Lyndhurst in Honnor v. Morton, 3 Russ. 65; 2 Week. Law Mag. 77; ́and see 2 Jac. & W. 456; 1 Roper's Husb. & Wife, ch. 6, sec. 2.

13. If a legal estate descend to an infant, what are the proceedings necessary to procure a conveyance from him?

Ans. The statutes relating to conveyances by infants, are 11 Geo. 4, and 1 W. 4, c. 47, s. 11; 11 Geo. 4, and 1 W. 4, cc. 60, & 65.—The first relates to the case of a suit in Equity for payment of debts, where a Court of Equity has decreed the estates liable to such debts. The second statute relates to infants and trustees, or mortgagees-order to convey to be made upon petition (s. 11); but where there is a doubt as to the title of the person claiming a conveyance, a bill must be filed to establish the right (s. 12). But where the court by its decree declares that an infant heir is a trustee, and the right of the party entitled to a conveyance is established by that decree, the court will at the same time direct a conveyance by the infant heir, a petition for that purpose being unnecessary.—Broom v. Broom, 3 My. and K. 443; Miller v. Knight, 1 Keen, 129.

14. Will equity interfere to restrain proceedings on ejectment, for forfeiture of lease by breach of lessee's covenant to insure?

Ans. A court of equity will not in general relieve a tenant.—Green v. Bridges, 4 Simon 96; Thompson v. Guyon, 5 Simon, 95; Rolfe v. Harris, 2 Price, 206; Reynolds v. Pitt, ibid. 212; 19 Ves. 134. There may, however, be cases in which the lessor, has by his own misconduct, induced the lessee to break the covenant, in which equity would relieve, supposing it would not amount to a defence at law; but it has been held at nisi prius, that a lessor could not even recover at law under the circumstances.-Doe d. Pittman v. Sutton, 9 C. & P. 706. So where the landlord was at liberty to insure, if lessee did not, and to distrain for the amount.-Ibid.

16. In what cases can a subpœna be issued before a bill is filed?

Ans. In general it is necessary that the bill should be on the file before the subpoena can be issued, unless the bill pray that an injunction may be awarded against the defendant, in which case it is sufficient if the bill be filed on or before the day on which the subpoena is made returnable.-4 Anne, c. 16.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. When have magistrates jurisdiction over apprentices?

Ans. Considerable doubt existed until lately, whether magistrates had jurisdiction when no premium is paid; but now, by stat. 5 & 6 Vict, c. 7, it is enacted that all the provisions of stats. 20 G. 2, c. 19, 33 G. 3. c. 55, 4 G. 4, c. 29, and 32 G. 3, c. 27, shall be taken to extend to apprentices when no premium has been paid. In case of parish ap

prentices, magistrates have jurisdiction where the premium does not exceed £5.-32 G. 3, c. 27. In other cases, the limit is £2.-54 Geo. 4, c. 29. 2. How are robberies distinguished from larcenies?

Robbery (rapina of the civilians) is the felonious and forcible taking, from the person of another, of goods or money to any value, by violence or putting in fear. Larceny, as applied to thefts from the person, signifies the privately stealing.

3. Is the wrongfully taking title-deeds of a freehold estate, a criminal offence or only actionable, as of things 'savouring of the inheritance?'

Ans. At common law the stealing title-deeds not relating to realty was larceny of the parchment; but taking title-deeds of real estate was only actionable, but now, by 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, sec. 23, is a felony, punishable by transportation, or fine, or imprisonment.

4. Define arson, state what is the essential ingredient in the offence, and in what cases it is a capital offence.

Ans. Arson is the unlawfully and maliciously setting fire to any building or vessel, or casting away any vessel, unlawfully exhibiting any false light or signal, with intent to bring any vessel into danger, or preventing or impeding any person endeavouring to save his life from any ship in distress, setting fire to any mine of coal, or to any stack of corn, &c., with intent to injure or defraud any person.

The essential ingredients are the doing the act wilfully and the intent to injure some other person. In case of setting fire there must be an actual blazing, not a mere charring.—R. v. Parker, 9 C. & P. 45. If the building be a dwelling-house, and any person be therein, or if any person be on board the vessel, so that life will be endangered, the offence is capital.—7 W. 4, and 1 Vic. c. 89.

5. In what cases have justices of the peace jurisdiction to deliver possession of premises after the tenancy has been determined?

Ans. By 1 & 2 Vic. c. 27, two justices are einpowered to give possession when the tenant holds over after the expiration of the tenancy, where the tenancy was at will or for a term not exceeding seven years, and the rent not exeeeding £20 a-year.

6. In what cases may justices require sureties of the peace and for good behaviour respectively?

Ans. A justice may require sureties from any persons who make an affray in his presence, or threaten to beat or kill another, or contend with angry words, or go about with unusual weapons or attendants, to the terror of the people; from such as are brought before him by the constable for any actual breach of the peace, and from whom any individual swears that he is actually under fear of death or bodily harm. -1 Hawk. 60; 4 Black. Com. 255.

Binding to the good behaviour seems in its origin to have been a discretionary judgment at the common law, and is also by many statutes declared to be part of the judgment on an offender.-5 Burn's J., 316.

And justices of the peace are also empowered by the statute 34 Edw. 3, c. 1, to bind over to the good behaviour all them that be not of good fame. As to what persons are included under these words, see Dalt. c. 124 ; 1 Hawk. 61; 4 Cromp. 124; 4 Bl. Com. 256.

7. What must be proved in order to convict a man under the Vagrant Act for deserting his wife and children; and what is the punishment?

Ans. The Vagrant Act, 5 G. 4, c. 83, s. 4, enacts that every person running away and leaving his wife or his child or children chargeable, or whereby any of them shall become chargeable, to any parish, township, or place, shall be deemed a rogue and a vagabond, and may be committed by any justice on the oath of one witness to the house of correction to hard labour for any time not exceeding three calendar months. The commitment must aver that the wife or children were chargeable.

8. Can there be accessories in a case of concealment of birth?

Ans. The stat. 9 Geo. 1, c. 31, declares, that any woman concealing the birth of a child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. But in cases which are criminal but not capital, i. e. not felonies, there can be no accessories.—1 Hale's History of Pleas of Crown, 613. There cannot, therefore, be any accessories, strictly speaking, in cases of concealment of birth. It was formerly holden that there could not be even an accomplice; on the ground that if any person were present, though privy to the guilt, there could be no concealment by the mother.-R. v. Peat, 1 East. P. C. 229. But in a subsequent case, under 43 G. 3, it was decided by the judges, that a woman might be found guilty of concealment, although the birth was known to an accomplice.-R. v. Cornwall, Russ. & Ry. 336, Deacon's Criminal Law, tit. "Bastard."

9. What is a sufficient wounding to bring the case within the statute and what the instrument effecting it, and could the party be convicted supposing that if death had ensued the offence would not have amounted to murder?

Ans. The last statute is 7 W. 4, and 1 Vic. c. 85; the words of this are, stabbing, cutting, or wounding, with intent to main, disfigure, or disable such person, or to do some other grievous bodily harm, or with intent to resist the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person.

Any wound, therefore, inflicted with intent to do some grievous bodily harm is sufficient. What is grievous bodily harm is a question for the jury.-R. v. Cox, R. & R. 262. It is immaterial with what instrument the wound be inflicted. If the offence would not have amounted to murder, in case of death, the statute does not apply, and an acquital was directed by Bayley J. in R. v. Akenhead, 1 Holt, N. P. R. 469. But in the recent case of R. v. Nicholls, 9 C. & P. 267, Baron Gurney held it immaterial whether the offence would have been murder or manslaughter.

10. In what cases can a wife's evidence be received against a husband?

Ans. As a general rule, husband and wife cannot be witnesses against each other.-1 Phil. 84, R. v. Cliviger, 2 T. R. 263. But in cases of personal injury to the wife, she is ex necessitate admitted as evidence against her husband.—1 Str. 633, R. v. Whitehouse, 2 Russ. 606. In cases where the marriage is not legal, the evidence is admissible, as in an indictment for bigny, after the first marriage is proved, the second wife may be a witness.—1 Hale, 693; 1 East. P. C. 469. And in cases of forcible abduction and marriage, her evidence is admissible.-Gilb. Ev. 202; 1 Hale, 302, B. N. P. 286.

11. Define an unlawful assembly and a riot respectively; what is necessary to constitute a beginning to demolish within the statute, and what is sufficient to constitute an actual demolition?

Ans. If parties assemble in a tumultuous manner, and actually execute their purpose with violence, it is a riot; but if they meet upon a purpose which, if executed, would make them rioters, and having done nothing, they separate without carrying their purpose into effect, it is an unlawful assembly.—Per Patteson, J., in R. v. Birt and others, 5 C. & P. 154. The jury must be satisfied that the intention was really to demolish the house; if, therefore, they separate after having done considerable damage to the house, but there being nothing to prevent them doing more if they had chosen, this was held to be evidence of their having completed their real purpose.-Per Littleton, J., R. v. Thomas, 4 C. & P. 237; and see Reg. v. Howell, 9 C. & P. 437. Nothing short of the actual demolition of the very walls of the building is contemplated by the provisons of the Act.-Reg. v. Adams, 1 Car. & M. 299.

12. When does the fraudulent appropriation of moneys or goods entrusted to a servant or other person become theft, and when only embezzlement ?

Ans. The distinction between a wrongful taking, and a conversion consequent on a lawful possession, constitutes the line of separation between theft and embezzlement, the former of which embraces acts of unlawful taking and removing, though no complete appropriation be affected, whilst to the latter some kind of actual misappropriation is essential.-Prefatory remarks to 4th Rep. of Crim. Law Com.; 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 27, and c. 29, s. 46; R. v. Williams, 6 C. & P. 626; R. V. Thornley, R. & M. 343; R. v. Snowley, 4 C. & P. 390; R. v. Hughes, R. & M. 370; R. v. John Murray, R. & M. 276, 5 C, & P. 145, S. C.; R. v. Jenkins, 9 C. & P. 38.

13. To what extent have magistrates jurisdiction in trespass to personal or real personal, and when is such jurisdiction taken away?

Ans. By 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, s. 24, it is enacted that if any person wilfully or maliciously commit any damage, injury, or spoil, to or upon any real or personal property, either of a public or private nature, for which no remedy or punishment is before provided, every such person shall pay such sum of money, as shall appear to the justice to be a

reasonable compensation for the damage, &c., not exceeding £5. This provision does not apply where the party trepassing acted under a fair and reasonable supposition that he had a right to do the act complained of; nor to any trespass, not being wilful and malicious, committed in hunting, fishing, or in pursuit of game.

14. What is now necessary to obtain an order of affiliation in bastardy against the putative father of a bastard?

Ans. Formerly the oath of the mother was sufficient to charge the putative father.-1 Black. Com. 458. But by 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, the oath of the mother must be corroborated in some material particular by other testimony to the satisfaction of the court; and this corroborative evidence in some matter essential to sustain the charge, must appear on the order.-Reg. v. Read, 1 Per. and Dav. 413.

CONVEYANCING.

1. State the distinction between an estate in tail general, and an estate in tail special.

Ans. An estate tail general is where lands and tenements are given to one, and the heirs of his body begotten: which is called tail general, because, how often soever such donee in tail be married, his issue in general by all and every such marriage is, in successive order, capable of inheriting the estate tail per formam doni.—2 Black. Com. 113; Co. Litt. 19; Litt. ss. 14, 15; Bacon's Abr. tit. "Estate in Tail" (C.); Com. Dig. tit. "Estates," (B. 4). See also Co. Litt., 13, 25o; Litt. s. 31; Burton's Compend s. 647; Doe v. Featherstone, 1 B. & Adol. 944; 1 Steph. Com. 230.

Tenant in tail special is where the gift is restrained to certain heirs of the donee's body, and does not go to all of them in general. This may happen several ways. 2 Black. Com. 113, 114; Litt. ss. 16, 26-9; Bacon's Abridgm. tit. "Estate in Tail" (C.); Com. Dig. tit. "Estates," (B. 5); ; Co. Litt. 20o, 25, 26a ; Hobart, 84, 172; Burton's Comp. s. 647; Doe v. Featherstone, 1 B. & Adol. 944; 1 Steph. Com. 130; Watk. Convey. by Morley & Coote, p. 113, &c.

2. Is there any, and what, difference between a remainder and a reversion?

Ans. The chief distinction between a remainder and a reversion in their creation, is that a remainder is the remnant of an estate in land depending upon a particular estate, and created with it.-Co. Litt. 49a, 143; Com. Dig. tit. (B. 13); 2 Black. Com. 164, 175; Burt. Comp. s. 28, and note by Cooper.

A reversion is the residue of the estate remaining in a grantor, &c., on a grant, &c., of a smaller estate, and which will return to the grantor or his heirs after the grant is over.-2 Black. Com. 175; Com. Dig. tit. " Estates" (B. 10); Litt. s. 19; Co. Litt. 22b; Dyer's Rep. 237; see 1 Steph. Com. 290, 291, and note (f).

B