice of Pennsylvania. In 1799 such private missions were prohibited by law, but his action is symptomatic of the way in which a war with France would have divided the nation.

tiate

Talleyrand had intended by his bullying to produce, not war, but money. American hostility was inconvenient to France; actual war and alliance with England Talleyrand offers to nego- on the part of the United States might be dangerous to her. Moreover, the French expedition to Egypt had proved disappointing, and in his brain were revolving American projects which required, for the time, peace with the United States. On September 28, 1798, therefore, he informed William Vans Murray, our minister at The Hague, that any minister whom the United States might send would

1 George Gibbs, Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John Adams, 2 vols., New York, 1846; J. Q. and C. F. Adams, John Adams, i. 516 ff.; John Adams, Works, vols. iii., viii., app.; C. R. King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King (6 vols., New York, 1894-1900), vol. ii.; Hamilton, Works (ed. Lodge), vol. viii. (ed. Hamilton), vol. v.; "Letters of Toussaint Louverture and of Edward Stevens, 1798-1800," Amer. Hist. Review, 1910, i. 64-101.