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Another distinction between a remainder and a reversion, is that a reversion is never created by deed or writing, but arises from construction of law, whereas a remainder can never be limited but by either deed or devise.-2 Black. Com. 175, 317; Noy's Max. ch. 28; Watk. Convey. by Coventry, 190, &c.; Doe v. Lynes, 3 B. and Cr. 388; Burt. Comp. p. 14, &c.

Another and a principal difference between a remainder and a reversion is, that to the latter belongs the actual or supposed fruits of seignory; whence it follows, that if a remainder-man grant an estate commensurate with the prior interest in the land, nothing passes; but if a reversioner makes such a grant, the fruits of seignory will pass, and the conveyance is, therefore, good.-2 Prest. on Abstracts of Title, 86. 87; Badger v. Lloyd, Salkeld, 232; Lord Raym. 523, S.C.; Duncomb v. Duncomb, 3 Lev. 437; Bacon's Abr. tit. "Remainder and Reversion," Introd.; 1 Week. Law Mag. 296; Watk. Convey. ch. 16, and p. 194, note (a) by Coventry.

For the definition of, and distinction between, remainders and reversions, the student should consult Co. Litt. 143; Mr. Butler's examination and explanation of Lord Coke's definition in his first chapter of the "Essay on Contingent Remainders; "the title "Remainder" in Bacon's Abridgment, written by the late Lord C. B. Gilbert; 1 Abridgm. of Preston on "Abstracts of Title," in 1 Week. Law Mag. 279 (44), and 295 (49), &c.; Burton's Comp. ch. 1, s. 1; 1 Steph. Com. ch. 7. The difference between Blackstone (2 Com. 164) and Coke (Co. Litt. 143a) in defining a remainder, is noticed by Mr. Serjeant Stephen (1 Com. p. 295, note (9); Watk. Convey. chap. 13 and 16.

3. Is there any, and what, difference in the manner of barring an estate tail in freeholds and one in copyholds?

Ans. By 3 & 4 W. 4, s. 15, every actual tenant in tail, whether in possession, remainder, contingency, or otherwise, shall have full power to dispose of for an estate in fee simple absolute, or for any less estate, the lands entailed as against all persons claiming the land by force of any estate tail which shall be vested in, or might be claimed by, or which, but for some previous act, would have been vested in, or might have been claimed by, the person making the dispositions, at the time of his making the same, and also as against all persons whose estates are to take effect after the determination or in defeazance of any such estate tail. But by s. 40 every disposition of lands [other than copyholds] by a tenant in tail shall be effected by some one of the assurances, not being a will, by which such tenant in tail could have made the disposition of his estate were an estate at law in fee simple absolute. The disposition must be made or evidenced by deed, but no disposition contract, even for a valuable consideration, and though evidenced a deed is of any force either at law or in equity. If the tenant in tail is a married woman, the concurrence of her husband is necessary, and the

deed must be acknowledged by her before a commissioner, &c. By s. 41 every assurance by a tenant in tail, except a lease for 21 years at a rack rent, or not less than five-sixths of a rack rent, will be inoperative unless inrolled in Chancery within six months after the execution thereof The disposition of estates tail in copyholds is thus provided for. 1stly. Where the tenant has an estate at law. By s. 5 of 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 74, all the previous clauses in that Act, so far as circumstances and the different tenures will admit, shall apply to lands held by copy of court roll, except that a disposition of any such lands under this Act by a tenant in tail thereof, whose estate shall be an estate at law, shall be surrender. 2nd. As to the case of a tenant having an estate in equity merely; by s. 5 a disposition of any such lands under this Act by a tenant in tail thereof, whose estate shall be merely an estate in equity, may be made either by surrender, or by a deed as hereinafter provided. By s. 43, such a tenant of such lands may by deed dispose of them in the same manner in every respect as he could have done if they had been of freehold tenure. The deed must be entered on the court rolls, or it will be void against any person claiming such lands, for a valuable consideration under a subsequent assurance, duly entered on the rolls prior to such preceding assurance. By s. 54, no inrolment of a disposition of copyholds is required, otherwise than by entry on the court rolls. See 1 Weekly Law Magazine, pp. 106, 216.

4. When A. by bargain and sale conveys to B. and his heirs, to the use of Z. and his heirs, what estates do B. and Z. take?

Ans. It was at a very early period after the Statute of Uses decided that a bargain and sale in such a case as the above, gave B. the legal estate; for from the very nature of the assurance B. had, in the first instance, an use merely, and there can be no use upon an use. It follows, therefore, that Z. has what is denominated a trust estate, in other words, an estate not executed by the Statute of Uses.-Com. Dig. tit. "Bargain and Sale" (B. 3); "Chancery " (4 W. 2); Popham, 81; Bendloe, 61; Dyer, 155, pl. 20; 1 Anderson, 37, 136! 1 Prest. on Abst., 307; Abridgment of same, in 1 Week. Law Mag., 231; Noy's Max., 305, 309, notes by Bythewood; 2 Story's Eq, Jurisp. 212; Sharrington v. Storton, Plowd. 301; Bacon's Abr. tit. "Uses and Trusts" (E.); 2 Black. Com. 335.

5. If a testator, having estates vested in him in trust or by way of mortgage, devise in a general manner all his real and personal estate. will those trust estates or mortgages pass by that general devise?

Ans. The general rule with respect to the words of a general devise, which will pass mortgage property, is this:-1st, there must be words sufficient to pass the mortgaged property; 2ndly, the property must not be limited to uses inapplicable to mortgage property.-Doe v. Reade, 8 Term. Rep. 118; Lord Braybrooke v. Inskip, 8 Ves. 417; Sylvester v. Jarman, 10 Price, 76; Shelf. Will Act, p. 60-62; Burton's Comp. s. 611; Coote on Mort. 585.

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As to trust estates, a will containing words large enough to comprehend trust estates, and no expression in it authorising a narrower construction than the general legal construction, nor any such disposition of the estate as is unlikely for a testator to make of any property not in the strictest sense his, as complicated limitations, nor any purpose at all inconsistent with as probable an intention to vest it in his devisee as to let it descend, will include trust estates. Lord Braybrooke v. Inskip, 8 Ves. 434; Burton's Comp. s. 611; Shelf. Will. Act. 62-65; 1 Sand. Us. 358; Galliers v. Moss, 9 B. & Cr. 267 ; Mather v. Thomas, 10 Bing. 44; Exp. Barber, 5 Sim. 451.

6. If a devise be now made to A. and his heirs, in trust to apply the rents for specified purposes, for a limited time, and then in trust for B. and his heirs, in whom is the legal estate vested?

Ans. The legal estate will be in the trustee or his heirs, until the limited period shall have expired, and then if the trust for B. and his heirs is not such an one as requires that the trustee should have the legal estate for the purpose of carrying out the intentions of the testator -as, for example, to pay over the profits to a married woman for her separate use-B. and his heirs will have the legal estate.-2 Will. Saund. 11; Kenrick v. Beauclerk, 3 Bos. and P. 178; Harton v. Harton, 7 Term Rep. 652; Noy's Max. 311, notes by Bythewood. If the devise had been to A., without more, and the trust had been such as to require that it should have endured beyond the limited time, then the trustee would have taken the legal estate in fee.-7 W. 4, and 1 Vict., c. 26.

7. Where A. conveys by lease and release to B., his heirs and assigns, to the use of Z., his heirs and assigns, what estates do B. and Z. take?

Ans. Under such a conveyance Z. will take the legal estate, as B. would be in by the common law, and the conveyance operating by transmutation of possession, the Statute of Uses would transfer the possession (of B.) to the use (viz., to Z., the party who would, previous to the Statute of Uses, have had the use).-See Samme's Case, 13 Coke's Rep. 56; Long v. Buckeridge, 1 Stra. 111; Gilb. Rep. 16, 17; Co. Litt., 271, notes; Burton's Comp., ch. 1, s. 2; Bacon's Abridgm. tit. "Uses and Trusts" (E.); Noy's Max., p. 305, notes by Bythewood. If in the above question the conveyance had been to the use of B., or unto and to the use of B. in trust for Z., then B. would take the legal estate, and Z. would have an equitable estate only. The reason is that there cannot be an use upon an use, or in other words, that the statute only executes the first use; consequently the statute operates to give B. the legal estate, by transferring his possession to the use for himself, and then the force of the statute is spent.-Bacon's Reading on the Stat. of Uses, 43; Tracts, 335, 2nd ed.; Tyrell's Case, Dyer, 155*; Gilb. Uses, 161; Gerland v. Sharp, Cro. Eliz. 882; Att.-Gen. v. Scott, Cas. temp. Talbot, 139; Burton's Comp. p. 52, ed. by Cooper; 1 Sand. Us. 155.

8. How does an appointment under a power, in a conveyance or settlement, affect the estate, and the conveyance or settlement of it?

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Ans. Appointments under powers in conveyances to uses operate in like manner as if the appointment had been a limitation of use in the original conveyance; and they defeat, by way of substitution, either wholly or partially, the uses in the original conveyance.-Abridgm. of Preston on Abstracts, in 2 Week. Law Mag. 6; Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 16; Maundrell v. Maundrell, 10 Ves. 266; Co. Litt. 216a, n. (2), 2715, n. (1).

9. What is meant by tacking a mortgage, and how can this be effected?

Ans. Where there are several-for instance, three-mortgages on an estate, if the third mortgagee buy in the first mortgage, he acquires a title in law, and having equal equity, will, in the language of the cases, squeeze out the second mortgagee. This is called tacking a mortgage.-1 Maddock's Pract. Chanc. ch. 6; 2 Black. Com. 160, note (16) by Hovenden; Bacon's Abridgment, tit. "Mortgage" " (E); Com. Dig. tit. "Chancery" (4 A. 10). But a third mortgagee can only tack where he has advanced his money bonâ fide, and without notice of the second mortgage.-2 Freem. 6, 14; Marsh v. Lee, 2 Vent. 337; 1 Ch. Ca. 172; Toulmin v. Steere, 3 Meriv. 224; Cator v. Cooley, 1 Cox, 182; White v. Hillacre, 4 Jur. 102; Grugeon v. Gerrard, 4 You & C. 119.

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So a first mortgagee, lending a further sum of money to the mortgagor upon a judgment, may retain, even as against, a mesne mortgagee (without notice of the latter's charge), till both the mortgage and judgment be paid.—2 P. Will. 494; 2 Atk. 352; 16 Ves. 397. mortgage may be tacked to a judgment.-Smithson v. Thompson, 1 Atk. 520. A bond cannot be tacked to a mortgage as against creditors -1 Ves. Jun. 513; 3 Bro. C. C. 23.

10. Can a husband act, to any, and what extent, for his wife, as executrix without her consent?

Ans. If the husband of a woman named executrix would have his wife to take upon her the execution of the will, and to prove the same, but she will not assent thereto, in this case the spiritual court will not fasten the executorship upon the wife against her will.-Godolph. Pt. 2, c. 10, s. 1; Wentw. Office of Exc. 376, 14th ed.; Da Rosa v. Da Pinna, cited 2 Cas. temp. Lee, 390. But if the husband, though the will be not proved, administer as in the wife's right, though against her consent, she will thereby be so far bound and concluded, as that during his life she cannot decline or avoid the executorship.-Wentw. Off. Exec. 378, 14th ed.; 1 Salk. 306; Thrustout v. Coppin, 2 W. Black. 802. But after his death she may refuse, if he has never intermeddled with the administration.-Stokes v. Porter, Dyer, 166; Benyon v. Gollins, 2. Bro. C. C. 323. Where the wife was single at the time of testator's death, her subsequent husband's acceptance of the

executorship will bind her, and she can never afterwards refuse.— Wentw. Off. Exec. 379, 14th ed.; Williams on Exec. Pt. 1, b. 3, ch. 1, p. 130, 2nd ed.

The husband has the power of disposition over the personal estate vested in his wife as executrix, &c.- Jenk. Cent. 2, case 79; Arnold v. Bidgood, Cro. Jac. 318; Thrustout v. Coppin, 2. W. Black. 801; 3 Wils. 277, S. C.; Wentw. Off. Ex. 381, 14th ed.; Dyer, 183. Therefore he may release debts, &c., owing to the testator, &c.—Bro. Abr. tit. "Releases," pl. 29; 5 Co. Rep. 27ь; 1 Rop. Husb. and W. 188, 2nd ed.; 2 Will. Exec. pt. 3, b. 1, ch. 4, pp. 608, 609, 2nd ed. 11. What searches should be made by a purchaser's solicitor previously to completing a purchase, and where should they be made, and for what time?

Ans. A search should be made for judgments effecting the vendor's lands. This must be made at the office of the Senior Master of the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster, whose duty it is to receive particulars of judgments and enter the same in a book which is kept in his office for searches to be made.-1 & 2 Vict. c. 1 & 2, s. 19; 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11. The search need not extend over a period of more than five years; as, by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, a judgment though registered shall be void after five years from the registration, as against purchasers, &c., unless a fresh registry be made within five years before the execution of the conveyance, &c., transferring the legal or equitable title, &c. If the vendor's lands be situated in a register county, the register of that county should also be searched. If the vendor be supposed to be a Crown debtor, &c., a similar search to that for judgments should be made.-2 & 3 Vict. c 11; Abridgm. of Prest. on Abstracts, in 2 Week. Law Mag. 41-43.

If the defendant reside in a register county a search should be made in the registry of that county for mortgages and other incumbrances.— See 2 & 3 Anne, c. 4; 6 Anne, c. 35; 5 & 6 Anne, c. 18; 7 Anne, c. 20, 8 Geo. 2, c. 6; 25 Geo. 2, c. 4; Sugd. Vend. & P. 693, 8th ed.; 2 Black. Com. 343; Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, ch. 11; Abridgm. of Prest. Abst. in 2 Week. Law Mag. 41.

12. Can a mortgagee of leasehold estates be protected, and how, from liability for rent and covenants in the original lease?

Ans. A mortgagee of a leasehold estate should not take an assignment of his mortgagor's lease, as he would thereby become liable for the rent and on the other covenants even without entry.-Williams v. Bosanquet, 1 Brod. and B. 238; Coote's Landl. and Ten. 323, 324. But the transfer of a mere equitable interest will not make the party assignee, and a mortgagee should therefore obtain a deposit of the lease as a security for his advance, without any assignment. This deposit, though it creates a right enforceable in equity, passes no interest at law.-Doe dem. Maslin v. Roe, 5 Esp. 105; Coote's Landl. and Ten. 307. The contrary, indeed, was decided in Lucas v. Comerford, 8 Sim. 499, and

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