The Evolution of CooperationThe much-discussed book that explores how cooperation can emerge in a world of self-seeking egoists--whether superpowers, businesses, or individuals--when there is no central authority to police their actions."A remarkable mixture of theoretical analysis, anecdotal evidence, and a most unusual mode of empirical research...In it he applies the prisoner's dilemma to topics ranging from collusion among large corporations to U.S. involvement in Vietnam."--James L. Gould and Carol Grant Gould, "Sciences" "A fascinating contribution to the theory of cooperation, and written in a clear, informal style that makes it a joy to read." "--Times Literary Supplement (London)" |
Contents
The Problem of Cooperation | 3 |
The Emergence of Cooperation | 25 |
The Success of TIT FOR TAT in Computer Tournaments | 27 |
The Chronology of Cooperation | 55 |
Cooperation Without Friendship or Foresight | 71 |
The LiveandLetLive System in Trench Warfare in World War I | 73 |
The Evolution of Cooperation in Biological Systems with William D Hamilton | 88 |
Advice for Participants and Reformers | 107 |
Conclusions | 143 |
The Social Structure of Cooperation | 145 |
The Robustness of Reciprocity | 169 |
TOURNAMENT RESULTS | 192 |
PROOFS OF THE THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS | 206 |
NOTES | 216 |
| 223 | |
| 231 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
actually altruism analysis Anatol Rapoport average score based on reciprocity behavior best strategy better biological chapter choice collectively stable strategy Computer Chess Computer Tournament conflict coop cooperation based decision rule developed discount parameter E. O. Wilson effective emergence of cooperation entries environment eration evolution of cooperation evolutionarily stable strategy evolutionary example exploit forgiving future game theorists Gordon Tullock hypothetical tournaments important incentive interaction invade TIT iterated Prisoner's Dilemma JOSS less live-and-let-live system Maynard Smith meanies ment mutant mutual cooperation mutual defection neighbors never cooperate newcomer nice rules nice strategy NYDEGGER once other's outcome pattern payoff matrix player cooperates player defects points population possible previous move Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament problem programs promote cooperation proposition provocable punishment random reputation response restraint retaliation robust second round side situation submitted successful rules TAT players territorial system theory tion TIT FOR TAT tive tournament results tournament score trench warfare