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tion in the internal affairs of a state is a law which admits of no exception to foreign powers, so long as the operations of that state are confined in their effect to the limits of the national territory."1
Nevertheless, the United States interfered in the affairs of Cuba on the ground of humanity. The President, in his message of April 11, 1898, says, after a long statement of the facts : "I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action."2 By joint resolution of Congress of April 20, 1898, demand was made upon Spain to relinquish its authority in Cuba, and the President was authorized to use land and naval forces to carry the resolution into effect.3
(4) In time of civil war, on invitation of both parties, a foreign state may act as mediator, but unless the revolting party has been recognized, this is mediation in a domestic sense rather than intervention in the sense of international law.
Under other conditions there is a diversity of view as to the proper course of action.4 Some deny with Vattel, G. F. de Martens, Heffter, Fiore, Bluntschli, Woolsey, and others maintain or permit intervention in civil war at the request of one of the parties, though some of the authorities do not permit intervention except on the invitation of the parent state and not on that of the rebelling party. Bluntschli (§ 476) and Wool- 1 Walker, p. 151.
* Ann. Cycl. 1898, p. 159; U. S. For. Rel., 1898, p. 760.
» 30 U. S. Sts. at Large, 738. * Bluntschli, § 477.
sey (§42) admit intervention only in behalf of the party representing the state; Vattel and some others permit intervention in behalf of the party which the intervening state considers to have the right of the contest, thus opening the arbitration of the contest to a foreign state. Both of these positions are receiving less and less of sanction. Intervention in behalf of the established state implies a doubt as to which power within the state is the defacto power, and as Hall says: "the fact that it has been necessary to call in foreign help is enough to show that the issue of the conflict would without it be uncertain, and consequently that there is a doubt as to which side would ultimately establish itself as the legal representative of the state."1 It is plain to see that intervention in behalf of the rebelling party is a violation of the independence of the existing state. It is equally clear that international law does not give a foreign state a right to judge upon the justice or merits of domestic questions in another state.
The principle may now be regarded as established by both theory and practice that the invitation of neither party to a domestic strife gives a right to a foreign state to intervene, and that no state has a right to judge as to the merits of the contest and to interfere in behalf of the party it thinks in the right. Indeed, intervention because of civil war only is in no case justifiable, though the consequences of such a disturbance may warrant intervention upon other grounds.2
(5) Intervention on the ground of financial transactions is not now sanctioned. A state may make any injustice done its subjects by a foreign state a matter i § 94, p. 307. 11 Hertslet, 664 ff.
of diplomatic negotiations. It has sometimes been held that contracts running between a state and the subject or subjects of another state may, if violated, become grounds of just intervention, and that the subjects had a right to demand action by their sovereign. This ground is manifestly insufficient, though each state is judge as to what measures it will take in a given case. International law does not guarantee the payment of loans which are merely personal transactions between the individual and the state in its corporate capacity, nor can the public law of one state be expected to hold in another. Interference on such grounds is a matter of expediency and not a matter of right.
(e) Conclusion. In general, the best authorities seem to agree that at the present time, owing to the ease with which other measures may be taken, intervention can be admitted only on the single ground of self-preservation. The numerous cases of intervention upon varied grounds amply show that any other ground would be open to wide abuse, as has often been the case. For general purposes of remedy for injury such measures as retorsion, reprisals, embargo, and pacific blockade may be taken when a state deems it expedient and is willing to assume the responsibility for such measures.1 While intervention is, for the sake of preserving the existence of a state, a justifiable measure, it is not a right, but merely a means sometimes justifiable to preserve a right, — the right of a state to exist, which alone supersedes the obligation of non-intervention.
i See ch. XV.
43. Equality In General.
44. Inequalities Among States.
(a) Court precedence.
(6) Matters of ceremonial.
(c) Weight of influence in affairs.
§ 43. Equality in General
The equality of states was an early premise of international law. This equality, however wide may have been its meaning, as interpreted by some of the earlier writers, can now be held to extend only to legal status. A state from its very being as a sovereign unity must be legally equal to any other state. Only those states members of the international circle are regarded as possessed of this equality from the point of view of international law. So far as legal attributes as states extend, the states members of the international circle are equal, yet that their weight in the world of affairs may vary by virtue of other circumstances must be admitted. The legal status of states is the same; regardless of the form of state organization, whether monarchy or republic; regardless of origin, whether by division or union of former states or even if created in a region hitherto outside the jurisdiction of any state; regard less of area, population, wealth, influence, etc.; regardless of relations to other states provided sovereignty is not impaired; regardless of any change in the form of state organization, as from a republic to a monarchy or even of a temporary lapse in the exercise of sovereignty.
§ 44. Inequalities among States
While all states, members of the family of states, are equal in international law so far as their legal attributes are concerned, they may be very unequal in other respects.
(a) One of the oldest marks of inequality is that of court precedence, which for many years was a fertile source of difficulty, and was at last settled to the extent of ranking by title of diplomatic representative by the Congress of Vienna in 1815.1
(6) Inequalities in matters of ceremonial of various kinds have not disappeared. These may be based upon tradition or conventional grounds, and frequently give rise to difficulties if disregarded. These ceremonials may be (1) political as between the sovereigns in their official personal capacity as emperors, kings, dukes, etc.,
(2) court and diplomatic in interstate negotiations,
(3) treaty as in alternat or in the alphabetical signing of treaties, (4) maritime ceremonial in salutes, etc.
(e) Inequalities in weight of influence in affairs.
(1) In Europe there is distinctly recognized in political practice an inequality of the states, and they are classed as "the great powers," "the minor powers," i See § 70 (6).